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This thesis examines the period in command of British land forces during the 
American War of Independence of Sir William Howe. The previously untapped 
resource of a draft of Howe’s famous narrative to the House of Commons underpins 
the original contribution made by this thesis, which also draws original conclusions 
from more familiar documents. Howe’s command is considered in the light of four 
major factors: his relationship with subordinate officers; the composition and quality 
of his army; his relationship with the American Secretary, Lord George Germain; and 
his personal qualities and experience. These four factors are then combined to 
consider key tactical and strategic decisions made by Howe while in command of the 
British army in North America. No attempt has been made to examine every decision 
or event during Howe’s period in command. Rather, those most contentious and 
controversial events, and those that can be reconsidered using new evidence and new 
interpretations of existing evidence, have been focussed on. This thesis does not (nor 
was it intended to) systematically counter the prevailing opinions of Howe set down 
over more than two centuries of historical works. However, it can be seen that Howe 
had more reasonable grounds for some of his most contentious decisions than has 
previously been argued and his overall strategy for 1776 was more coherent than he is 
generally given credit for.  
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Introduction 
The American War of Independence has provided fertile ground for historians, with 
many thousands of books considering myriad elements of the conflict. New 
interpretations of the war appear every year, yet one of the major figures has been 
neglected. William Howe, who commanded at battles including Bunker Hill, Long 
Island and White Plains, and who was largely responsible for the formulation of 
British strategy for the first two campaigns of the war, has not been considered in the 
depth afforded to other British commanders, including Henry Clinton and John 
Burgoyne. This is not, however, because he is considered to be an uninteresting 
subject; Howe is one of the most enigmatic figures in the war and would undoubtedly 
have featured far more prominently in many of the existing histories were it not for 
one simple problem: an apparently crippling lack of primary sources on which to 
draw. The papers of Howe’s older brother, the admiral Lord Richard Howe, were 
destroyed in a fire and it is assumed that the general’s papers were also being kept in 
the library at the family house at Westport, Ireland.1 Unless Howe’s papers are one 
day found, any historian tackling him must deal with limited resources. Bellamy 
Partridge’s Sir Billy Howe, the only biography written on Howe, may be largely 
superficial, but Partridge is probably correct when he suggests that many writers will 
have started out to produce a book on Howe, only to ‘turn sadly away’2 when 
confronted with the scarcity of source material. 
More primary sources would doubtless be beneficial to an understanding of 
Howe, but the absence of a large collection does not make it impossible to come to a 
clearer understanding of this intriguing character. A large number of letters to, from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Bellamy Partridge, Sir Billy Howe (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1932), p. viii.  
2  Ibid., p. vii.  
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or concerning the general does exist, although they are scattered throughout various 
collections. We do not have the luxury of perusing a personal diary in which Howe 
clearly explained the many puzzling moments in his command of British land forces 
in America during the 1776 and 1777 campaigns, but nor do we have to cope with a 
daunting quantity of written evidence such as that amassed by Sir Henry Clinton, 
Howe’s second-in-command, who felt the need to commit every thought to paper. 
The limited supply of Howe evidence imposes a certain discipline on anyone who 
chooses to study him; every sentence must be carefully considered to extract the 
maximum amount of information and if Howe’s true position on many key points 
may not be easily ascertained, it is often possible to combine elements from several 
sources to come to a plausible conclusion. 
Howe’s correspondence with the American Secretary, Lord George Germain, 
must form one of the cornerstones of any attempt to understand the general’s period 
in command. His letters tended to be limited to a rather dry recounting of events, but 
insights into his thinking were sometimes offered, at times in a curiously unguarded 
manner.3 More revealing of Howe’s mood while in America were the many 
memoranda made by Henry Clinton of private conferences with the commander-in-
chief. These are as close as we can get to personal journal entries informing us of how 
the general felt at several critical periods of the war and, even though presented 
through the prism of Clinton’s growing dissatisfaction with his commanding officer, 
they are hugely valuable.4 Further detail on Howe’s character can be gleaned from 
entries in various collections of papers, as well as printed memoirs, including several 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 (TNA) PRO, CO 5/92-95, Military Dispatches, 1774-1778; Lomas, S. C., ed., Report on the 
Manuscripts of Mrs Stopford-Sackville, Vol. I & Vol. II (London: Mackie & Co. Ltd, 1904 & 
1910); Parliamentary Register; or History of the Proceedings and Debates of the House of 
Commons during the Fifth Session of the Fourteenth Parliament of Great Britain, Vol. X 
(London: Wilson and Co. 1802). 
4 WCL, Henry Clinton Papers. 
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from officers who served under him. Such sources often also give valuable insight 
into various elements surrounding Howe’s command, including the quality of his 
army and the strength of his opponent.5  
When raw materials are so scarce, any new source is obviously extremely 
valuable, like finding a new seam in a mine that was thought to have been exhausted. 
The emergence of a draft of Howe’s famous ‘narrative’ to the House of Commons is 
just such a rare find.6 Although it is impossible to imagine that no one had read this 
document before it was purchased at the end of 2010 by the William L. Clements 
Library at the University of Michigan, it has apparently never been carefully studied 
with Howe’s performance as a general as the primary consideration. Sotheby’s 
auction notes from the sale of the Henry Strachey Papers declared that, although the 
collection had been known by historians since the end of the nineteenth century, it 
was not easily accessible (it was part of the personal collection of James S. Copley), 
and the portion containing the draft of Howe’s speech had never been published.7 
The draft has not been quoted in any book or paper, yet it offers a large 
amount of compelling new evidence on Howe’s own assessment of his command. By 
studying how his narrative changed from draft to delivery, we can discern where he 
believed himself to be vulnerable, and where he felt elements needed to be changed 
prior to public consumption. As well as the many subtle alterations highlighted by the 
draft, which give added insight into Howe’s cautious nature and his distaste for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Examples include WCL, Loftus Cliffe Papers; F. von Muenchhausen, At General Howe’s 
side, 1776-1778: the diary of General William Howe's aide de camp, translated by Ernst 
Kipping and annotated by Samuel Smith (Monmouth Beach, N.J.: Philip Freneau Press, 
1974); P. Padelford, ed., Colonial Panorama 1775: Dr. Robert Honyman’s Journal for March 
and April (Pasadena: San Pasqual Press, 1939); R. Lamb, Memoir of His Own Life, by R. 
Lamb, Serjeant in the Royal Welch Fuzileers (Dublin: J. Jones, 1811). 
6 WCL, Strachey Papers, Draft of Howe’s Narrative. 
7 Sotheby’s, The James S. Copley Library: The Henry Strachey Papers, (auction catalogue), 
Oct. 2010, p. 10. 
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punitive warfare, there is also the major revelation that he was let down by the 
Hessian contingent of his army at White Plains, and his apparent lack of concern over 
the progress of Burgoyne’s army from Canada, in 1777, is underlined by evidence 
suggesting he failed to understand fully what the Hudson strategy was meant to 
achieve. The draft is also notable for the level of confusion often evident in Howe’s 
effort to explain exactly what had happened in America during his period in 
command, although this is rather cold comfort for a historian attempting to do the 
same.  
Such a major new source of primary evidence inevitably forms a major part of 
this thesis, yet a new interpretation of Howe’s leadership is also possible simply by 
careful scrutiny of the documents that have been known about for decades or even 
centuries. These documents, including correspondence with Germain and with his 
fellow generals, have formed the basis of the small number of works to deal with 
Howe in depth, as well as a larger number in which he is just a bit player.8 In these 
works, Howe does not often emerge unscathed; he has been pilloried as an 
incompetent, a traitor, a slow-witted blunderer, a careless libertine, a man out of his 
depth – in short, the perfect opponent for the rebels’ own inexperienced leader, 
General George Washington.9  
Such criticism would have seemed unthinkable as Britain embarked on its 
unprecedented effort to win back control over the rebellious colonies in 1775. Howe 
was a highly regarded figure, having distinguished himself during the French and 
Indian War two decades previously and, most importantly, having demonstrated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Partridge, Sir Billy Howe; T. S. Anderson, The Command of the Howe Brothers During the 
American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936); I. D. Gruber, The Howe 
Brothers and the American Revolution (New York: Atheneum, 1972). 
9 W. B. Willcox, Portrait of a General: Sir Henry Clinton in the War of Independence (New 
York: Alfred A, Knopf, 1964). Willcox commented on the variety of accusations hurled at 
Howe and asserted that no conclusions could be drawn unless new evidence surfaced. 
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himself as a modern-thinking military man.10 Howe had gained valuable experience in 
effective light infantry tactics in North America, and had developed a system of drill 
for light infantry in 1774.11 He was considered both brave and innovative, yet just 
over two years after taking over the besieged British army at Boston, he was the 
subject of  a storm of protest over his lack of results. Two main charges stand out as 
most frustrating to Howe’s critics: his ponderousness and his inability to grasp 
repeated opportunities for a decisive victory.12 Regarding the former charge, Howe 
started as he meant to go on; after assuming command of the British army in August 
1775, he took a full year before mounting an offensive operation. When he did move, 
however, he moved with effect. He routed Washington’s forces at the Battle of Long 
Island (27 August 1776), but failed to complete his victory. Washington’s badly 
shaken army was able to evacuate under the noses of the British and regroup on York 
Island (now Manhattan). 
Howe proceeded to follow a repeating pattern. Slowness to move was 
followed time and again with operations that invited debate and dissent. He landed at 
Kip’s Bay when he might have landed further north and trapped Washington on 
Manhattan. He landed at Frog’s Neck when, again, a more imaginative movement 
could have placed his army behind the Americans. He landed at Pell’s Point and then 
shadowed the rebels’ none-too-hasty march to White Plains, where, unhurried by 
Howe, they were able to take up a commanding defensive position. Howe’s decisions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 A. O’Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America: British Command During the 
Revolutionary War and the Preservation of Empire (London: Oneworld Publications, 2013), 
pp. 83-84. 
11 NAM, ‘Discipline established by Major General Howe for Light Infantry in Battalion, 
Sarum September 1774’. 
12 Examples of the most vociferous criticism include J. Galloway, Letters to a Nobleman on 
Conduct of the War in the Middle Colonies (London: Printed for J. Wilkie, 1779), p. 47; I. 
Mauduit, Strictures on the Philadelphia Mischianza or Triumph Upon Leaving America 
Unconquered (London: Printed for J. Bew, Pater-Noster-Row, 1779), pp. 4-5. 
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were widely questioned by fellow officers, most notably Major General Sir Henry 
Clinton, who repeatedly pressed his idea of getting in the rear of the rebel army and 
trapping them en masse.13 Howe’s failure to assault the American lines at White 
Plains invited further criticism and, following the capture of Forts Washington and 
Lee, a ponderous pursuit of Washington’s disintegrating army brought the 1776 
campaign to a frustratingly inconclusive end. Washington was then able to put what 
was left of his army to good use with small, morale-boosting victories at Trenton and 
Princeton.  
Prior to these two setbacks, Howe’s conduct of the campaign had met with 
approval from his superiors (he was awarded the Order of the Bath) but several of his 
contemporaries, army and navy men alike, were dissatisfied with his painstaking 
approach and apparently excessive caution.14 Sir George Collier, of the frigate 
Rainbow, wrote of the ‘strange delay’15 between the Battle of Long Island and the 
landing on Manhattan, while Clinton criticised almost every decision made by 
Howe.16  
Events would show that 1776 was Howe’s high-water mark. Though 
questioned for his deliberate planning and slowness of movement, the campaign was a 
positive blur of activity compared to the one that followed. The key element to 
consider when attempting to understand Howe’s painfully slow progress in 1777 
appears to be the fact that, by April of that year, he felt that the administration at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 W. B. Willcox, ed., The American Rebellion: Sir Henry Clinton’s Narrative, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1954), p. 40, pp. 44-45, p. 48. 
14 Parliamentary Register, Vol. X, pp. 367-368, Germain to Howe, 18 Oct. 1776. 
15 C. Hibbert, Redcoats and Rebels: The War for America, 1770-1781 (London: Grafton, 
1993), p. 125.  
16  Detailing all of Clinton’s criticisms would take pages, but representative examples can be 
found for the failure to follow up the victory on Long Island, the decision to land at Kip’s Bay 
and the slow pursuit of Washington through New Jersey in Willcox, ed., The American 
Rebellion, pp. 43-44, p. 45 and pp. 55-56, respectively.  
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home had lost confidence in him.17 Howe’s request for a reinforcement of 15,000 
men at the end of 1776 was perhaps unrealistic given the extraordinary efforts made 
to put together an effective army for the opening campaign of the war, efforts that had 
stretched the cumbersome British military infrastructure to its limit and had required 
the hiring of German troops at considerable expense. When Lord George Germain 
(who admitted to being ‘really alarmed’18 at Howe’s request for such a large-scale 
reinforcement) attempted to fudge the numbers in an effort to satisfy him with less, 
Howe instantly pointed out that any hopes of ending the war in 1777 were therefore at 
an end.19 
It was in this frame of mind that Howe allowed months of campaigning 
weather to pass before finally removing his army from Jersey and travelling by sea to 
the Head of Elk. Howe then defeated Washington at the Brandywine, again drawing 
criticism (though with less justification here than at Long Island) for not turning an 
advantage into a decisive victory, before occupying Philadelphia and effectively 
ending operations for the year. If Howe’s objective and methods caused puzzlement 
(Clinton neatly termed Philadelphia ‘a fitter object to close than to begin the 
campaign with,’20 although Howe managed the tricky feat of doing both), the fact that 
he had totally neglected the southward movement of Sir John Burgoyne’s army from 
Canada was considered calamitous. Without the planned-for support (a two-pronged 
movement on the Hudson River had been the keystone of British strategy since the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 W. Howe, The Narrative of Lieut. Gen. Sir William Howe, in a Committee of the House of 
Commons, on the 29th of April, 1779, Relative to his Conduct, During his Late Command of 
the King’s Troops in North America (London: H. Baldwin, 1780, Second Edition), p. 14. 
18 The National Archives, PRO, CO 5/94, ff. 1-6, Germain to Howe, 14 Jan. 1777. 
19 Ibid. ff. 141-145, Howe to Germain, 2 Apr. 1777. 
20 The American Rebellion, ed. Willcox, p. 61.  
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end of 1775), Burgoyne’s army was defeated at Saratoga, clearing the way for direct 
French intervention in the rebellion.21 
By October, 1777, Howe was asking to be relieved of his command, citing the 
loss of the ‘confidence and support’22 of his superiors, and he finally left America on 
24 May 1778. Clinton took over, already thoroughly disenchanted with the war. He 
had claimed in conversation with Howe to be planning to make the 1777 campaign in 
America his last, but was persuaded to reconsider when the carrot of overall 
command was dangled before him.23 
Howe’s part in the War of Independence was at an end, but the controversy 
over his performance was just getting started. Howe’s perception that the 
administration was not supportive enough of him (failing, in his opinion, to speak out 
definitively and confirm they were satisfied with his performance while commander-
in-chief), led to he and his brother forcing an inquiry before a committee comprised of 
the entire House of Commons.24 The Howe Inquiry, which opened on 22 April 1779, 
offered the beleaguered general the chance to set out clearly his own thoughts on the 
two campaigns he had led in the colonies, but he opened proceedings with a long, 
rambling speech that did anything but set things out clearly.25 Howe could have 
expected, and would no doubt have received, a thorough grilling on his conduct and 
elements of his narrative had his opponents wished, but the administration, in the 
form of Lords North and Germain, was not interested in trying to apportion blame, 
fearing that if too much scrutiny were applied to the failing war effort in America, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  (TNA), PRO, CO 5/92, ff. 200-206, Dartmouth to Gage, 2 Aug. 1775. Ibid. ff. 237-240, 
Dartmouth to Howe, 5 Sept. 1775. Ibid. ff. 311-316, Howe to Dartmouth, 9 Oct. 1775. 
22 (TNA), PRO, CO 5/94, ff. 356-358, Howe to Germain, 22 Oct. 1777. 
23 The Sir Henry Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Vol. 
XXI, f. 26, memo of conversation with Sir William Howe, 6 Jul. 1777. 
24 Parliamentary Register, Vol. X, pp. 111-114. 
25 Howe, Narrative, pp. 1-34. 
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then their own performance would be brought into question.26 The inquiry therefore 
went nowhere, as both sides effectively pulled their punches and waited for the whole 
thing to go away, which it did on 29 June, when Howe simply failed to turn up and 
proceedings were hastily closed with no resolution having been made.27 
Through a combination of overzealousness (a series of pamphlets mocking his 
lack of results in America went too far in their criticisms, burying valid points under a 
mountain of bitter vitriol), disorganisation and simple lack of appetite for the fight, 
Howe’s critics bungled their attempts to discredit him and, although he never quite 
cleared his name (he never commanded an army in battle again) he did hold several 
important posts and was to be commander of a British defence force, raised against a 
possible Spanish invasion in 1790. He achieved the rank of full general in 1793 and 
died in 1814, having produced no children despite his fondness for female company.28 
Early works on the American War of Independence were patchy in quality. 
Much of the nineteenth-century literature has been dismissed as ‘turgid and high 
flown,’29 often more interested in demonising the tyrannical British and lionising 
Washington and his brave band of patriots than coming to any measured 
conclusions.30 More considered appraisals of the conflict still found Howe to be a 
tricky subject, but a consensus arose that he was slow-moving and conventional, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 J. Fortescue, ed., Correspondence of King George III, Vol. IV, 1778-1779 (London: 
MacMillan and Co., 1928), p. 337, Lord North to the King, 10 May 1779. North commented 
how a favourable outcome for Howe would inevitably be viewed as being censorious of his 
administration; Ibid., p. 338, The King to Lord North, 10 May 1779. This letter showed the 
King’s displeasure at a slip by Germain making it impossible to prevent Howe from calling 
witnesses at his inquiry and thus prolonging the affair. 
27 The Parliamentary History of England From the Earliest Period to the Year 1803, Vol. 
XX, ed. William Cobbett (London: T.C. Hansard, 1814), pp. 139-141. Ibid. pp. 675-816. 
28 Partridge, Sir Billy Howe, pp. 245-246. 
29  D. Higginbotham, ‘American Historians and the Military History of the American 
Revolution’, The American Historical Review, 70 (1) (Oct., 1964), p. 22. 
30 For an example, see G. W. Cullum, ‘The Struggle for the Hudson’ in Narrative and Critical 
History of America, Vol. VI, Part I, ed. J. Winsor (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin 
and Company, 1886). 
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rather than negligent and dull. Criticism tended to be mild or indirect. George 
Bancroft wrote of Howe’s plans for Long Island: ‘The plan of attack by General 
Howe was as elaborate as if he had had to encounter an equal army.’31 With one of 
the strongest criticisms of Howe being that he repeatedly seemed pessimistic in his 
assessment of his army’s chances against the Americans, this is a telling phrase. 
The opinion of  Charles Stedman (who served under Howe) is interesting. 
Stedman alluded to the possibility that Howe may have been reluctant to deal harshly 
with the Americans, considering their close ties to Britain.32 Howe had served 
alongside colonial militia in the French and Indian War and it would be 
understandable had he felt some misgivings about commanding troops against the 
colonists. This idea was also touched upon by Sydney George Fisher in 1908, and 
would become the unifying theme of the two major attempts to examine Howe’s 
generalship that appeared during the twentieth century.33 Troyer Steele Anderson and 
Ira Gruber both argued that the Howe brothers had followed an ultimately doomed 
policy of alternating military action with attempts to broker a peaceful resolution to 
the conflict. In their dual capacities as peace commissioners and commanders of land 
and seas forces, they were each wearing two hats, although both Anderson and Gruber 
believed that Howe alternated hats with some skill and almost achieved the goal of an 
amicable reunion.34  
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Vol. IX (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1875), p. 87. 
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Vol. I (New York: Arno Press, 1969), pp. 198-199. Even though the value of Stedman’s work 
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Stedman’s History of the American War’, The American Historical Review, 63 (4) (Jul., 
1958), pp. 924-934, the idea of Howe not wishing to treat the Americans harshly is still 
worthy of consideration. 
33 Sydney George Fisher, The Struggle for American Independence (Philadelphia and 
London: Lippincott, 1908), p. 510. 
34 Anderson, Command of the Howe Brothers; Gruber, Howe Brothers. 
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Other important writers on the subject often appear to throw their hands up in 
despair of ever understanding Howe. When writing of his failure to exploit the victory 
on Long Island on 27 August 1776, Piers Mackesy declared it ‘a puzzling episode, 
never satisfactorily explained’.35 Sir John Fortescue, considering Howe’s overall 
sluggishness of movement and repeated refusal to press home his advantage in the 
1776 campaign, suggested that ‘the only acceptable excuse for his inactivity was that 
the American army was likely to break up more rapidly if left to itself than if 
attacked,’36 a conclusion that seems to have a little desperation about it. 
The explanations for Howe’s performance have been varied. Some have 
pointed to the traumatic experience of the assault on Breed’s Hill as a key moment, 
one that reduced him to a shadow of his former self. C. F. Adams wrote in 1896 that 
‘Probably on the 27th of August, 1776, [Howe] remembered the 17th of June, 1775; 
and, a burnt child, he feared the fire’.37 Maldwyn Jones believed that the battle deeply 
affected Howe and that he avoided frontal assaults whenever he could for the rest of 
his time in command.38 Jeremy Black also cited Breed’s Hill as the root cause of 
Howe’s caution when the Americans were entrenched, but there was no hint of 
censure in this appraisal; Black acknowledged that the countryside in America was 
well-suited to the construction of defensive works and that British commanders had to 
decide how to deal with them. Black also recognised the fact that Howe’s favoured 
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mode of proceeding was to outflank an opponent.39 This was clearly demonstrated on 
Long Island, at White Plains and at the Brandywine (even the attack on Breed’s Hill 
was actually an attempt to overpower one flank of the rebel position and then roll up 
the rest of the line), so rather than being cowed by experience it would appear that 
Howe was not a proponent of the frontal assault to begin with. Caution in the face of 
an entrenched enemy is, in any case, no sign of weakness and certainly does not 
deserve censure, and Howe demonstrated that his caution was not paralysing when he 
immediately called for an assault on the Dorchester Heights after the Americans took 
possession of it; only bad weather forced him to call the assault off.40 Howe also 
showed a willingness, when outflanking was not an option, to attack extensive 
defensive works at Fort Washington the following year.  
As well as attempting to explain his conduct as stemming from concern for the 
well-being of the men under his command, or a distaste for treating former friends too 
harshly, some historians have also simply written Howe off as a poor general. George 
Washington Cullum said of Howe that he was incompetent, lazy and ponderous.41 
Henry Belcher also delivered a stern verdict. Admitting that the Americans at Long 
Island had been thoroughly defeated,  he went on to comment on the Howes’ ‘ruinous 
conduct of the immense interests entrusted to them’ and wondered aloud if they were 
‘merely tools of the most factious of all oppositions’.42 Henry Cabot Lodge simply 
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41 Cullum, ‘Struggle for the Hudson’, p. 291. 
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noted that during the 1776 campaign Howe had taken two months to advance 30 
miles and commented, ‘This in itself was defeat’.43 
Aside from offering personal opinions based on the limited documents 
available for study, historians tended to largely skip over Howe’s command. The 
contradictions of a general who never lost a battle during his two campaigns at the 
head of the British army and yet somehow contrived not to win the war were no doubt 
intriguing, but there were easier targets in the shape of Burgoyne and Cornwallis, who 
had the decency to write their failures in the bold type of decisive defeats, at Saratoga 
and Yorktown, respectively. With no answers to offer on the many puzzling elements 
of Howe’s generalship, some no doubt turned sadly away, as Partridge suggested, 
while others could not resist acknowledging the mysteries they were unable to 
unravel. ‘The British Commander’s conduct,’ wrote Belcher, ‘is so unintelligible 
unless on grounds highly uncomplimentary to his loyalty, that fairy tales hang round 
his adventures.’44 
The most vociferous criticism aimed at Howe came in the series of pamphlets 
that started during his period in command and continued through the Howe Inquiry 
and for a brief period afterwards. These pamphlets were sometimes replied to by 
Howe himself, resulting in a protracted and heated form of correspondence, in which 
Letters to a Nobleman drew the response Observations upon a Pamphlet Entitled 
Letters to a Nobleman, which in turn prompted A Reply to the Observations of Lieut. 
Gen. Sir William Howe on a Pamphlet Entitled Letters to a Nobleman.45 The 
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pamphlets often contained pertinent criticisms of Howe’s conduct, but these were 
presented alongside more fanciful charges or simple errors of fact, which were often 
easy to dismiss, thus weakening the argument of the whole. In this manner, in A Reply 
to the Observations, Joseph Galloway asserted that Howe, ‘contrary to the most 
urgent motives, to the plainest dictates of military science, and the explicit orders of 
his Sovereign, [led] his force 600 miles from the place where he was directed to join 
General Burgoyne’.46 Howe had certainly invited criticism by unilaterally abandoning 
the Hudson strategy and this could have been a fruitful path for his critics to follow, 
but he was able to easily bat aside the notion that he had disobeyed explicit orders, 
from his sovereign or anybody else, because he had received nothing of the kind. 
In a field, therefore, where few historians have felt confident enough to offer 
more than a passing opinion on Howe, the two works devoted to him and his brother 
demand serious consideration. Anderson developed the argument first proposed 28 
years earlier by Fisher, noting the coincidences between the pauses in British military 
efforts in 1776 and the attempts at brokering a peaceful solution. It is clear that 
Anderson considered that the role of peace commissioners interfered with the purely 
military prosecution of the war, but he also painted Howe as a distinctly conventional 
eighteenth-century general. In other words, he was not incompetent, merely ordinary. 
He also claimed to have discerned fluctuating moods, evidenced in Howe’s 
communications with Germain. Sometimes Howe appeared bullish and eager to 
proceed, at other times timid and full of concerns. This (according to Anderson) 
impacted on Howe’s ability to command, and Anderson went on to claim that Howe’s 
slow movements during the latter part of the 1776 campaign stemmed from his belief 
that a decisive victory was now impossible. Perhaps surprisingly, Anderson did not 	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put this forward as a criticism of Howe’s generalship, but merely as an observation.47 
Elements of Anderson’s argument were picked up by Gruber, first in a journal article 
in 1965 and later in a full-blown book on the Howes’ conduct of the war, in 1972.48 
(Gruber’s conclusions were later condensed into an entry in the Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography.)49 Starting from the premise that it was Admiral Howe who was 
most inclined to pursue a peaceful solution to the rebellion, and that this intruded 
upon General Howe’s conduct of his military strategy, Gruber carried the thesis to its 
ultimate conclusion. The concept of Howe’s mediocrity was replaced by an even 
more thorough analysis of the impediments raised by the attempts to make peace at 
the same time as war. Gruber claimed that Howe had made a conscious decision to 
wage a campaign for territory, manoeuvring the Americans out of New York in a 
display of irresistible military power that would open the door for successful peace 
negotiations. In Gruber’s thesis, Howe had no intention of seeking a decisive victory 
and would even spurn the chance if it presented itself. Gruber admitted that he could 
not claim to know why Howe chose this course, having initially favoured the idea of a 
decisive battle (although he suggests that his elder brother must have been 
influential), but events tend to fit in with Gruber’s theory and his work has the 
tantalising allure of an explanation that seems to answer every question at every stage 
of the campaign.50 
 Gruber’s theory does not, however, take account of the fact that if indeed the 
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negotiations, it should have been obvious that it was failing. The peace negotiations 
attempted, chiefly by Lord Howe, never showed any inclination to bear fruit. They 
foundered on matters of basic protocol (the rejection of a letter to ‘George 
Washington, Esquire, etc. etc.’, rather than to ‘General George Washington’, was just 
one way in which the Americans showed repeatedly that they were not willing to 
negotiate)51 and on substance; the fact that the Howes were empowered only to accept 
the Americans’ apologies and return to loyalty, and not to address any of their 
grievances, meant that there really was nothing to talk about when negotiators finally 
did get together. Thus, this persuasive argument, which developed steadily throughout 
the last century, cannot claim to have explained Sir William’s actions entirely.  
Apparently, contemporary historians were not convinced either, as many 
works demonstrated. Sir John Fortescue acknowledged the idea that, on Long Island, 
Howe may have been treating the rebels gently out of hopes for a peaceful settlement, 
but he finally accepted Howe’s own excuse that the strength of the American lines at 
Brooklyn were too great to allow him to storm them.52 Fortescue did, it must be said, 
appear to be somewhat confused over the disposition of the American defences, but 
this is hardly to be wondered at if he was taking Howe’s own imprecise evidence at 
the inquiry as his main source of information. On the taking of Fort Washington, 
Fortescue commented that it was ‘a pretty little action, neatly designed and very 
neatly executed; for Howe at his best was no contemptible commander’.53 Fortescue’s 
conclusion was that Howe had been let down by the politicians at home, who failed to 
provide the necessary forces in time for Howe and Carleton to wield them effectively. 
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(In relation to this it is interesting to note that Howe himself had expressed his ‘utter 
amazement’54 at the efforts of Germain in raising the army for the 1776 campaign.) 
Black championed a persuasive argument – the idea that Howe may have been 
fighting an unwinnable war. In Black’s opinion, decisive battles were hard to come by 
in the eighteenth century, and the failure to achieve one might often be due to an 
opponent being unwilling to stand and fight.55 Tactics in both land and naval 
confrontations tended to be rigid and formalised and equally matched armies would 
often result in inconclusive battles. Black considered the fact that the major powers of 
the world were so closely matched (in terms of military technology, tactics and 
organisational abilities) to be a key factor in the difficulty of achieving overwhelming 
successes on the battlefields of the eighteenth century.56 He noted that American 
forces attempted to fight a conventional war (they built fortifications and stood in line 
to fight) and he asserted that Washington was actually attempting to build an ancien 
régime army.57 The problem was that their organisational abilities and tactical 
awareness lagged far behind those of the British and Hessian forces, especially in the 
early months of the conflict. Black went on to suggest that revolutionary warfare 
allowed for decisive battles when relatively unsophisticated, unprofessional forces 
came up against regulars, such as at Culloden in 1746.58 In Black’s opinion, this may 
have been the case in the colonies as well, had the terrain been more suitable to the 
pursuit of a defeated foe, and if Howe’s army had been blessed with a stronger 
cavalry contingent (the area around New York was heavily wooded and criss-crossed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54  (TNA), PRO, 5/93, ff. 212-213, Howe to Germain, Jun. 8, 1776. 
55 J. Black, ‘Eighteenth-Century Warfare Reconsidered’, War in History, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 
219-224. 
56  Ibid., p. 219. 
57 Black, War for America, p.17. 
58 Black, ‘Eighteenth-Century Warfare Reconsidered’, p. 224. 
	   18	  
with stone walls, making it unsuitable for cavalry – and Howe had less than 1,000 
light dragoons at his disposal).59 
It is therefore important to consider Howe’s performance in the context of 
eighteenth-century warfare. Maldwyn Jones’s essay on Howe is revealingly entitled 
‘Sir William Howe: Conventional Strategist’. Jones saw Howe as acting within ‘the 
limitations imposed by his military education’.60 He may not have been a military 
genius, able to see through the problems to a decisive strategy, but he was also far 
from incompetent. In his introduction to that volume, George Billias concurred, 
stating that all the British generals in America (not just Howe) ‘tended to… cling too 
closely to the military orthodoxies of the day’.61 Gruber added his weight to this idea 
in 1974, pointing out that there was little enthusiasm for strategy in the British armed 
forces of the time and seeing an emphasis on tactics in the courses of the Woolwich 
and Portsmouth academies. ‘What interested English officers most,’ Gruber 
contended, ‘were the skills required for managing ships and men in the face of the 
enemy’.62 Indirect support for this ‘unwinnable war’ idea comes in the theory that the 
American War of Independence was Britain’s Vietnam. James W. Pohl addressed the 
military similarities between the two conflicts and although these appear, upon deeper 
inspection, to be largely superficial, the very fact that these wars have been compared 
is interesting. Vietnam has become a byword for military futility, so by association 
the War of Independence is painted as an uprising the British were ill-equipped to 
quell, if, indeed, anybody could have quelled it. Vietnam, while perhaps not a perfect 	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analogy for the War of Independence, did provide an important impetus to the re-
evaluation of revolutionary warfare and this, together with the twentieth-century 
move towards professional historians identified by Don Higginbotham, resulted in a 
rather more robust approach to military history.63 
By the current century, historians were ready to reconsider events, with the 
result that Howe has been at least partially exonerated and even fulsomely praised in 
several recent works, most notably by Hugh Bicheno and Stanley Weintraub. Bicheno 
referred to a ‘very nearly successful strategy of alternating sharp military action with 
political concessions’64 and praised the Howes for attempting to win the war without 
creating a lasting resentment in the colonies. Bicheno also supported Howe’s decision 
to restrain his men at Long Island, claiming that an attack on the American lines 
might have failed and would certainly have resulted in many casualties, although with 
the confusion over the strength of those lines it is hard to be sure of this. Bicheno’s 
conclusion was that Howe was attempting to create an aura of invincibility by 
demonstrating that he could go wherever he pleased, whenever he pleased.65 
Bicheno’s ideas are fresh and compelling, and they take the unusual tack of focussing 
on how close Howe came to ending the revolutionary war effort in one campaign, 
rather than merely considering how he eventually failed. Weintraub, writing two years 
after Bicheno, took a similar approach, praising Howe for his performance in 
occupying New York, but adding that he was unable to exploit his victories to the 
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full.66 Weintraub, perhaps thinking that everything had already been said about Long 
Island, limited himself to a two-sentence description of the battle: ‘Sullivan fortified 
the Jamaica Road approaches on Long Island with all of five militiamen. Howe sent 
10,000 redcoats.’67 This succinct account is a reminder that hindsight can be 
unforgiving and that at many times during the 1776 campaign it appeared as if Howe 
was leading his army to a comprehensive and easy victory over a disastrously 
outclassed opponent. 
Acting as a counterpoint to these two accounts is that of Barnet Schecter, 
whose hostility towards the British is evident throughout his study of the war. 
Choosing to concentrate on New York, which Schecter maintained was the keystone 
of the revolution during the war, he delivered a blow-by-blow account of the Battle of 
Long Island, noting the controversy surrounding Howe’s decision not to press his 
advantage but offering the explanation that he was merely trying to limit his 
casualties. Schecter also offered the familiar Bunker Hill reasoning, claiming that, 
‘Politically, and perhaps personally, he couldn’t bear a repeat of Bunker Hill,’68 but 
this sits uneasily with his insistence that the British had been arrogant and over-
confident. Howe was portrayed as competent, if a little slow-moving, and Schecter 
made no bold statements on either Howe’s quality, or that of Washington, although he 
wrote of Washington’s many questionable decisions in the campaign without censure. 
Mark Urban added an unexpected theory to the mix by claiming that it was a 
fundamental weakness in the British Army itself that led to defeat.69 In Urban’s thesis, 
the War of Independence served as a training ground that enabled the army to 	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improve – too late to secure the colonies, but in time to take on the French 
successfully a decade or so later. This thesis is undermined by the fact that Howe’s 
men were victorious on almost every occasion they went into battle against the 
Americans; the war was not lost because the British army was not up to the job. A 
recent analysis of the strategies employed in the war saw Black pointing out the 
differences between a war of conquest and one of pacification and outlining the two 
options open to the British – destroying the American army or taking key strategic 
points. Black concluded that ‘the British emphasis possibly should have been 
destroying the Continental Army,’ but he also went on to praise ‘one of the most 
impressive and complex joint military operations in history against New York City 
and its environs’.70  
Clearly, Howe is able to be interpreted in many different ways. This thesis will 
attempt to come to a clearer understanding of the factors that shaped his decisions in 
America. There are four areas that merit in-depth analysis: Howe’s relationship with 
his subordinate officers; the quality and composition of the army he commanded; his 
relationship with his political superiors; and his personal qualities and attitudes to his 
command. The first chapter of this thesis will concentrate on Howe’s working 
relationship with his second-in-command, Clinton, and the commander of the Hessian 
contingent of his army, Lieutenant-General Leopold Philip von Heister. These are the 
men with whom Howe had to deal when planning operations and implementing those 
plans. The second chapter will deal with the quality and composition of Howe’s army, 
considering if it was fit for the purpose of quelling a rebellion 3,000 miles from home. 
The third chapter will concentrate on Howe’s interaction with Lord George Germain, 
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who ran the war as the American Secretary; confidence in that relationship would be 
critical if both men were to act effectively. The fourth chapter, an attempt to come to 
a fuller understanding of Howe’s personal qualities and attitudes to the war, is 
hampered by the lack of personal documents, but although Howe did not write freely, 
it is often possible to discern quite subtle shifts of attitude in his correspondence. 
Most important in this section will be a close perusal of the draft of his narrative. In 
seeing where Howe changed his arguments it is possible to see where he thought his 
conduct was most vulnerable to attack. It is also reasonable to assume that a draft 
would be more open and revealing than the final (polished and revised) speech as 
delivered to the House. A draft is not intended for public consumption and in many 
cases the changing of a single word can be highly illuminating. 
By assessing both old and new primary sources, it will be demonstrated that 
Howe started the campaign of 1776 with hopes of a successful prosecution of the war, 
but that his confidence was first undermined by a lack of support from his subordinate 
officers and then a loss of confidence in his political superiors. Howe’s loss of 
confidence was shockingly sudden (it can clearly be seen to materialise through two 
letters to Germain), the reaction of a man who could see where his problems lay, but 
was not blessed with the abilities to solve them. Howe was straightforward and 
impatient of intrigue and flattery, making him ill-equipped to indulge in the sort of 
political in-fighting necessary to put his command on a more secure footing. His 
political maladroitness was highlighted by his narrative, which, revised though it may 
have been, was painfully inadequate to the task of clearing his name. Overall, this 
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thesis will offer a more rounded assessment of Howe as a commanding officer than 
has ever been produced before. 71 
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I 
William Howe’s relationship with Henry Clinton 
Howe’s working relationship with his fellow officers impacted significantly on his 
ability to perform as commander-in-chief. His second-in-command, Major General 
Henry Clinton, filled an especially important role, as he acted as a sounding board for 
Howe’s ideas, offered ideas of his own and often commanded an important corps of 
the army during operations. It was important that Howe trusted his key subordinate, 
yet he was unable to. Tracking of their interactions reveals that, following a brief 
period of harmony, the two drew apart, first due to fundamental differences of opinion 
on the running of the war and subsequently due to a personal falling out that had more 
to do with Clinton’s sensitivity than actual events. Worse than this, Clinton began to 
undermine his commanding officer, subtly at first, but with increasing openness, until 
he finally displayed utter contempt for him, declaring that he would rather desert than 
continue to serve under him.1 
The key evidence for the Howe-Clinton relationship comes from Clinton’s own 
notes on meetings between the two men, which raises the question of Clinton’s 
reliability. Crucially, although Clinton proved that he was able to distort facts to suit 
his ends in letters to friends, colleagues and family, his personal memoranda of 
private conversations seem to have been straightforward and without agenda. He did 
not criticise Howe in these notes, sticking to a detailed and often revealing statement 
of the topics discussed during each meeting. In fact, Clinton often emerged in a poor 
light, while Howe was depicted in broadly sympathetic terms. Had Clinton intended 
these memoranda to be read by the public he may well have coloured them more with 
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his personal opinions, but he seems to have been interested only in making a reliable 
record of what passed between the two men for his future reference. 
Relationships between fellow officers were far more complicated than those 
between an officer and the rank and file, not because the officer class was intrinsically 
more complex than the common soldier, but because they had far more liberty to 
express any dissatisfaction. Officers were influenced by the driving forces of ambition 
and honour, and there was also the tricky element of patronage, which could lead to 
cliques and factions forming, sometimes to the detriment of the service. Eighteenth-
century officers also felt perfectly justified in putting their own interests before that of 
the army. Loftus Cliffe, an officer in the 46th Regiment who fought under Howe in the 
1776 and 1777 campaigns, was able to write after the capture of Philadelphia that ‘if I 
do not succeed in my prospect of promotion during the course of [the next campaign] 
I shall sincerely wish myself out of it’.2 In his own retrospective of his campaigns in 
the war, Clinton was able to write without self-consciousness of his disappointment, 
in 1777, of having no opportunity to advance his personal ‘fame’.3 
Officers felt that it was their right to be given the chance to distinguish 
themselves and saw no contradiction in threatening to return home if they felt this 
right was being withheld, or if they felt their commanding officer was being unduly 
critical of them. Notorious in this respect is the spat between Howe and Major 
General Hugh Percy at the beginning of 1777. Percy felt so personally affronted by 
perceived criticism in a letter from Howe that he declared he was unwilling to 
continue to serve in America. ‘In short,’ he wrote to Henry Clinton, ‘I am so hurt that 
nothing on earth shall make me stay here… I had rather quit the service entirely than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 WCL, Loftus Cliffe Papers, Loftus Cliffe to Bartholomew Cliffe, 20 Jan. 1778. 
3 Willcox, ed., American Rebellion, p. 65. 
	   26	  
remain here any longer.’ Percy was deadly serious; he returned home to England and 
did not serve again in the war.4 
Heightened sensitivity to personal slights, on what might be considered the 
flimsiest of grounds, also manifested itself in the behaviour of Burgoyne. Scheduled 
to travel to Canada from England on the Apollo in March 1777, Burgoyne found he 
had been redirected to sail on the Ariadne. For two reasons (the fact that he wanted to 
sail with his friend, Philemon Pownall, the captain of the Apollo, and the fact that the 
Ariadne was smaller than the original ship and therefore amounted to a demotion of 
sorts) this was unacceptable to Burgoyne, who raged that the decision was borne of 
‘caprice, ill harmony and stupidity’.5 Burgoyne went on to claim to Captain Pownall 
that ‘I really feel myself offended and shall make my complaint to the King’.6 
Burgoyne personally wrote to Lord Sandwich, the First Lord of the Admiralty, to get 
the change reversed, referring to it as ‘so marked a slight’.7 
These examples serve to illustrate that the eighteenth-century British officer was 
very different from his modern counterparts. Friction between officers was therefore 
inevitable and commonplace and Howe would certainly have experienced it before. 
What made the relationship with Clinton so destructive was the way in which his 
second-in-command constantly disagreed with him and brooded over perceived 
injustices long after he had received explanations and apologies. 
Howe, Clinton and Burgoyne had travelled to Boston together on the Cerberus 
(arriving in May 1775) to add extra impetus to the British military response to 
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6 Ibid. 
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growing tensions in the colonies.8 Howe, as the senior officer among the three, would 
have been the obvious choice to take over from Thomas Gage should he be relieved 
of his command. Although Burgoyne would take a far more prominent position than 
Clinton in the campaigns to follow, he was destined to be removed from Howe, 
commanding the army that attempted to push through northern New York state in 
1777.9 
Clinton had a much closer relationship with the British commander, but before 
getting into the specific details of this relationship, it is worth noting the peculiarities 
of Clinton’s character, peculiarities that would make it all but impossible for Howe 
(or, indeed, almost anybody else) to work harmoniously with him. Clinton’s 
personality was so fascinating, a psychological profile has been written of him.10  
Frederick Wyatt and William B. Willcox argued that it was his ‘unconscious conflict 
over authority’11 that was the root of his prickly personality. It is true that Clinton 
displayed markedly different character traits when advising a superior compared to 
when he was in command. In their paper, Wyatt and Willcox argued that this might 
have stemmed from an unusually complex relationship with his father; Clinton both 
craved power and, at the same time, felt that he was undeserving of it, apparently a 
classic character trait of those who are in awe of their parents and feel unworthy to 
assume authority from them. Although fascinating, the thesis is flawed in assuming 
all other factors influencing Clinton’s behaviour remained constant. In fact, Clinton’s 
lack of aggression when in a position of command can be attributed to the 
considerably smaller forces he generally had to work with. When championing bold 
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and aggressive movements to Howe in 1776 and 1777, for instance, he was planning 
for an army of 20,000 men or more. When in command of a detached force at New 
York in 1777, he commanded around 7,000 and was limited to what he called a 
‘starved’12 defensive.13   
Clinton’s behaviour is more easily explained by considering the single most 
important facet of his character, that which overrode all others – his hypersensitivity. 
Even in an age where personal honour was a delicate matter, Clinton took the concept 
to extreme lengths. Coupled with an absolute refusal to let a perceived slight drop, 
even if a full apology had been extracted, this made Clinton extremely difficult to deal 
with. Clinton’s falling out with Sir Peter Parker, the naval commander who worked 
alongside him during a botched combined operation against Sullivan’s Island in 1776, 
is a prime example of Clinton’s relentless approach.14 Although Clinton and Parker 
shared the blame fairly equally for a poorly planned and executed expedition, Clinton 
attempted to absolve himself completely at Parker’s expense and besieged the 
unfortunate man with demands for redress, both in person and via letters, until Parker 
responded that the matter ‘had best be consigned to oblivion’.15 Clinton also 
corresponded freely with friends on the matter, frequently repeating himself and 
seemingly seeking only to vent his anger and justify his own conduct; he neither 
asked for, nor appeared interested in, the opinions of his correspondents.16 
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Howe and Clinton actually got off to a good start in the colonies; in a personal 
letter, Clinton wrote of Howe and Burgoyne that ‘I could not have named two people 
I should sooner wish to serve with in every respect.’17 The letter continued with what 
could be viewed as an ominous cloud on the horizon, admitting that the three men 
differed in opinions, but this letter removes any possibility of there having been a 
history of disagreement between the men. Memoranda of conversations between 
Howe and Clinton during their time together in Boston suggest they were exchanging 
ideas freely and without rancour. Although they often disagreed on potential plans, 
they seemed to share the idea that something needed to be attempted to break the 
monotony of the rebel siege of Boston. Both men also lamented their lack of 
manpower. Howe, for instance, suggested a diversionary action towards the town of 
Mystick, while Clinton did not believe they had sufficient men to detach a corps for 
that purpose and suggested instead the taking of Mount Prospect, which Howe did not 
feel would be of any use if taken.18 There is also evidence that the two men shared a 
dissatisfaction with Gage, which may have acted as a unifying force until his removal. 
When Clinton suggested an expedition to Newberry, only to be told by Gage that he 
could not spare the 1,000 men necessary, Howe agreed that the proposed move would 
be a good idea and that Gage could easily spare the men.19 
Warning signs were, however, already apparent, and not just in the simple fact 
that the two men almost always disagreed with each other. Howe and Clinton had 
taken prominent parts in the assault on Breed’s Hill (popularly known as the Battle of 
Bunker Hill) on 17 June 1775, and although both had emerged with credit, Howe was 
to receive a foretaste of the doggedness of Clinton’s sensitivity in the aftermath of the 
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battle. Clinton was originally intended to have taken no part in the assault, but, seeing 
the difficulties the British soldiers were in as the attack foundered, he crossed the 
Charles River to help.20 Clinton was concerned that his actions, which exceeded his 
orders, might be viewed unfavourably, but he was also in no doubt that he had 
performed well and deserved credit, which put him in an awkward situation. Clinton 
took care to create the appearance of being uninterested in personal credit or glory, 
while actually being extremely vigilant on that point. Thus, when Howe mentioned 
Clinton’s service in his report, referring to the ‘laudable proceeding of Major General 
Clinton,’21 Clinton wrote to a friend that ‘My friend Howe in his thanks does me too 
much honour in mentioning my little services’.22 
When, several months later, Clinton became aware that Gage had failed to give 
these ‘little services’ full credit in his official report, he was furious. An angry letter to 
Gage described how Clinton was dissatisfied with the account, believing that it gave 
the impression that he had merely followed reinforcements over to Charlestown when 
he should have led them.23 Clinton also took the matter up with Howe, quizzing him 
on what he had written in his report. This reaction seems all the more curious 
considering he had been mentioned as deserving of special thanks in a message from 
the King, received by the troops at Boston in September; 24 Clinton must have been 
aware that his actions had not gone unnoticed. Howe reassured the irate general that 
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proper credit had been given in his own report, even quoting the relevant passage, 
which appears to have satisfied Clinton as to Howe’s part in the affair.25  
Gage was another matter entirely. Clinton took the matter up with the man who 
was still commander-in-chief in the colonies, but received a firm rebuttal, which 
served to highlight one of the problems that could be raised by Clinton’s peculiar 
sense of justice. Gage defended his report of the action robustly and logically, 
explaining that he had asked for Clinton’s assessment of the battle, to be told that he 
(Clinton) could claim no credit; ‘… you would say nothing of it,’ wrote Gage, ‘further 
than you could not help going over, but had no merit in it, for that the affair was 
over’. Gage then took this to its logical conclusion: ‘I could not mention what I did 
not know.’26 
Clinton had overplayed the role of the noble officer who is too modest to put 
himself forward for special notice, but despite Gage’s strong defence, and the fact he 
went on in his letter to express his concern at having caused Clinton distress, this was 
not the sort of matter that Clinton would or could forget. The strongly disapproving 
manner in which he wrote of Bunker Hill after his falling out with Gage suggests his 
contempt for the man. ‘We are an army of children and our officers have customs I 
highly disapprove,’27 he wrote. This could also be read as disapproving of Howe, who 
had led the attack even though he was operating under Gage’s orders. Perhaps aware 
of how strong these words were, this letter required reading through an hourglass 
mask (a sheet of paper with an hourglass-shaped section cut out, which would conceal 
part of a letter and allow a hidden message to be conveyed) for the real content to be 
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27 Ibid., Vol. XII, f. 22, Clinton to William Phillips, before 5 Dec. 1775. 
	   32	  
revealed, but whether or not any criticism of Howe was intended, friction was 
developing in their relationship. 
Clinton’s contemptuous assessment of the assault on Breed’s Hill underlined a 
key difference of opinion between the two men, which quickly drove them apart and 
fatally undermined their working relationship: they disagreed on almost every detail 
of how the war should be fought. Clinton believed that seaborne raids were the best 
way to bring the colonies to their senses; it was the sort of war that would cause them 
the most distress and, given the vulnerable nature of their extensive coastline, a 
natural step to take, in his opinion. Clinton believed this made more sense than 
attempting to operate with a large army on the mainland, where support from loyalists 
would be doubtful (he actually wrote to General Harvey and the Duke of Newcastle 
that they had no support whatsoever in America, obviously an exaggeration, but 
indicative of the lack of faith he had in raising significant loyalist forces).28 To Major 
General William Phillips, Clinton wrote that the Royal Navy was the best instrument 
for bringing the colonies to heel.29 
Howe was fundamentally opposed to such a method of warfare, as borne out by 
his reaction to the punitive raid on the Massachusetts town of Falmouth on 18 
October 1775, in which around 400 buildings were destroyed by a combination of 
incendiary fire from Royal Navy ships and fires set by landing parties.30 Howe was 
concerned that the British public might believe he was responsible for the raid, even 
though it had been authorised before he took command of the army. Clinton’s 
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30 MHS, Dispatch from Lt. Henry Mowat to Vice Admiral Graves about the destruction of 
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no such qualms about treating the colonists roughly, and he reassured his 
commanding officer during a conversation in December that the decision to burn 
Falmouth had been the right one and should have been taken earlier.31 
There was also fundamental disagreement on the keystone of the British efforts 
at ending the rebellion – the Hudson strategy. This aimed at dividing the colonies by 
the cooperation of two sizeable British armies, one moving down the Hudson river 
from Canada and one moving up it from New York City. Clinton wholeheartedly 
believed in this strategy, but Howe did not. While still in England, Clinton had 
sketched out his thoughts, noting the importance of New York.32 By June 1775 he 
was writing to General Harvey that New York was the place to begin the next 
campaign, and he reiterated the sentiment in November, claiming that taking 
possession of New York would ‘awe the southern provinces’.33 
More revealing than this is a conversation between Howe and Clinton on 3 
December 1775. Discussing the possible fall of Quebec, Howe stated that it would be 
best in that scenario for the British to concentrate everything on New York. This 
would obviously be a clear departure from the Hudson strategy; a large rebel force in 
Canada would mean that the British could not have complete control over the 
Hudson. Clinton insisted that Quebec would have to be retaken if it fell, so that two 
British armies could operate along the Hudson and break the colonies’ 
communications with each other. Howe in turn claimed that even complete mastery of 
the Hudson would not totally end interaction between the colonies, as they would 
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have Indian allies on the Lakes to facilitate communication.34 Howe, therefore, 
showed that from the very start he had serious misgivings about the Hudson strategy 
and doubted that it could deliver the results for which it was designed. While still at 
Boston, Clinton further demonstrated his support of the strategy, outlining a plan for 
seizing the rebel fortifications in the Hudson Highlands as soon as their construction 
had been completed. The plan was sound, and anticipated by almost two years the 
actual taking of the forts, by Clinton, in October 1777.35 
Disagreement over the desirability and efficacy of punitive warfare would drive 
the first wedge between Howe and Clinton and disagreement over the Hudson 
strategy would finish the job of alienating the generals over the course of the next two 
years. These differences of opinion need not have been disastrous (it is perfectly 
possible for two officers to work effectively together while holding differing views on 
the way a war should be conducted), but these differences of opinion provided fertile 
ground for Clinton’s hypersensitivity, until simple disagreement was transformed into 
open hostility and a desire to undermine Howe.  
Clinton’s experiences while on the detached command that attacked Sullivan’s 
Island provided the first serious stress point in the Howe-Clinton relationship. 
Originally proposed in October 1775, the expedition was intended to support an 
uprising of loyalists in North Carolina, but due to a number of factors it became 
symbolic of the logistical nightmare that faced British commanders in the colonies.36 
Although intended as a means of carrying the war to the rebellious colonies swiftly, 
and before the main British army was built up for an offensive campaign the 
following year, planning and implementation were beset by so many problems that 	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nothing was actually attempted until late June 1776, four months after the loyalists of 
North Carolina had risen up (expecting support) and been decisively defeated.37 
In December 1775, Clinton grumbled to Howe that his orders from Germain 
regarding the expedition were not clear enough, believing that they suggested much, 
but actually ordered nothing.38 Howe would later refer to such ‘whispers across the 
Atlantic’39 in his own defence and Clinton obviously felt vulnerable as plans for the 
expedition took shape. As time dragged on, however, it became clear that the original 
intention of the expedition was no longer a viable option, but as Clinton found himself 
detached from Howe, with a combined force at his disposal, he was tempted to mount 
a seaborne raid and the focus of the expedition switched to Charleston, South 
Carolina. The steady disintegration of the expedition is not relevant here, but the fact 
that Clinton felt such a compulsion to press on, when it had clearly foundered, is 
important. Aware that his commander-in-chief did not share his enthusiasm for such 
seaborne raids, it is reasonable to propose that Clinton wanted to demonstrate the 
soundness of the principle, and vindicate his faith in the method. He could not accept 
a meek failure to attack in the very mode he personally championed; pride was a 
factor here and, as so often in the career of Clinton, this personal failing would be 
warped to transfer blame onto others, with Howe himself being caught in the 
backlash.40 
Gruber contended that it was Howe’s falling out with Percy, which took place at 
the beginning of 1777, that caused Clinton to lose confidence in Howe, but the 
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process started much earlier and was actually almost complete before the Percy affair 
even started.41 It was Clinton’s sensitivity over the southern expedition that started the 
process. More specifically, it was to do with the amount of time Clinton wasted on the 
expedition while Howe was awaiting reinforcements at New York. The difficult 
nature of eighteenth-century communications came into play here. On 18 May, 
Clinton had written to Howe complaining that it had been three months since he had 
last heard from him, leaving him ignorant of Howe’s plans for the coming 
campaign.42 Shortly after writing this letter, Clinton received one from Howe, written 
on 12 April, stating that no firm operational plans had yet been made.43 Clinton took 
this as a justification for remaining in the south. As late as 15 June he wrote to an 
unknown correspondent, claiming that he was ‘totally at liberty for a few days at 
least,’44 given his lack of orders from Howe. Clinton may have had a technical point 
here. He had not yet received explicit orders to return to New York or Halifax, but he 
would have been aware that the campaigning season was progressing and that the 
main push was to be made at New York. To his unknown correspondent, Clinton 
admitted that Sullivan’s Island tempted him and he offered further justification, 
claiming that he would not know where to find Howe even if he did return north.45 
Clinton should have been more aware of the length of time it took for 
correspondence to reach its destination. When writing on 15 June he knew that it was 
more than two months since Howe had informed him that no firm operational plans 
had yet been made; it does not seem reasonable for Clinton to have assumed that this 
was still the case and the possibility presents itself that Clinton may have simply been 
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hiding behind a lack of written orders to justify his actions.46 As it happened, 
circumstances to the north had changed. On 22 May Howe had written another letter 
of a completely different tone and had asked Clinton to return to New York as quickly 
as possible, giving him the option of leaving one or two regiments in the south only if 
Clinton thought they might serve some ‘essential purposes’.47 Howe had also 
explained that some earlier correspondence from him (regarding the evacuation of 
Boston) had been lost when the ship carrying them, the Glasgow, had encountered a 
rebel squadron. 
All might have ended well had the attack on Sullivan’s Island gone smoothly 
and swiftly. It did neither and Clinton soon revealed anxiety over his tardiness in 
returning with his men to New York. Writing to Brigadier General Sir John Vaughn 
on Long Island, on 18 June, Clinton was suddenly bursting with impatience to be 
heading north. The rising tension, and the fact that he could see where he may have 
left himself open to criticism, was revealed in a very telling sentence. ‘Time is 
precious,’ he wrote. ‘I heartily wish our business was done, and we were on our way 
to the north.’48 This abrupt change of tone from Clinton could be due to misgivings 
over the operation against Sullivan’s Island, but it is also reasonable to suggest that 
Howe’s letter of 22 May might have recently arrived and dramatically changed the 
situation. Clinton, in that case, would suddenly have been aware that he had actually 
been ordered back to New York almost a month before, which would certainly 
explain his sudden anxiety.49 
The attack on Sullivan’s Island dragged on and Clinton was not ready to leave 
for New York until the middle of July, by which time he was simultaneously 	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attempting to justify his decision to press the assault and fretting over his inability to 
extricate himself from the mess and head to New York. To Germain, on 8 July, he 
again claimed that it was Howe’s lack of explicitness in his orders that had influenced 
his decision, and that by suggesting Clinton was free to act as he saw fit, Howe had 
made it clear there was no hurry for him to return to the north.50 Clinton made no 
reference to Howe’s later letter, urging him to return as quickly as possible, but he did 
go on to say that, following the failure of the attack on Sullivan’s Island, he had 
proposed to Sir Peter Parker that he should now take his troops to link up with Howe, 
even suggesting that the health of the men would be affected if they stayed in the 
harsh southern climate for much longer, something that had not seemed to trouble his 
thoughts before. To Parker himself, on 17 July, Clinton wrote of the ‘absolute 
necessity’51 of being at New York as quickly as possible, even suggesting he would 
be willing to set sail without a frigate escort. This would have been reckless and 
underlines Clinton’s increasing desperation. Eight days later he was writing to Howe 
himself while finally en route to New York. In this letter, Clinton laid out the case for 
his defence, again mentioning the long period with no correspondence from the 
commander-in-chief (although now Clinton claimed it was four months, rather than 
three), stating that Howe had made no demands on him to return and even suggesting 
that Howe had implied Clinton would not be needed at all for the start of the 
campaign in the north.52 
Clinton’s sensitivity on this matter was actually misplaced. Howe had no 
intention of attacking the American forces around New York before receiving 
substantial reinforcements from Britain and he was in no way waiting impatiently for 
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Clinton to return so that he could commence his operations. The only suggestion of 
dissatisfaction with the southern expedition had come in a letter to Lord Dartmouth 
back in January 1776, in which he had expressed the opinion that it would have been 
better to concentrate forces on New York rather than dissipate them.53 However, it 
was not until 7 June that Howe’s small army of around 8,500 had embarked at 
Halifax, ready to sail to New York, and by then the commander-in-chief had already 
started to fudge the issue of when he would attack the rebels.54 On 25 April he had 
obliquely hinted to Germain that he might be able to take New York before 
reinforcements arrived from Europe, but by 7 June he had given up thoughts of any 
such decisive action before his army was substantially reinforced.55 The first of the 
reinforcements began to arrive on 8 June, but it was another three weeks before 
Howe’s army was at New York, having reached Sandy Hook on 29 June.56 
Imprecision again enters Howe’s correspondence with his political master here. After 
detailing the strength of the rebel positions on Long Island in a letter sent on 7 July, 
Howe stated that he would await either the English fleet (bringing the Hessians and 
Guards from England) or Clinton’s force before moving.57  This clearly suggested 
that the addition of Clinton’s men might be enough to persuade him to move, but 
Clinton had a mere 2,445 men with him according to returns of 1 August and, given 
Howe’s subsequent insistence on awaiting the arrival of all his intended 
reinforcements, it seems unlikely that Clinton’s earlier arrival would have made any 
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difference.58 On 6 August, in fact, Howe wrote of the importance of having all of the 
reinforcements before acting.59 
Clinton had more reason to be concerned with Germain’s response to the 
drawn-out proceedings of the southern expedition. The American Secretary had 
grown increasingly impatient while awaiting news of the first strike back against the 
rebels. On 3 May he had urged Howe to remain patient and await the ‘large 
reinforcements’60 that were on their way from Britain, believing that this would make 
his ultimate success more assured. By 21 June he was hoping that the arrival of the 
first units (Highlanders from the 42nd and 71st Regiments) may already have allowed 
Howe to take New York (these troops had actually started to arrive with Howe on 8 
June, but he was still at Halifax at the time). Germain betrayed one of the reasons for 
his impatience: the immense cost of supplying Howe’s army from Britain. Having a 
firm base at New York would hopefully reduce Howe’s dependence on supplies 
shipped from home.61 Replying to Howe’s letter of 7 July, Germain gave a subtle 
prod, assuring Howe that the King was quite happy with his decision to await ‘the 
arrival of one of the expected reinforcements’.62 Two days after writing this to Howe, 
Germain wrote also to Clinton, in response to a letter of 8 July, declaring himself 
‘extremely disappointed and mortified’63 to hear by that letter that Clinton was still to 
the southward. 
This sort of criticism was almost unbearable to Clinton. In his narrative of the 
war, the defence of his decisions regarding the southern expedition is exhaustive (it 
takes up the best part of 15 pages in the published version, The American Rebellion, 	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while the Battle of Long Island is dealt with in just two)64 and at the time he 
despatched his secretary, Richard Reeve, to Britain to defend his name. Reeve’s 
report back, written on 27 August 1776, could not have made comfortable reading. 
Reeve reported that Germain in particular was unhappy with Clinton’s performance, 
that General Harvey believed he should not have gone south in the first place and that 
Germain also believed Clinton would now be too late to take part in the attack on 
New York.65 Clinton had finally arrived at New York on 31 July and had lost little 
time in pushing his ideas on Howe.66 Clinton felt aggrieved, and although Sir Peter 
Parker would be the main focus of his indignation regarding the southern expedition, 
Clinton’s hypersensitivity would also lead him to be prickly around Howe, whom he 
partly blamed for being imprecise in his orders. This can be seen clearly in Clinton’s 
pressing of advice on his commanding officer, claiming that he had suggested moving 
on the rebel positions along the Gowanus Heights on Long Island earlier than the 
assault was actually made (Howe did not make his move until 27 August). Clinton’s 
insistence that he repeatedly pressed Howe on this suggests that he wanted to remove 
any possible impression that he had held up the offensive himself. The fact that Howe 
insisted on awaiting the arrival of the Hessians ought to have calmed Clinton and 
removed any concerns that he might be blamed for the delay in attacking, but by now 
he was engaged in a subtle undermining of Howe, a process that would get more overt 
as their relationship deteriorated.67 
The first signs of active undermining of Howe had appeared as early as the 
previous year. In their psychological study of Clinton, Wyatt and Willcox noted the 
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trustworthiness and accuracy of Clinton’s documents, claiming that ‘everything that is 
known of his character… acquits him of a wilful effort to deceive’.68 Clinton began to 
disprove this on 15 November 1775. Although there had been no falling out with 
Howe at this time, apart from the slight issue over the report on the battle of Bunker 
Hill, Clinton began to undermine his commander-in-chief in correspondence with 
friends and family. Whether this can be viewed as a systematic attempt to discredit 
Howe, or whether it was merely a product of Clinton’s distrust for anyone’s opinions 
but his own, he began to criticise Howe, subtly at first, but with increasing strength. In 
his letter of 15 November, to General Harvey and the Duke of Newcastle, he 
lamented that the British army was not already in New York and that it was too late to 
go there now.69 Just over a month earlier, however, he had written to General Gage 
that, although acting from a base at New York was the best option for the campaign 
the following year, he doubted that reinforcements would arrive in time to take 
possession of it immediately. This sound reason why New York had not already been 
taken was conveniently omitted from his later letter.70 
Following the southern expedition, and in a defensive state of mind, Clinton’s 
undermining gathered pace. Feeling that his plan for an attack on an undefended pass 
on the extreme left of the rebel lines on the Gowanus Heights had not been well 
received, he began to disagree with Howe on every point.71 During the Battle of Long 
Island, Clinton allowed men under his command to approach a redoubt in the 
American lines on Brooklyn Heights. This, Clinton freely admitted, was contrary to 
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explicit orders from Howe that the lines were not to be assaulted.72 The subsequent 
plan to land troops at Kip’s Bay on Manhattan was not to Clinton’s liking either. In a 
memorandum of 15 September he declared that he believed the plan could lead to a 
serious reverse. Instead, Clinton favoured a move to entrap the rebel army on 
Manhattan by taking the Heights of Fordham, which dominated King’s Bridge, the 
principal route off the island of Manhattan.73 Clinton’s preference for this sort of 
enveloping manoeuvre was perfectly reasonable and was certainly bolder than the 
methods Howe ultimately adopted, but Clinton’s disagreement was not limited to a 
mere difference of opinion. There was spite involved as well, such as when he wrote 
in derogatory fashion of Howe’s plan to land at Kip’s Bay, dismissing it as having ‘no 
demonstration but what a child would see through’.74 (This resonates with Clinton’s 
earlier criticism of the plan of attack at Bunker Hill, in which he described the British 
as an ‘army of children’.75) 
In a conference with Howe on 1 October, Clinton disagreed with plans to 
continue moving against the Americans, believing that they should wait for news 
from the northern army before doing anything more. He also disagreed with the 
choice of landing point suggested by Howe as the British continued to press the rebel 
army and again mentioned the possibility of suffering a defeat.76 The landing point, 
Throg’s Neck (also sometimes referred to as ‘Frog’s Neck’), turned out to have been 
poorly chosen. After disembarking a force under Clinton on 12 October, it was 
discovered that the route to the mainland (Throg’s Neck became an island at high 
tide) was easily defended and a small force of American riflemen prevented Clinton 
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from moving inland. On 18 October the British troops re-embarked to move to a more 
advantageous landing point, but not before further damage was done to the Howe-
Clinton relationship.77 Although no surviving documents detail the events clearly, 
Clinton mentioned in a much later conference with Howe that he (Clinton) had been 
insulted by orders arriving from Howe during the Throg’s Neck debacle. Condemning 
the entire affair as a ‘tweedledum business,’78 Clinton claimed that he had received 
several contradictory orders from Howe. This had annoyed Clinton, who felt the 
orders were unnecessary and condescending. According to Clinton’s notes of the 
meeting, Howe had later told Clinton that he had been entirely satisfied with his 
actions and that he had, in fact, done exactly as Howe would have wanted even before 
the orders arrived. Unfortunately for Howe, Clinton was not the sort of man to be 
easily mollified.  
On 27 October Clinton had advised against a direct attack on the rebels at White 
Plains.79 On 30 October, Clinton again disagreed with Howe’s plans to attack the 
rebel lines, giving an exhaustive list of reasons, including the ‘strength of the post, the 
difficulty of approach, the little protection from cannon, little chance of making a 
blow of consequence, the risk after a tolerable good campaign of finishing it by a 
cheque, the moral certainty of a junction with Burgoyne next year’.80 Clinton’s 
official account of events at White Plains, as contained in The American Rebellion, 
sidestepped the matter and mentioned only that Howe was aware of his thoughts on 
the proposed attack, but the draft of Howe’s narrative adds further detail.81 In a 
section entitled ‘In addition to White Plains’, which was ultimately left out of the 	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narrative as read out to the House of Commons, Howe stated that he had informed 
Clinton of his intention to attack the American lines with the British soldiers under 
Clinton’s command.82 Clinton’s list of reasons why they should not attack was 
therefore a more direct rejection of Howe’s plan. In the event, bad weather on the 
morning of 1 November put paid to any hopes of launching the attack.83 
As well as these differences of opinion, Clinton’s disenchantment with Howe 
continued to develop. In September he wrote to Edward Harvey (although he later 
deleted the line) ‘At last our C[ommander] does me the honour on all occasions to 
give me the avant garde,’84 suggesting that he felt he was due more than this and 
possibly referring to Howe’s unwillingness to take his advice. More seriously, during 
the withdrawal from White Plains, Howe’s refusal to allow Clinton to alter the order 
of march prompted an unguarded comment, in which Clinton stated that he would 
prefer to command three companies on his own rather than serve under Howe in a 
bigger force. This outburst was heard by Cornwallis and subsequently passed on to 
Howe.85 Rather than accepting that he had been unwise to give voice to such an 
opinion, Clinton chose to view Cornwallis’ revelation as an act of treachery, and even 
made reference to a conspiracy to undermine the relationship between himself and his 
commanding officer.86 
In November, to Harvey again, he bemoaned Howe’s decision to send him to 
Rhode Island, suggesting that a move up the Chesapeake as part of a two-pronged 
offensive on Philadelphia would be more effective. Clinton rather snidely wrote that 
Howe must have better intelligence than himself and that ‘I am to suppose he has 	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decided for the best’.87 The memorandum of another conference with Howe, in 
November, shows that Clinton was again pressing with his alternative ideas for 
prosecuting the war, but by December his disdain for his commander finally erupted 
into the open. In a letter to the Duke of Newcastle he referred to him as ‘Mr. How,’ a 
clearly derogatory term and one that chimes with a political cartoon of 1777, entitled 
‘A conference between the Brothers HOW to get Rich’.88 Presumably at about the 
same time, although the document is only dated ‘1776’, another Clinton memo, partly 
in cipher, finally laid all his grievances open. 
I do not esteem the man I serve under. Be assured if ever you serve 
certain men essentially they never forgive it. I have borne the burden 
this whole campaign, always command the first attack, always 
succeed and am never thanked. As I have repeated many times the 
minister has used his country and me ill by not given me powers. I 
believe all would have been over and I the happy instrument for 
these people have told me they treated with me preferably.89 
 
It is worth considering what exactly Howe had been doing to generate such an 
escalating response from Clinton. Howe’s correspondence with Clinton appears to 
have been uniformly business-like and professional. There was none of the flattery, 
liberally sprinkled with French phrases, that peppered Clinton’s correspondence with 
friends and relatives, but Howe’s letters could not be considered cold. He appears to 
have kept Clinton informed of operational plans and, indeed, to have consulted with 
him frequently on those plans. Written communication could probably have been 
more frequent, but this was a general failing of Howe (he was forced to defend 
himself on this point during the parliamentary inquiry) and certainly not especially 
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aimed at Clinton.90 On 14 September, Howe invited Clinton to a meeting to discuss 
the landing of the army on Manhattan and Clinton’s memos note this as well as 
subsequent meetings.91 He was kept appraised of enemy movements around New 
York, of rumours of the approach of Burgoyne from the north and of Cornwallis’ 
success at Fort Lee (originally known as Fort Constitution).92 It also appears that 
Howe made efforts to bring his second-in-command over to his way of thinking. He 
did not merely dismiss Clinton’s ideas out of hand, but sought to convince him of his 
reasons for adopting different plans. Clinton admitted that, regarding the landing at 
Kip’s Bay, Howe ‘made use of every argument to induce me to be of his opinion’.93 
When it came to planning for the capture of Rhode Island, a plan that Clinton 
disapproved of, Howe delivered clear and concise orders and, following the receipt of 
intelligence that the rebels had evacuated the island, informed Clinton that he was to 
proceed there immediately.94 It was after the successful occupation of Rhode Island 
that Clinton wrote to Newcastle, referring to his commander-in-chief as ‘Mr. How’, 
yet days later Howe wrote a warm congratulatory letter to Clinton, praising him for 
the smoothly effected occupation and terming it ‘an acquisition of infinite 
importance’.95 Clinton’s claim that he had never been thanked by Howe was 
obviously mistaken.96 
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It has been suggested that the decision to put Clinton in command of the Rhode 
Island expedition was symptomatic of Howe losing patience with his fractious 
subordinate, a way of getting Clinton, and his endless disagreements and suggestions, 
out of his way.97 Although the idea is plausible, there does not seem to be any 
evidence to support it. Howe had long considered Rhode Island to be an essential 
acquisition; he had mentioned its importance as a source of supplies back in May, in a 
letter to Germain, and it would also provide a safe winter harbour for the ships under 
the command of his brother.98 Clinton was the obvious choice, as second-in-
command, to lead such an important expedition and it seems likely he have 
complained had the honour been given to somebody else. 
Although it has been shown that the Howe-Clinton relationship had already 
deteriorated to the point where Clinton was thoroughly contemptuous of his 
commander-in-chief, the capture of Rhode Island provoked more antagonism. Having 
commended Clinton on his leadership of the expedition, Howe went on to criticise 
Lord Percy, who took over command at Rhode Island following Clinton’s return to 
Britain in early 1777. Howe wrote to Percy on 7 January 1777, requesting that forage 
be gathered and sent to him from Rhode Island (one of the main reasons for taking 
control of Rhode Island was to secure an easier source of supplies), but when Percy 
took six weeks to reply, and then claimed not to have much forage available, Howe 
reacted badly. He insinuated that Percy should have taken Providence as well during 
the initial invasion of Rhode Island, naturally upsetting Percy, who had been 
subordinate to Clinton at the time.99 Clinton had actually written to Howe during the 
invasion to insist that a move on Providence was too risky and might suffer a 	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reverse.100 It is possible that Howe had originally been frustrated by Clinton’s 
reluctance to be more aggressive and that this spilled over in misdirected anger 
towards Percy. Whatever the reason, Percy took offence and decided to resign.101 
Percy’s first letter to Clinton on this matter, in February 1777, coincided with 
Clinton’s visit home, where he used a meeting with Germain to inform the American 
Secretary of his ideas for running the war. Clinton outlined his preference for 
launching a two-pronged attack on Philadelphia rather than the invasion of Rhode 
Island, and reported on his pushing of a plan to land behind the rebels on Manhattan 
following the Battle of Long Island. Clinton claimed, in notes on the meeting, that 
Germain was impressed with his ideas.102 Clinton also used his time at home to push 
his case regarding the southern expedition, eventually (and remarkably) securing the 
red ribbon of a Knight of the Bath. That Clinton was able to see this as a genuine 
mark of approval, considering the fact that the southern expedition achieved nothing 
and was highly embarrassing to himself and Peter Parker, speaks volumes for his 
ability to delude himself. It seems almost certain that the conferring of an official 
mark of approval was the only way Germain could see of getting Clinton to let the 
matter drop, and Clinton even noted, apparently oblivious to the irony, that after their 
meeting Germain had ‘expressed his anxiety for me to be gone, and wished me to 
name a time’.103 
Clinton’s near-paranoid state of mind by this stage was revealed in his notes of 
a conversation with General Harvey on the same day, in which Clinton had made it 
clear that he was accepting the red ribbon as redress for an injustice already received 	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and that he would not accept any more slights in the future. He also revealed that he 
was suspicious that Germain would undermine him once he was back in America and 
that he was jealous of Burgoyne being given command of the northern army to move 
down the Hudson river.104 
It was in this frame of mind that Clinton returned to America, to find that he 
now had a genuine grievance against Howe. By criticising Percy’s failure to occupy 
Providence, Howe was indirectly criticising Clinton, who had actually been in 
command. This was to become a major source of friction between the two men for the 
rest of the time they worked together. As a working partnership they were already 
probably finished, but what was possibly their first conversation after Clinton arrived 
back in the colonies was to underline the fact. Clinton’s memorandum of this 
conversation with Howe, on 6 July 1777, revealed that their relationship was now 
hopelessly fractured. On Howe’s side there appeared to be genuine regret that they 
had not been able to work together. On Clinton’s side, there was no such impression, 
and he was less than completely honest with his commanding officer. Clinton opened 
the conversation by referring to Howe’s insinuation that not occupying Providence 
was a mistake. Both men then professed a desire to be friends, but Clinton claimed 
that ‘secret enemies’105 were working to make that impossible. Clinton was obviously 
referring to Cornwallis, and his recounting of Clinton’s exclamation that he did not 
wish to serve under Howe. Cornwallis could hardly be considered a secret enemy, but 
Clinton seemed more affronted by this supposed betrayal of confidence than 
embarrassed by his own lack of discretion. Howe then stated that the two of them had 
never agreed on any single question. Clinton’s reply was that they could not be 
expected to have agreed on everything, considering their very different military 	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backgrounds (Clinton had learned his trade in Europe, while most of Howe’s 
experience had come in North America).106 Clinton claimed that he had always given 
his opinions freely (which was certainly true) but with the deference due Howe’s 
position as commander-in-chief. Howe in turn replied that he had no use for deference 
and that the very term was hurtful to him. ‘We argued a little bit,’ Clinton continued, 
‘and both thought it right to drop the subject.’107 According to Clinton, both men 
agreed that they held each other in high regard but ‘by some cursed fatality’ they were 
unable to work together. Clinton here fudged the issue of his dealings with Germain 
in Britain, claiming that he had been defending the honour of the army when 
discussing the southern expedition, where in reality he had merely been defending his 
part in the affair and seeking to shift the blame onto Parker and the Royal Navy. 
Howe, unaware of Clinton’s actual motives, was apparently touched by this and 
(Clinton believed) felt guilty at the bad impression he had formed of his second-in-
command.108 
This most revealing memorandum, effectively describing the final breakdown 
of a relationship, might have been expected to draw a line under matters to some 
extent, but despite having agreed that the subject should be dropped, Clinton went on 
to mention Howe’s ‘insinuation’109 in further conferences on 8, 11 and 13 July. On 
each occasion it is clear that Clinton was initially angry about Howe’s criticism, and 
that he calmed down after receiving reassurances from Howe that he had not intended 
to criticise him. On 8 July Clinton wrote that their conversation was ‘very warm’ at 
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first, but that he was composed after receiving Howe’s reassurances.110 On 11 July he 
again raised the matter, to be told by Howe that he had only one wish; that the two 
could ‘draw together’.111 On 13 July, Clinton again raised the issue, and Howe again 
denied having intended any affront.112 The fact that Clinton repeatedly returned to the 
issue after apparently accepting Howe’s reassurances must have been confusing and 
draining for Howe, yet Clinton’s memoranda do not hint at any loss of patience from 
the commander-in-chief, who actually comes over in a far more sympathetic light 
than Clinton himself. This is an important point. The notes of the meetings between 
Howe and Clinton are among the most valuable evidence available regarding Howe’s 
conduct while in command. If Clinton, who held Howe in contempt, nevertheless 
depicted the man in a favourable light in these notes, then that is extremely telling. 
Howe repeatedly comes across as a patient man, one who was at pains to establish a 
working relationship with his second-in-command, despite repeated rebuffs. This does 
not appear to be a man who was oblivious to, or unconcerned with, his subordinate’s 
opinions. 
Clinton would continue to serve as Howe’s second-in-command for the duration 
of the 1777 campaign, but he was already set on resigning once the campaign was 
over.113 Howe, finding it impossible to work alongside Clinton and realising that his 
second-in-command did not wish to work alongside him, had little alternative but to 
place him in command of the troops at New York while the bulk of the army moved 
on Philadelphia. Clinton viewed this as a further slight and seethed at the limitations 
imposed upon him by his small force at New York, while Burgoyne, an officer junior 
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to him, commanded an army acting on the offensive with an opportunity to seize 
personal glory, but he had left Howe with no alternative.114 
Howe and Clinton did not work closely together during the 1777 campaign, so 
there are no revealing memoranda of conversations to draw on, but Howe’s 
communications with his second-in-command continued to be business-like and 
professional. He actually went further than this when requesting that Clinton send him 
some of the regiments under his command at New York. Aware of the limitations of 
Clinton’s position, he apologised for requesting the troops and insisted that he would 
not have done so were it not essential.115 Howe was also free with his praise for 
Clinton’s move on the rebel positions in the Hudson Highlands in October of that 
year.116  
Despite Howe’s efforts, however, Clinton continued to chafe and formally 
requested to be relieved of his command in New York on 26 October 1777. Howe’s 
reply of 10 November included a detailed defence of his actions towards Clinton, but 
there was also a sense of resignation. Howe noted from Clinton’s letter: 
…that you conceive yourself not at liberty, consistent with your honor, to 
serve another campaign in America, if I should be continued in the 
command of the army, from whence I am to conclude you think I have 
been remiss in attention to you as second in command… Upon your arrival 
at York this year you repeatedly mentioned your dislike to serve in the 
same corps with me; there was then no alternative than the command at 
New York, in which (by the way) you have gained much honor and done 
singular good service… with respect to my drawing the troops lately 
arrived from New York, to strengthen this army, be assured it was not 
done without admitting every consideration, and from a conviction the 
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measure was absolutely necessary… the King’s service must suffer 
materially by your absence.117 
 
Clinton was displeased that the personal nature of his dissatisfaction with Howe 
had become so apparent and even suggested to Howe that he had been misquoted.118 
In private correspondence, however, he admitted that dissatisfaction over Burgoyne’s 
superior command was merely a smokescreen for public consumption and that the 
real reason for his request to resign his position was his unwillingness to continue to 
serve under Howe. ‘I have served this campaign cheerfully,’119 he wrote (with a 
shocking absence of self-awareness) to General Harvey, but went on to admit that 
there was no chance of a cordial relationship with Howe and that they disagreed on 
almost every military matter. He also claimed that Cornwallis had repeated his words 
to Howe in an attempt to drive a wedge between the two, but Clinton had already 
admitted that there was no common ground between himself and Howe. To the Duke 
of Newcastle, he made it clear that his personal dissatisfaction with Howe pre-dated 
the affair over Lord Percy and the failure to occupy Providence. It was in this letter 
that Clinton revealed that he had mentioned to a friend that he would rather desert 
than continue to serve after the following campaign (but he also claimed that he was 
exaggerating for effect).120 
The slow deterioration in Howe’s relationship with Clinton would have been a 
distraction to his work as commander-in-chief, but it need not have been disastrous. 
Howe was still apparently able to take his army where he wanted and choose his own 
strategy and tactics. Although Clinton’s permanent grumbling would have become 
annoying, the fact that Howe is depicted by Clinton as retaining his patience during 	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their many conferences suggests that he did not find it unbearable. Where Clinton 
may have had a far more serious effect on Howe’s performance was in the strangely 
pessimistic approach he took to operations. 
Clinton is generally considered to have been a bold officer when not in 
command himself, always putting forward plans and stratagems and seemingly in 
favour of decisive action.121 Closer consideration of his advice, however, reveals a 
more cautious frame of mind and it was this approach to the war that directly 
impinged on Howe’s command. Early in the 1776 campaign, while planning was still 
underway, Howe repeatedly claimed to be looking for a decisive victory over 
Washington’s army.122 He wrote of his hope that rebel confidence would be high after 
forcing the British out of Boston, and that it might be possible to lure them into a 
major battle.123 Around the same time, he ordered an assault on the fortified positions 
on Dorchester Heights while still in Boston, casting doubt on the assumption that his 
experience at Breed’s Hill had knocked the appetite for battle out of him (his men did 
not seem to have been dispirited either, as Howe wrote of the ‘ardor of the troops’124 
encouraging him to plan an attack that only bad weather prevented). 
When Clinton and Howe were reunited following the failed southern 
expedition, Clinton certainly presented a variety of plans for Howe’s consideration, 
but also revealed a distinctly conservative side. Clinton repeatedly wrote of his 
concern that the British must not offer the Americans even the possibility of a 
successful action, however small. After British forces landed on Long Island, he 
criticised the decision to move a force under Cornwallis towards Flatbush, claiming 	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that he knew it would provoke skirmishing and that this might give the rebels a taste 
of success. On the plan to land at Kip’s Bay, on York Island, he was more critical, 
claiming that it offered ‘little prospect of victory without buying it dear’ and that there 
was ‘some apprehension of receiving – what we might have given – a defeat en 
détail’.125 Given the fact that the rebels offered no resistance to the landing 
whatsoever (a naval bombardment forced them to abandon their defensive works even 
before any British soldiers landed), Clinton’s caution seems misplaced, and he had 
also recently witnessed how easily the Americans had been routed from positions on 
Long Island that they had been strengthening for weeks.126 
Clinton again voiced concern over a possible serious defeat when discussing 
plans for the landing at Throg’s Neck. His memorandum of that conference with 
Howe records how he (Clinton) would have preferred to wait for news from Burgoyne 
before moving against the Americans.127 Again, the landing proved uneventful and 
even though it turned out to have been a poorly chosen point to disembark, there was 
no danger of suffering a serious defeat. On 30 October, Clinton spoke against 
attacking the rebel lines at White Plains.128 This is a key point, because White Plains 
is one of the moments in the war that critics of Howe have used to demonstrate his 
timidity and unwillingness to commit his troops.129 Having manoeuvred 
Washington’s army off York Island following the Battle of Long Island, Howe had 
allowed the American general to take up a defensive position near the village of 
White Plains. On 28 October there was a small action to dislodge a body of rebels 	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from a hill on the extreme right of the American lines. Howe intended to follow this 
up with an assault on the main American lines, but when he consulted Clinton on the 
matter he was presented with his exhaustive list of reasons why no attack should be 
made. Once more, Clinton had voiced his concerns over the possibility of suffering a 
setback. The conversation continued, with Clinton advising that taking possession of a 
‘bald hill’ on the left would force the Americans from their lines. One of the more 
common criticisms of Howe is that he constantly favoured manoeuvring the enemy 
out of a position rather than assaulting it. Here it can be clearly seen that it was 
Clinton who suggested this sort of approach at White Plains, while Howe was 
favouring an assault. Despite Clinton’s cautions, Howe made preparations to attack on 
1 November, with Clinton leading from the centre. This plan was thwarted, with bad 
weather again putting in an unwelcome appearance.130 In his own account of the 
affair, Clinton failed to mention his list of objections to an assault, stating only that he 
had advised caution in any move. This is plainly a misleading account of his 
conversation with Howe, and Clinton also wrote that he had informed Howe that he 
(ever the good soldier) would be ready to attack whenever the order was given.131 
In assessing the impact Clinton made on Howe’s command of the British army 
it is important to note that Clinton’s pessimism about various plans did not prevent 
Howe from enacting them. His disagreement on every point the two discussed did not 
push Howe’s patience to snapping point. His personal disdain for Howe was not 
reciprocated and his undermining of Howe in letters to friends and relatives was 
repaid by fulsome praise of his performance in the field. In short, Howe was not 
crippled by having a second-in-command who disagreed with his every order, yet it 
simply must have been wearing for him to deal with the constant stream of 	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suggestions, the endless disagreements and the mounting evidence of his personal 
dislike. It is clear that Howe, though disappointed with events, was able to deal with 
the situation and that he worked hard to maintain a positive working relationship. 
However, it is only when considered in the light of problems in other areas, when 
Clinton’s influence is considered as merely one of the problems faced by Howe, that a 
true picture of the pressures upon the commander-in-chief can be revealed.  
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II 
Howe’s army 
The quality of Howe’s army was for a long time largely unquestioned. Many 
historians praised it as large and efficient (the comparison of ‘the hardened veteran’ 
and ‘the ingenuous recruit’1 was not uncommon). Where historians have looked 
closely at the make-up of the armies involved, a more considered opinion has 
developed. Michael Stephenson stated the simple fact that few men in Howe’s army 
would have experienced active service when hostilities broke out, being too young to 
have taken part in the last two major battles fought by the British Army, at Minden 
and Quebec in 1759.2 Other recent works have also explored this theme, most notably 
Fusiliers, by Mark Urban, which went further and argued that the troops under Howe 
were not only inexperienced, but were also disastrously ill-disciplined. Urban used 
this as the starting point for his thesis that the army improved steadily throughout the 
war (in his own words, how it ‘lost America but learned to fight’3). The British army 
in America undoubtedly improved as the war progressed, but Urban’s assertion that it 
was a rigorous program of drill and training (instigated by Howe) that was responsible 
for this improvement is debateable, as shall be shown. 
It is important to explore the abilities of the fighting men under Howe’s 
command, but equally important in the context of this thesis is his opinion of them. 
Confidence, or a lack thereof, in the men he led would inevitably play a large part in 	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determining strategy and also decisions on the battlefield. It would not be fair to 
suggest that Howe was able to choose whatever course of action he desired at any 
given time. He was given tremendous latitude by his political superiors to make and 
change his own plans, but he was still constrained by his army’s size, composition 
and quality. This chapter will consider how much that influenced his decision-making 
as commander-in-chief. 
Howe’s experience in the French and Indian War (1754-1763), and his 
reputation as an expert in light infantry tactics, were attractive qualities as a new 
commander-in-chief was sought to run the war.4 Far from being rigidly bound to 
conventional European methods, key British figures, including Germain, realised the 
need to adapt to American conditions. Howe, having adapted in the previous war, was 
a strong candidate to lead the army. Germain appears to have believed that Howe 
would be able to mould his army to suit the conditions in America, with the light 
infantry performing essential work in screening the main body of the army from 
enemy irregular troops. Germain showed that the lessons of the last war were not lost 
on him, explicitly referring to the disaster suffered by Major General Edward 
Braddock at the Monongahela River, on 9 June 1755. The pertinent lessons drawn 
from that defeat, as far as Germain was concerned, were the need to abandon rigid 
formations on the American battlefield and to disperse the light infantry, who should 
find cover behind trees, walls or hedges and engage the enemy from there.5 
Maldwyn Jones’s chapter on Howe in George Washington’s Generals and 
Opponents argued that conventional thinking in terms of strategy was a theme of 
Howe’s period in command, but he was not believed to be conventional when it came 	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to tactics.6 Germain’s championing of him as a man of ‘more than common abilities’7 
made it clear that he was expecting great things from his new commander, but 
curiously, the dashing light infantry officer that Germain appeared to be counting on 
never materialised. 
Howe’s experiences in the French and Indian War included command of the 
light troops under Major General James Wolfe during the capture of Quebec, and his 
leading of an advanced party of 24 men that secured the Plains of Abraham for Wolfe 
to mount his assault is justifiably celebrated.8 Howe also appears to have led his light 
infantry well during the battle, protecting the left flank of Wolfe’s army from enemy 
irregular troops, including Canadians and Indians.9 This conflict, the counterpart to 
the European-based Seven Years’ War, gave several key British officers (including 
Gage and Cornwallis, as well as Howe) a taste of war in the difficult terrain of North 
America. The lessons were often severe. Braddock’s small army of 1,400 at the 
Monongahela suffered casualties of nearly 1,000 when attacked by an inferior force 
made up mostly of Indians, but by the end of the war it is generally agreed that British 
light infantry, led by capable officers like Amherst, Wolfe and George Augustus 
Howe (William Howe’s eldest brother, who died at Ticonderoga in 1758), had at least 
attained parity with the irregular Indian, French and Canadian forces ranged against 
them.10  
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The problem was that those honed light infantry companies were disbanded 
following the war. Fuller argued that it was misguided complacency about the ease 
with which light troops could be assembled following the outbreak of war that was at 
the heart of the matter, but he also cited the infatuation with the elaborate parade-
ground evolutions of Frederick the Great of Prussia (although John Childs argued that 
the ‘Prussianization’11 of the British army did not really start before 1786).12 Despite 
the decision to disband them, the light infantry had their champions and a common 
opinion was that they would inevitably be needed again. This was underlined by a 
section devoted to them in a publication by Captain Bennett Cuthbertson, from 1768, 
in which he acknowledged that although the light infantry was not an official part of a 
regiment at the time of writing, they would undoubtedly be called into being once 
more when war broke out again.13 Cuthbertson did not get round to addressing the 
duties of a light infantry company until the last chapter of his book (after sections 
dealing with marriages, book-keeping and the ‘suppression of all sorts of 
immoralities’14), but when he did briefly touch on their benefits he made the 
observation that such soldiers could not simply be conjured up in time of war. The 
special skills they had to master meant they needed to be formed and drilled in 
peacetime, and he lamented that the same consideration that had led to marines and 
light cavalry being maintained on the establishment had not been extended to the light 
infantry. Skirmishing through woods was one of the duties Cuthbertson outlined for 
such a body of men, but he also suggested that the separate companies could be 
formed into battalions, ‘to push forward the operations of the campaign, with greater 	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vigour’.15 Cuthbertson was proved right. Two years after his work was published, 
light companies were reinstated, but many of the lessons learned on active duty had 
inevitably been forgotten and it is hardly surprising that the new companies were 
initially of indifferent quality.16 
 
Light infantry training prior to the American War of Independence 
Howe enhanced his reputation as a light infantry expert by organising a six-week 
training camp at Salisbury, from 6 August to 22 September 1774. Seven light infantry 
companies (from the 3rd, 11th, 21st, 29th, 32nd, 36th and 70th Regiments) were put 
through a series of drills that Howe had devised himself.17 This was not intended to be 
an isolated event; following a review of the manoeuvres by the King (at Richmond, 
on 3 October 1774), it was ordered that the drills be practised by all regiments in the 
army and it appears that the new skills were then passed on from one regiment to 
another. In 1775, the 9th Regiment was instructed in the new drills by the 33rd (who 
were not themselves present at the camp, suggesting that the dissemination of 
knowledge was at least partially effective).18 It is also possible that Howe’s 
manoeuvres were about to be taught to the garrison at Boston just prior to hostilities 
breaking out. Orders, on 15 and 16 April 1775, that the light companies were to 
assemble to learn ‘new evolutions’ and ‘new manoeuvres’19 may have signalled this, 
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but might simply have been a cover for preparations for the march on Concord, which 
commenced on the night of 18 April. 
Details on Howe’s training camp are scarce, but a slim document has survived, 
outlining the manoeuvres and, especially, the review overseen by the King.20 This 
booklet details a series of manoeuvres and the words of command to initiate them. 
Key points were the intervals to be kept between files (termed ‘order’, ‘open order’ 
and ‘extended order’, they were two, four and 10-feet intervals, respectively) and the 
speed at which the evolutions were to be carried out (‘march’, ‘march march’ and 
‘advance’ meaning slow time, quick time and run, respectively).21 Although a list of 
manoeuvres may not suggest free-moving light infantry formations, it is important to 
note that Howe’s approach here would have found favour with at least one other light 
infantry expert of the era. The Hessian Jäger commander Johann von Ewald (who 
fought under Howe in the War of Independence) insisted that line companies should 
be trained in light infantry techniques and vice versa. He dismissed the notion that 
light troops did not need to be proficient in manoeuvres (because they would not be 
expected to fight in close order during pitched battles), believing that drill was 
essential for their discipline and pride. He also reasoned that well-drilled troops would 
appear more formidable to an enemy.22 Drilling light companies as a battalion was 
also an accepted concept; von Ewald advocated grouping light companies into 
battalions during operations, although they could stay with their respective regiments 
during peacetime. Even then, he recommended drilling them in battalion strength.23  
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In all, 12 pages of Howe’s slim volume were devoted to manoeuvres, with a 
further three covering platoon exercise, or loading of a musket. Just four further pages 
completed the manual, but these are by far the most revealing and demonstrate that 
Howe’s camp involved far more than parade-ground drills. The final four pages dealt 
with ‘Light Infantry Movements before his Majesty at Richmond Park, 3 October 
1774’24 and prove that the manoeuvres were taught within the context of a series of 
tactical situations; a plain, wood, hill and house provided focal points for the 
manoeuvres, allowing the companies to extend or contract their order at various 
speeds in realistic situations. It even appears that a body of men may have played the 
part of an enemy force during the review. At one point, three light companies attacked 
an ‘enemy’ posted on rising ground to the left of the battalion, while three more 
advanced on a house to the right that had also been occupied. A single company in 
extended order (10-feet intervals between files) maintained communications between 
the two corps. The enemy then fell back to a hill to take up a new position, which was 
in turn attacked.25  
Of particular interest is the use made of trees. Soldiers approached the house 
using the trees as cover and then fired from behind them. ‘Tree’ was even used as a 
verb (‘March thro’ the wood in extended order, halt at the edge of it, tree and fire by 
files’26). This would suggest that Germain’s faith in Howe was well placed, as this 
was one of the key elements that Germain believed essential to successfully fighting 
in North America. Firing was almost always ordered by files, in which the two-man 
file on the right of a formation would fire first, followed by the next file. In this way 
shots would be aimed, rather than delivered en masse, and the concept of firing by 
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files while advancing is a recurring theme in the manual.27 However, other elements 
of the drill do not fit so neatly into light infantry orthodoxy and it is revealing to see 
how Howe used the battalion. The companies actually took on roles that would be 
seen in a corps of combined line and light infantry. In this respect, flankers were 
employed and at one stage several companies launched a frontal assault on an enemy 
position on the hill, screened by an advanced line of skirmishers.28 The document 
even noted how the assaulting companies would have been checked by an enemy 
volley (simulating this was part of the display on 3 October) and would have taken a 
moment to recover. Historians would not consider such a frontal assault to be part of 
classic light infantry tactics.29	  Likewise, the mention of firing by companies and by 
volley (although there was just one in each case) do not fit into the standard ‘free-
moving, free-firing’30 model of a light infantryman in action.31  
Howe’s detailed thoughts on light infantry were never committed to paper. Had 
he written a treatise on the use of light troops, as Ewald was to do after the war, it 
would be possible to be certain of his thoughts on the matter, but the scant details of 
his light infantry camp provide evidence upon which to draw. Imagining Howe’s light 
infantry companies advancing as regular infantry, screened by fellow light 
infantrymen deployed as skirmishers and flankers, is at first puzzling, but it hints at 
what Howe’s philosophy may have been. He appears to have believed that his light 
infantry battalion had to be able to take on some of the duties of heavy infantry, being 
prepared to assault defences rather than merely preparing the way for the line 	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companies. He appears to have viewed his composite battalion as an elite corps, able 
to manoeuvre at speed and retain cohesion when fighting in extended order, but it was 
not merely an adjunct force to flank or screen heavy infantry. It was to be a self-
sufficient unit that could operate independently of line companies (if this was not the 
case, he would presumably have invited some line infantry to take part in his 
exercises). This would, theoretically, enable the light infantry to move more quickly, 
unencumbered by slower heavy troops and able to flow seamlessly from one 
formation to another, taking on the different roles (flanker, skirmisher, assaulting 
troops) as needed. Howe’s vision of a light infantry corps appears to have been one of 
a fast-moving, hard-hitting, independent force, able to take on and overwhelm enemy 
positions, driving them from defensive works and then pursuing them relentlessly 
(‘they [the light companies] fire upon the flying enemy, continuing to pursue from 
one strong post to another, until at length he surrenders’32). 
This would be demanding work and would require resourceful men. A 
publication dating from the time of the French and Indian War throws a good deal of 
light on what expectations were placed on these soldiers. William Smith’s An 
Historical Account of Bouquet’s Expedition Against the Ohio Indians in 1764 was 
first published in 1765 and went into great detail on how a light infantryman should 
be trained, dressed and equipped for operations in North America.33 Starting with a 
detailed description of how an irregular force, such as one composed of Indians, 
might attack a conventional European army, Smith went on to describe how that 
mode of warfare could be countered. Light troops, or ‘hunters’, should be (according 
to Smith) light in every way: lightly clothed, lightly armed and lightly accoutred. 
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Smith went on to describe a veritable super-soldier, recruited from the age of 15 and 
able to leap logs and ditches, pursue an enemy tirelessly, fire and reload with great 
rapidity, swim across rivers (pushing clothes and weapons before them on a small 
raft), perform complex evolutions at the run and attain such a mastery of every 
element of soldiering that they would, in time, become ‘tolerable good carpenters, 
joiners, wheelwrights, coopers, armourers, smiths, masons, brickmakers, saddlers, 
tailors, butchers, bakers, shoemakers, curriers, etc.’.34 There is no way of knowing if 
Howe was familiar with Smith’s book. He is not generally reckoned to have been a 
student of warfare (Ira Gruber’s recent work on the literature read by British officers 
has no information on Howe, but this may again be the result of the scarcity of 
documents on which to draw)35 and it is probably safer to assume that he had never 
read it, but it is reasonable to suggest that the tone of the work would have chimed 
with Howe’s own experiences in North America.  
Howe’s training camp alone would have been scant preparation for war, even 
assuming that the ripple effect of regiments passing on their new skills was effective 
(intriguingly, the copy of Howe’s manual at the National Army Museum is marked 
‘No. 287,’36 suggesting that multiple copies were prepared and distributed) but further 
evidence shows that light infantry training was undertaken regularly by British troops 
in Boston in the period immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities. This small 
army would form the nucleus of Howe’s force in America and its quality at the start 
of the war is of critical importance when considering Howe’s leadership. 
Howe was not the only British officer to learn light infantry tactics in the 
previous war. Gage had actually been with Braddock at the Monongahela and it 	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would have been a very stubborn traditionalist indeed who could not draw lessons 
from that. Gage, in fact, raised and commanded a light infantry battalion following his 
experience alongside Braddock.37 This clashes with the accepted picture of Gage as a 
man out of his depth (Germain said as much in a letter to Suffolk, depicting Gage as a 
man who did not have the imagination to ‘venture to take a single step beyond the 
letter of his instructions’38). Fuller was even more damning of Gage, condemning him 
as a mediocre general who could not learn from experience. Fuller also claimed that 
British infantry training prior to the American War of Independence was flawed and 
contributed directly to the problems at Bunker Hill and the earlier retreat from 
Concord.39 Both themes were picked up by other historians, including Piers 
Mackesy.40 
There is strong evidence to dispute these assertions. In a private journal by Dr 
Robert Honyman, fairly detailed descriptions are made of the training undertaken by 
British troops at Boston in early 1775. Honyman’s journal was written as discontent 
in the colonies was bubbling over and he often reported seeing local militia training as 
well. In a country that appeared to be on the verge of slipping into open hostilities it is 
unsurprising that the British garrison at Boston would be regularly drilled, but it is the 
nature of that drill that is of most interest here. Honyman described how, on 22 March 
1775, he spent an entertaining morning watching British troops drill on the common. 
In particular, it was the activities of the light infantry companies that caught his eye. 
Describing them as ‘young active fellows’41, he wrote that they took part in the same 
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drills as their comrades in the line companies (also known as ‘hatmen’), but also 
practised irregular tactics. This included lying on their backs to reload (thus 
presenting a very small target) and firing while lying prone. They also massed on the 
wings of their regiments, firing constantly but independently (there was no volley fire 
from them, with each man picking out his own shots) and acted both to secure a 
retreat and to screen a body of men forming up. This sounds like classic light infantry 
tactics and although Honyman cannot be held up as a military expert, it is clear that he 
had at least some understanding of what he was watching, and he insisted that some 
of the regiments he watched were ‘extremely expert in their discipline’.42 It is also 
worth noting that the companies Honyman watched were not grouped together in a 
light infantry battalion, but appear to have remained with their respective regiments. 
As well as the light infantry drill, Honyman described how he watched a 
regiment engaged in target practice. It is often stated that eighteenth century muskets 
were too inaccurate to make aimed shots of much value; the massed volley was the 
answer to this, trusting that a large number of musket balls would be sure to hit 
something, whereas individual shots would be likely to miss their targets 
completely.43 Honyman watched as an entire regiment was drilled, the soldiers 
stepping forward individually to fire at a target. Disappointingly, Honyman did not 
note how far away the target was, or how accurate was the fire, but the drill continued 
until each man had fired 10 rounds. Marines then fired by platoons, companies and 
files (but still aiming at targets). Interestingly, Honyman claimed that Gage was 
overseeing these drills and that they took place despite extremely cold weather and 	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frequent flurries of snow. Three days later, Honyman saw five companies again 
engage in target practice, again firing 10 rounds per man. As well as these detailed 
descriptions, he also briefly noted seeing British soldiers drilling on 20, 27 and 31 
March and again on 1 April, before his travels took him away from Boston.44 
Again, it must be said that tension in the colonies was mounting at this time, so 
regular drill would be expected, but Gage had been drilling his men for months by 
this point. On 21 November 1774 he had issued orders that the men were to exercise 
whenever the weather was fine and that this should include firing with live 
ammunition. Regiments fired at targets on 3 December, while on 7 December the 4th, 
5th, 38th, 47th and 52nd Regiments took part in a field day on the common (a field day 
allowed concentrations of troops, five full regiments in this case, to stage mock 
battles, including ambushes and the storming and holding of defensive works, and 
were therefore highly valued as methods of bringing a garrison closer to battle-
readiness).45 John Houlding noted that musket balls were very sparingly supplied in 
peacetime (at the near-farcical amount of two to four balls per man per year) and that 
it was only in time of war that enough lead shot was available for target practice, 
suggesting that the British garrison in Boston was well aware that hostilities were 
imminent.46 
The diary of Lieutenant Frederick Mackenzie of the 23rd Regiment adds more 
detail. Mackenzie told how regiments were frequently given target practice, although 
he reported that six rounds per man was the usual number of shots. He also provided 
the fascinating information that the targets employed were full-size cut-outs of human 	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figures, made of thin board.47 The switch from bulls-eye targets to human-shaped cut-
outs has been cited by David Grossman (a psychologist and former officer in the 
United States Army) as one of the modern developments employed by armies to 
increase the effectiveness of their men and their willingness to fire upon the enemy, 
yet here is clear evidence that the British were using this sophisticated technique in 
the eighteenth century.48 Grossman claimed that this type of drill served to instil a 
reflex action known as ‘automaticity’, making it more likely that they would be 
willing to fire at an enemy, and also commented on the rewarding of soldiers for 
proficient marksmanship (by granting leave or awarding a badge). Mackenzie 
reported that exactly the same sort of rewards system was in place in Boston in 1775, 
saying that ‘Premiums are sometimes given for the best shots, by which means some 
of our men have become excellent marksmen’.49 It would be going too far to suggest 
that British officers in eighteenth-century Boston were aware of automaticity on a 
conscious level, but there seems to have been an instinctive understanding of the 
concept. Mackenzie also noted that objects were sometimes pointed out on the sea to 
be fired at, adding the extra difficulty of a moving target.50	  
This was clearly not a garrison that was falling into slothful ways, and the 
training appears to have been quite sophisticated, but British troops were about to 
perform poorly during the first engagements of the conflict. Just how poorly they 
performed, and what the reasons for this were, have been the subject of some debate. 
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Early engagements 
The ‘shot heard round the world’51, fired on 19 April 1775, signalled the outbreak of 
open hostilities between Britain and her colonial subjects. A column comprising the 
light and grenadier companies of nine regiments of the Boston garrison had been 
ordered by Gage to march via Lexington to Concord and seize a suspected cache of 
military supplies. The march back became a nightmare as swarming militia kept up a 
constant fire on the retreating British. Were it not for a relief column, led by Percy, 
the 900 or so men of the light and grenadier companies might conceivably have been 
forced to surrender. As it was, casualties numbered over 200, with 68 dead, making 
this a very costly opening gambit by the British.52 
 A lack of discipline among the British troops has been an accepted facet of this 
encounter ever since reports began to circulate. Lieutenant Barker’s personal account 
included damning testimony. He stated that, upon a shot or two being fired (it is 
unclear who actually fired first) at Lexington, the British troops rushed at an already 
dispersing group of militia and opened fire without orders, killing several of them. 
Trying to restore order proved difficult as ‘the men were so wild they could hear no 
orders’.53 Although it has been shown that the British army had been drilled regularly 
by Gage, shooting at targets is no preparation for the shock that comes when the 
targets shoot back. The repeated drilling of the procedure needed to load and fire 
muskets was intended to prepare troops for performing this relatively simple task 
under the intense stress of combat, but as most of the British troops at Lexington 
could not have taken part in a battle before, they would not have been hardened to the 	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effects of receiving fire. Grossman undertook a study of combat stress and reached 
some revealing conclusions about its effect on a solder’s ability to function. When the 
heart-rate tops 175 beats per minute (as might be expected when under fire for the 
first time), there is ‘an absolute breakdown of cognitive processing’.54 Senses begin to 
shut down and ‘behaviour becomes inappropriately aggressive’. With respect to this, 
Barker’s comment that his men could hear no orders was a remarkably pertinent and, 
in fact, literal observation. Comments from the likes of Lord Suffolk, who wrote to 
Germain that reports of the retreat ‘don’t do much credit to the discipline of our 
troops,’55 suggested that at least some people believed blame for the debacle rested 
squarely on the soldiers. The reply from Germain, in which he criticised the planning 
of the march and accused Gage of inadequately training his men, sought to put the 
blame elsewhere as part of his preparations for taking over the running of the war and 
replacing Gage with Howe.56 
Historians have tended to favour Germain’s opinion. Fuller simply stated that 
had the light infantry operated like light infantry there would have been no problem, 
while Fortescue claimed the British were unprepared for the nature of combat they 
experienced.57 More recently, Spring criticised British training in Boston prior to the 
action, claiming that only orthodox, close-order formations had been part of their drill 
(an assertion that is not supported by evidence, as has been shown).58 Urban took a 
different view, describing how there had been no failure in tactics on the part of the 
British. The light infantry had been used to flank the retreating column as it returned 	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from Concord, but had simply become exhausted and overwhelmed by large numbers 
of enemy militia.59 Urban’s assessment finds support in the writings of von Ewald, 
whose highly regarded book on light infantry tactics drew heavily on his experiences 
with Howe’s army in America. Von Ewald asserted that flanking or skirmishing work 
during a retreat was exhausting and that troops needed to be rotated every hour if it 
was to remain effective. There is no mention of such a rotation of troops during the 
retreat from Concord and Fortescue reckoned the men had been on their feet for 14 
hours by the time the harried column reached Lexington.60 
That there had been indiscipline, however, is not in question. An anonymous 
eye-witness report confirmed that Lieutenant-Colonel Smith of the 10th Regiment, 
leading the initial British column, had given strict orders that they were not to fire 
unless fired upon.61 The one or two shots, perhaps fired by the local militia, ought not 
to have triggered such a strong response. Again, having reached Lexington, where a 
body of militia had gathered, the witness reported Major Pitcairn, commanding six 
companies of light infantry, ordering his men not to fire unless ordered to do so. 
However, as the militia began to disperse, the light infantry rushed at them, possibly 
provoking the shot that triggered the excessive British response: ‘Without any order 
or regularity, the light infantry began a scattered fire… but were silenced as soon as 
the authority of their officers could make them’.62 
Indiscipline is one thing, but the charge of not acting as light infantry does not 
seem to be substantiated. In fact, the note of censure in the anonymous report above 
fails to take account of the fact that light infantry fire was not meant to have any 	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regularity about it; it was meant to be comprised of individual, aimed fire rather than 
organised volleys. Barker also referred to flanking parties being utilised as the British 
retreat continued from Lexington. These were not from the light infantry companies; 
exhausted from their morning’s work, they marched at the head of the column with 
the equally fatigued grenadiers. Nevertheless, the makeshift flankers from the 
battalion companies in Percy’s relief force did their job of keeping the militia at bay 
for a time, until the terrain they were passing through forced them to close in on the 
column they were protecting. The importance of flanking companies was evidently 
well understood and the British soldiers had been trained well enough that regular 
companies could tackle the duty with at least reasonable effectiveness.63 
It therefore seems unfair to characterise the Boston garrison as a collection of 
ill-trained troops. They were regularly drilled, including in marksmanship and light 
infantry tactics. The retreat from Lexington and Concord became a near rout not 
because of deficiencies in the men themselves, or in their training, but simply because 
the British column had to march for miles under fire. As a first taste of battle, as this 
would have been for the majority of the British soldiers, this must have been a 
traumatic experience. Another account of the retreat (attributed to ‘an officer of one 
of the flank companies’64 and included in the published version of Mackenzie’s diary) 
claimed that the poor performance of the British was due in part to the inexperience of 
the troops, adding that ‘most of them were young soldiers who had never been in 
action’.65  
The youth and inexperience of the British soldiers is borne out by data 
accumulated by Gareth William Morgan, who compiled tables of the regiments 	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showing age, nationality and years of service.66 More than 68% of the Boston garrison 
was less than 30 years old.67 More than a third of them (35%) had three or fewer years 
of service. However, there was a significant seasoning of older troops, with more than 
900 men (over 15% of the garrison) having 15 years or more of service to their credit 
(enough, theoretically, to have allowed them to take an active part in the French and 
Indian War or Seven Years’ War).68 The figures do not seem out of place with general 
conceptions about the make-up of an army (the callow youths looking to a few 
grizzled veterans for reassurance is a staple of military lore), but the retreat from 
Concord was a particularly harsh introduction to the realities of war. 
It was in the period after this baptism of fire, as militia gathered around Boston 
to open what became a lengthy siege and the British soldiers brooded on their first 
taste of war, that the Cerberus arrived, carrying Howe, Clinton and Burgoyne. Less 
than a month later (the three generals arrived on 25 May 1775), Howe led a British 
force against the Americans on Breed’s Hill. As this was Howe’s first taste of combat 
against the rebellious colonists, the engagement, known popularly as the Battle of 
Bunker Hill, has been examined in excruciating detail, and the heavy loses suffered 
by the British in driving the Americans from their fortifications have been cited by 
some as a reason for Howe’s subsequent reluctance to attack the Americans when 
drawn up behind defensive works.69 
The battle once more highlighted indiscipline among the British troops, notably 
the grenadiers and light infantry. Whereas at Concord the poor performance of the 
men could at least partly be attributed to their inexperience and the extreme nature of 	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the stresses they were placed under, at Bunker Hill there was more evidence of a 
simple lack of steadiness. It could still be argued that this stemmed initially from 
inexperience, but it had a more damaging effect on the course of the engagement. At 
Concord, the British had come close to disintegrating under pressure from the rebel 
militia. At Bunker Hill they were actually repulsed.70 
Urban raised the idea that the British army in Boston was so lacking in 
discipline that Howe was effectively hamstrung when it came to wielding the forces at 
his disposal. Bunker Hill was the key element in this thesis. Drawing on personal 
accounts of several officers and men he painted a vivid picture of the battle, detailing 
how the grenadiers began their advance without orders, how troops stopped their 
advance to fire and thus lost momentum, and how the light infantry fell back after the 
rebels opened fire and then, in confusion, actually opened fire themselves on the 
grenadiers. The result, a shambolic mess, left the assault in turmoil and eventually 
resulted in shockingly high casualties.71 
In his official report on the battle, to Gage, Howe chose his words carefully and 
did not make any criticism of the men he had commanded.72 There is no reason to 
suspect that he was attempting to deceive his commanding officer. This official report 
would be the basis for Gage’s own report back home (he had not taken part in the 
assault himself) and would thus set the tone for the official version of the battle. It is 
reasonable to assume that Howe’s oral report would have been very different. 
Certainly, a letter to the Adjutant-General, Edward Harvey, back in England, was 
different. To Gage, Howe had written that his orders ‘were executed with great 	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1777, pp. 220-224, Howe to Adjutant-General (Edward Harvey), 22 & 24 Jun. 1775; Black, 
War for America, pp. 82-84. 
71 Urban, Fusiliers, pp. 34-45. 
72 WCL, Thomas Gage Papers, Vol. XXX, Report of Bunker Hill, 21 Jun. 1775. 
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perseverance’.73 To Harvey he added ‘but not with the greatest share of discipline’.74 
Gage read how the fences between the British and the rebels had ‘greatly impeded the 
attack by the difficulty of passing them in a very hot fire,’75 while the more candid 
report told how, as soon as the grenadiers were slowed by the fence, ‘they began 
firing, and by crowding fell into disorder’.76 What had been intended by Howe to be 
an attack with bayonets had descended instead into an uneven firefight, with the 
rebels, safely behind their lines, inflicting high casualties and driving the British 
troops back. 
It was the repulse of the best infantry under his command that appears to have 
shocked Howe the most. The 10 companies of light infantry, comprising around 300 
men, and the somewhat higher (but unspecified) number of grenadiers were driven 
back by the Americans, causing Howe to experience ‘a moment that I never felt 
before’.77 Urban interpreted this as being shock at seeing his beloved light infantry 
fail, but it is equally possible that Howe was shocked at the indiscipline and 
subsequent repulse of his entire attacking force.78 
Losses were high, especially among the officers, who suffered 92 casualties.79 
Among these was the commanding officer of the grenadiers, Lieutenant Colonel 
James Abercrombie of the 22nd Regiment, who was shot and killed by the British light 
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infantry.80 Howe expressed his horror at the heavy toll, what he termed ‘a most 
dreadful account,’81 and declared that the cost of the victory had been too high. There 
seems to be some confusion, however, about the exact number of casualties. In his 
letter to the Adjutant-General, Howe detailed the 92 officers, along with about 160 
men killed and 300 wounded, for a total of around 552. This is considerably fewer 
than the commonly accepted number of 1,054 casualties (and Fortescue pointed out 
that, for some reason, the casualties of the 38th Regiment were not included in the 
official returns, estimating them to have been at least 100).82 Howe mentioned a 
further 300 men ‘incapable of present duty,’83 but not, presumably, actually wounded. 
It is possible that many of these were simply exhausted or too shocked by the battle to 
do anything but rest.  
As distressing as the casualty list obviously was to Howe, the indiscipline 
among his soldiers must also have been a cause for concern. Losing men in an assault, 
however regrettable, was inevitable, but losing them due to their own indiscipline, and 
even to ‘friendly fire’, was not. Howe mentioned to Harvey that British sentries had 
heard the Americans at work on Breed’s Hill throughout the preceding night, but had 
not thought to notify an officer – more evidence of a slackness in the army that would 
need addressing.84 Howe’s first impression of the men under his command had not 
been favourable, therefore, and it is interesting to note that, having been given overall 
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command (on 2 August 1775) and having evacuated Boston, Howe took pains to 
ensure all his troops were drilled at Halifax.85 
Intriguingly, Howe had not used his light troops as might have been expected in 
the assault on Breed’s Hill. It could be argued (as Fuller and Hew Strachan have) that 
he had actually used them as heavy troops, assaulting a prepared defensive line with 
bayonets.86 Urban would argue that this was a consequence of Howe’s lack of 
confidence in his men, or of the inadequate training they had been receiving under 
Gage, but is important to remember (as evidenced by the training camp in 1774) that  
Howe believed his light troops should be prepared to assault defensive positions.87 It 
is less easy to understand why, on Breed’s Hill, Howe does not appear to have 
employed a line of skirmishers in advance of his main force. It is uncertain exactly 
how much input Howe had in the plan of attack, or how far he amended the plan after 
landing his troops and finding the American position was substantially stronger than 
expected (he certainly called for reinforcements).88 It is, however, reasonable to 
suggest that his input would have been extensive, and that he would (or at least 
should) have pointed out any faults in the plan while it was under discussion; he was, 
after all, going to command it. Howe made no allusion to any dissatisfaction with that 
plan in any of his reports, and far from lacking in confidence in his flank companies, 
the plan enacted by Howe demonstrated that he had every confidence in them. The 
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grenadiers and lights were to break the American left flank, with line companies 
merely following up to exploit the initial success.89 
The distressing experience of Bunker Hill does appear to have had an effect on 
Howe, but perhaps not in the manner often claimed. Authorities including Mackesy 
and Fortescue have claimed that it affected Howe’s willingness to send his men into 
battle.90 However, the British commander remained willing to take decisive action, 
but he took account of the indiscipline of his still-inexperienced army in his planning. 
This was demonstrated clearly when the Americans occupied another patch of high 
ground and threatened the British with a second Bunker Hill. The failure of the British 
to occupy the Dorchester Heights (which was just as threatening to their position in 
Boston as Breed’s Hill), is puzzling, especially as Howe recognised instantly the need 
to drive the Americans away once they themselves had belatedly moved men onto it, 
during the night of 4 March 1776. In his report to Lord Dartmouth, Howe claimed that 
the enthusiasm of his troops had encouraged him to launch an assault as quickly as 
possible, but his orderly book showed a somewhat different frame of mind.91 No 
doubt mindful of the indiscipline that had proved so costly on Breed’s Hill, Howe 
ordered his light infantry and grenadiers not to load their muskets for the assault on 
the Dorchester Heights. This time, clearly, he was determined that they should attack 
with bayonets only, as he had intended in the earlier engagement.92 It is also clear 
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that, in his letter to Dartmouth, Howe was again protecting the reputation of his men 
and masking his own doubts, a recurring theme. 
Bad weather prevented the assault from being made and gave time for the 
Americans to strengthen their position and bring up cannon, to the point where Howe 
thought it too hazardous to risk an attack.93 The British position in Boston was now 
untenable, as the Americans would be able to shell the city from their new positions. 
Having long desired to get out of the uncomfortable and rather undignified position of 
being under siege to the rebel army, Howe was finally forced to do so, even though 
there were insufficient transport ships for an orderly withdrawal. On 17 March the 
British left Boston, despite the difficulties encountered due to the shortage of shipping 
and the number of loyalists who had no intention of remaining behind. The 
disorganised withdrawal was certainly one reason why a direct move to New York 
was not made, but by going instead to Halifax, Howe would be able to restore some 
order, enjoy a respite from the stresses of life under siege and, most importantly, drill 
his men.94 
 
Training under Howe 
Howe had begun the process of reorganising his elite troops while still at Boston. In 
July 1775 he had appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew, Major Smelt and Major 
Mitchell to command the grenadiers (due to ill-health, Smelt was replaced in October 
by Major Dilkes), while Lieutenant-Colonel Clark, Major Butler and Major Musgrave 
were placed in charge of the light infantry.95 Howe had also ordered musket practice 
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(again, the term ‘firing at marks’96 reveals that targets were used) for recruits and new 
drafts, adding that all soldiers could be given such practice if their respective 
commanders felt it necessary. Allowance had also been made for the local conditions 
– the fact that the British would be fighting on broken ground with many obstacles, 
rather than sweeping across open battlefields. Howe ordered that, when in line, the 
men should leave an 18-inch gap between files, giving them more room to negotiate 
obstacles without crowding and causing disorder.97 This was still six inches closer 
than even the tightest light infantry intervals specified at Salisbury, but it shows 
Howe’s awareness that even regular infantry needed to adjust to the terrain they 
would be moving over. 
The winter in Boston had been a miserable one. Fresh provisions had been 
largely limited to the sick and wounded since at least July, and only the more 
seriously ill were allowed ‘the small assistance of fresh meet that can be provided 
from time to time’.98 Clearly, a cold, hungry winter in Boston (an outbreak of 
smallpox had added to the misery) was not going to improve the condition of the 
troops, but once safely transferred to Halifax, Howe embarked on an organised 
schedule of drilling to bring the men to a better state of readiness for battle.99 This 
should not be mistaken for a gruelling regimen of daily drill, however. Troops 
remained on their transports for most of the time while the army was at Halifax and 
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were ferried to land only when ordered for work or to drill. Apart from this, just about 
the only way a soldier could get ashore was to die.100 
Howe’s orderly book detailed each regular regiment being given one day of 
organised drill during the entire period at Halifax, under the supervision of Percy. 
Three regiments at a time were put through their paces, on 15, 18, 20, 22, 26 and 27 
April 1776.101 The grenadier companies were drilled separately, in two groups (one 
group including two battalions of marines) but each also received just one day of 
training.102 The importance of the light infantry was underlined by the fact that they 
were drilled in groups on four separate days (13, 15, 22 and 27 April), but even so, 
each individual company only received two days of training.103 Major Musgrave 
commanded the drilling of both the grenadiers and the light infantry, so if the men 
weren’t rigorously exercised, he at least was. On three occasions, Howe ordered 
corps, companies or regiments to parade one or two days after drilling. In this way 
one of the grenadier corps and both light infantry corps received an extra opportunity 
to hone their skills.104 After this flurry of organised drill, taking up the second half of 
April, it was left to the commanding officers of each regiment to exercise their men as 
they saw fit.105 
Following this brief period of reorganisation, Howe arranged his grenadiers and 
light infantry into four battalions.106 The 18 light infantry companies were evenly 
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battalions of marines who had been drilled with them. Once more, it is important not 
to overestimate the level of organisation. Although the grenadier and light infantry 
companies had been exercised in groups, the composition of the four battalions took 
no account of who had trained alongside whom while at Halifax. The companies were 
allocated in strictly numerical order, so at least some of any camaraderie or cohesion 
built up during those precious days of drill was lost.107 The drill sessions on Halifax 
would not have raised the light infantry battalions to the perfect pitch described by 
Smith in An Historical Account of Bouquet’s Expedition, but Howe simply did not 
have the luxury of steadily honing his men’s skills, and these small measures would 
have to suffice.108 
 
The campaign of 1776 
Howe did not launch his 1776 offensive until 27 August, more than five months after 
leaving Boston and more than 14 months since the last military action against the 
main rebel army, on Breed’s Hill. There were various logistical reasons for the delay, 
but it is important to consider whether any doubts over the battle-readiness of his 
army also factored into Howe’s decision-making. While at Halifax, Howe was aware 
of worrying intelligence regarding enemy activity in New York. The rebel general 
Charles Lee (a former British officer and therefore respected, if also reviled as a 
turncoat) was reported to be entrenching the city from as early as 10 February, 
1776.109 Later intelligence suggested the work included a battery on Long Island to 
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protect the section of the East River known as ‘Hell’s Gate’, and further batteries 
were under construction.110 Howe had learned to respect the Americans’ abilities 
when it came to throwing up formidable fortifications, sometimes overnight, and 
would have realised that the taking of New York would need to be planned carefully. 
This led to a peculiar disjunction between Howe’s written correspondence and 
his actions, which was to prove frustrating for the politicians at home, waiting for 
news of a decisive victory over the rebel army. Howe was searching for a decisive 
battle, ‘than which nothing is more to be desired or sought for by us, as the most 
effective means to terminate this expensive war’.111 He declared that, ‘Should the 
enemy offer battle in the open field we must not decline it’112 and later admitted that 
‘I am still of opinion that peace will not be restored in America until the rebel army is 
defeated’.113 These appear to be the words of a general in bullish mood, but on 
considering that the letters quoted were from 25 April, 7 June and 7 July, respectively, 
they take on a different complexion, that of a man repeatedly failing to back up his 
words with actions. Howe’s desire to have the large numbers of reinforcements he 
had been promised was understandable, but had he considered his men greatly 
superior to the rebel soldiers he might have been expected to move more quickly. In 
his letter of 7 June, he claimed that his men were in such condition that they would be 
sure to prevail if the rebels risked a battle (more evidence of his desire to protect the 
reputation of his soldiers), but it was certainly not only the British forces that were 
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being strengthened during the delay. The more time the Americans had, the stronger 
their defences were likely to be.114 
Having arrived at Sandy Hook on 25 June, Howe lapsed into a period of 
seeming inactivity. It must be remembered, however, that his men had been largely 
confined to their transports for the preceding three months (Boston having been 
evacuated on March 17 and Halifax having insufficient buildings to accommodate the 
men on land). A period of recuperation was essential for the men to gather their 
strength, but it is also clear that Howe was swayed by intelligence on the American 
defences to adopt a less aggressive strategy than he had originally proposed.115 
Having consulted with Governor Tryon and other loyalists, Howe was made aware 
that the rebels had strong entrenchments on both Manhattan and Long Island, with 
more than 100 cannon. The Americans were also in possession of a ridge of high 
ground on Long Island known as the Heights of Guan, or the Gowanus Heights. This 
knowledge prompted Howe to land his troops on Staten Island, rather than at 
Gravesend Bay on Long Island itself, as he had originally planned. 
On 6 August, Howe informed Germain that, having received enough 
reinforcements to act (though not yet all of them), he was now awaiting delivery of 
camp equipment, especially kettles and canteens, before moving onto the offensive.116 
This might seem like a rather weak excuse for his inactivity, but in fact it was prudent 
given the climate the European troops would be operating in. High heat and humidity 
posed grave risks to the health of unseasoned troops and although eighteenth-century 
medical science had few answers to camp illnesses, the benefits of giving the soldiers 
the means to cook their meals properly were recognised. Howe had also been present 	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at the British expedition against Havana in 1762 and had witnessed what disease and 
a harsh climate could do to a concentrated group of Europeans. At one point during 
that operation, no fewer than 8,000 soldiers and sailors were ill.117 Chief among the 
problems at Havana, however, was the presence of deadly tropical diseases, which 
were not a factor at New York. 
The extenuating circumstances behind Howe’s slowness to move were 
undermined somewhat when, upon the arrival of the first wave of Hessians on 12 
August, he claimed that they were in good condition despite many weeks at sea and 
that he would now move quickly. It therefore seems reasonable to suggest that it was 
not questions over the fitness of his men after their long period confined on ships that 
had been Howe’s major concern, but the size of his force.118 
In the event, whatever the reasons were for Howe’s caution about moving his 
men onto Long Island, they proved groundless – the landing was completely 
unopposed. In what was to become a recurring theme, Howe had apparently over-
estimated the Americans, calling to mind the veiled criticism levelled at him by 
Bancroft after the Battle of Long Island, in which he wrote that ‘The plan of attack by 
General Howe was as elaborate as if he had had to encounter an equal army.’119 The 
soldiers under Howe took note of the apparent naivety of the rebels, commenting that 
it was a mistake not to have made the British suffer during the landings both at Staten 
Island and Long Island.120 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 D. Greentree, A Far-Flung Gamble, Havana 1762, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), p. 
56. 
118 (TNA) PRO, CO 5/93, ff. 247-248, Germain to Howe, 15 Aug. 1776.  
119 Bancroft, History of the United States (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1875), p. 87. 
120 E. J. Lowell, The Hessians and the Other German Auxiliaries of Great Britain in the 
Revolutionary War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1884), p. 60. 
	   90	  
Whether Howe’s caution stemmed from misgivings about his men’s discipline, 
or if he was merely revealing his essentially cautious nature as a commander, is 
impossible to tell for certain, but his planning for the eventual assault on Long Island 
did not suggest any concerns with the fighting abilities of his army; Howe appears to 
have been contemplating an assault on the rebel positions along the Gowanus Heights. 
It is not clear what his exact plan had been, but when Clinton suggested a long 
flanking march to get behind the rebel lines, it appears that Howe was initially 
reluctant to adopt it, suggesting that he had a more direct approach in mind.121 The 
strength of the American positions may have caused Howe to think again (if he was 
impressed by the positions along the Gowanus Heights, he was not alone; a Hessian 
soldier wrote that the rebels had ‘a very advantageous position… and we had a very 
bad one’122) and he eventually accepted Clinton’s plan, one of the rare occasions on 
which he did so.123 
When the assault began on 27 August, the same Hessian who had noted the 
strength of the rebel position recorded that resistance crumbled quickly and the 
Americans simply ran away, ‘as all mobs do’.124 At the same time, there were further 
examples of British indiscipline, which strengthens the argument that Howe may have 
been uncertain about the steadiness of the army under his command. The Hessian 
colonel von Heeringen said that most of the British casualties on Long Island (Howe 
reported 318 killed and wounded) were due ‘more to their disorderly attack than to 
the valour of the enemy’.125 His criticism, however, seems harsh, as the bulk of the 
British casualties were suffered on the left flank, during a diversionary attack by 	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troops under Major General James Grant in which he had been ordered not to press 
the Americans too strongly. With his hands tied, casualties were inevitably higher 
than they would have been had he exploited his early advantage, which had seen him 
gain possession of a pass through the Gowanus Heights with very little effort and at 
very little cost.126 
There was, however, a very serious example of British indiscipline that may 
well have caused Howe to cast his mind back to the Battle of Bunker Hill. Having 
sent the Americans scrambling back to the safety of their lines on the Brooklyn 
Heights, a body of troops under Brigadier General John Vaughan proceeded to exceed 
their orders and storm one of the redoubts that comprised the Americans’ second line 
of defence. Howe’s orders for the battle have not survived, but in Clinton’s own 
account he makes it clear that he knew full well that the attack was not to be pressed 
following the initial attempt to shift the American forces off the Gowanus Heights. ‘I 
must confess,’ Clinton wrote, ‘that (notwithstanding I knew the Commander in 
Chief’s wishes) I had permitted this move.’127 
Confusion surrounds this moment of impetuousness. Howe’s description of it in 
his report to Germain following the battle, and his subsequent detailed explanation 
during the Howe Inquiry, only made things more muddled. As one of the key 
moments of controversy in Howe’s career, this episode has been thoroughly raked 
over by historians, many of whom have been especially interested in the strength of 
the rebel lines and the numbers of men defending them.128 Although that is a 
fascinating debating point, it is perhaps more important to consider that, from Howe’s 	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point of view, this was the second time he had led his men into battle, and the second 
time they had exceeded their orders. Moreover, the troops that allowed their 
enthusiasm to provoke them into a reckless assault were, once more, the grenadiers. 
Following the disastrous results of their indiscipline on Breed’s Hill, this must have 
been galling for Howe, and he must have been further annoyed at having to issue 
repeated orders to withdraw from their unauthorised attack before they complied.129 
Clinton claimed that his indulgence of the grenadiers stemmed from a belief that 
the American position could be overrun completely by the storming of the redoubt in 
question. He believed that the British would then be able to march down to Brooklyn 
Ferry and thus trap the entire corps of rebels. That may indeed have been the case, but 
it was not a decision to be taken by the grenadiers. Howe’s decision to restrain his 
men appears perfectly reasonable, especially considering his experience on Breed’s 
Hill. The suggestion that his will to fight had somehow been shaken by the high cost 
of that battle does not appear to be borne out by subsequent events, but he had seen 
what an undisciplined attack could lead to and understandably had no wish to see it 
repeated.130 
Following the victory on Long Island and subsequent evacuation of American 
forces on the night of 29 August, Howe moved his men onto Manhattan, where a 
further episode of indiscipline occurred. The Battle of Harlem Heights (16 September 
1776) was in reality merely a skirmish that escalated and gave the rebel troops the 
satisfaction of seeing British regulars forced to retreat. Again, it was the light infantry 
that had acted without the proper caution and Howe gently reproved his men in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 (TNA) PRO, CO 5/93, ff. 257-260, Howe to Germain, 3 Sep. 1776. 
130 Wilcox, ed., American Rebellion, pp. 43-44. 
	   93	  
general orders, criticising the ‘want of attention in the light company’s pursuing the 
rebels.’131  
Although Howe’s mild words in this context must be treated with caution (he 
was unlikely to risk undermining his men’s morale by issuing a stern rebuke in the 
middle of a campaign), he also made several comments about his confidence in his 
troops, noting their ‘evident superiority’132 to the enemy and praising the ‘prevailing 
spirit of the army’.133 The issue of indiscipline, however, would not go away, and 
some of Howe’s orders take on the tone of a disapproving parent. On 15 October he 
chastised his sentries for exchanging fire with their rebel counterparts, claiming that it 
betrayed unsteadiness, while on 24 October he again mixed praise with criticism, 
noting that the behaviour of the Hessian Jägers, while spirited, had been reckless and 
had led to unnecessary casualties.134 
Howe appears to have been more disappointed with his men than a reading of 
these mild admonishments would suggest. Lieutenant Loftus Cliffe, in Howe’s former 
regiment, the 46th, gave tantalising hints of the general’s feelings in letters home from 
New York. After the Battle of Harlem Heights, Cliffe claimed that Howe was angry 
and especially displeased with Brigadier-General Alexander Leslie, who led British 
and Hessian troops in the battle.135 Howe’s displeasure apparently stemmed from the 
fact that so much had been gained up to that point at such a low cost. The casualties 
from this disorganised, unstructured skirmish (Cliffe estimated 12 or 13 dead and 140 
wounded, while official returns put the losses slightly higher, at 14 dead and 154 
wounded) were seen by Howe as totally unnecessary. Cliffe reported that Howe felt 	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this was ‘the severest blow we have yet felt’.136 Howe’s concern for the safety of his 
men comes through in this letter, with Cliffe writing that Howe had declared he was 
determined not to suffer unnecessary casualties. There was also a personal element to 
Howe’s concerns over this skirmish. ‘General Howe has been a good deal hurt at 
this,’ wrote Cliffe, ‘… he says he did not deserve it.’ Howe was so displeased that he 
took steps to ensure this type of escalating engagement would not happen again, 
ordering pickets not to allow officers or men to pass them (unless, presumably, they 
had written authorisation, although this was not specified in Cliffe’s letter).137 
For the first time, a plausible argument can be made that Howe now felt 
uncertain about committing his army to battle given its repeated lapses in discipline. 
Having seen them act impetuously on Breed’s Hill, Long Island and the Harlem 
Heights, he made no further move for a month and, when he did, he turned to his 
brother’s ships to attempt an outflanking of the Americans, rather than assaulting yet 
more prepared defensive positions. It would be going too far to suggest that Howe felt 
his men could not be relied upon to defeat the enemy (there is no evidence to suggest 
he ever doubted his troops would prevail in battle), but he was painfully aware of the 
need to keep casualties to an absolute minimum. The disaster at Breed’s Hill, the 
needless losses at Harlem Heights and the possibility that more heavy losses had been 
narrowly avoided on Long Island must have factored into his plans for the remainder 
of the campaign. Even before the landing on Long Island he had referred to his army 
as ‘the stock upon which the national force in America must in future be grafted’138 
and he was not alone in recognising the need to limit casualties; Lord Percy had 
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famously claimed, while still at Boston, that the British could not even afford a 
victory if it was accompanied by any significant loss of men.139 
It is equally possible, however, to read Howe’s refusal to attack the Americans 
in their prepared defensive works on Manhattan as prudent generalship. By refusing 
to fight the rebels on their own terms, and by simply shifting his own army via the 
East River, he was able to force them to vacate their works without suffering any 
casualties at all. This was not lost on his men. Back on Long Island, Cliffe had noted 
that Howe was not willing simply to ‘run our heads against their works, which is what 
they have all along hoped for’.140 Howe himself would later give the clearest 
indication of his personal thoughts on the subject during his narrative, when he stated: 
I do not hesitate to confess, that if I could by any manoeuvre remove 
an enemy from a very advantageous position, without hazarding the 
consequences of an attack, where the point to be carried was not 
adequate to the loss of men to be expected from the enterprise, I 
should certainly adopt that cautionary conduct, in the hopes of 
meeting my adversary upon more equal terms.141 
 
It is telling, however, that in the remaining two actions of the 1776 campaign, at 
White Plains and at Fort Washington, Howe ordered the Hessians to bear the brunt of 
the fighting, and they consequently took the majority of the casualties for the 
remainder of the year. It was also the Hessians who were placed in the most exposed 
position in the line of posts adopted at the close of the campaign, at Trenton. 
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The Hessians 
Consideration of the part played by the Hessian contingent of the British army has 
tended to focus on the mechanics of the treaties negotiated for their hire.142 Where 
their skill as soldiers has been considered, their reputation as merciless and cruel 
fighters has received the most attention. They were viewed with something 
approaching dread by the Americans;  ‘A reputation for both skill and savagery 
preceded these mercenaries,’143 noted Barnet Schecter. The German states had a long 
tradition of hiring out their men for active service under foreign powers, yet Howe 
had concerns about the quality of the men who would make up such a substantial part 
of his force.144 He initially felt that Russians would have been preferable, but he still 
wrote to Dartmouth (while at Boston at the end of 1775) to suggest that Hanoverians 
and Hessians be mixed in with new British troops, obviously feeling that this would 
add a little experience to the ranks of recruits.145 
Howe expressed more explicit concern over the officers who would be leading 
the German troops. Feeling that their commitment to the cause might be questionable 
(a reasonable concern given that they had no connection with Britain), he suggested 
that a bonus might be offered to them, reliant upon the report of the British 
commander-in-chief. Howe also asked to be informed of the ‘characters and 
dispositions’146 of the senior officers that were to accompany the German troops. No 
evidence exists that any such bonus was offered to the Hessian commanders (and they 
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might have considered it insulting if it had), but Germain did write back to reassure 
Howe that the foreign generals would be cooperative with him.147 
Germain’s confidence appears to have been misplaced in the case of the 
Hessians’ overall commander, Lieutenant General Philip von Heister. Howe and von 
Heister seem to have endured a strained relationship from the start, when the Hessian 
commander insisted his men needed time to recover from their Atlantic crossing 
before embarking on active duty.148 This was not an unreasonable request, but Howe 
was beginning to feel pressure as the campaigning season ticked away and Germain 
waited impatiently in Britain for news of the first blow against the rebels. Howe 
compared von Heister’s attitude with that of the Guards division (who arrived with 
the first wave of Hessians), who had professed themselves ready to move as soon as 
they had landed. This was not entirely fair as the Hessians had already endured a 
lengthy journey before embarking with the Guards in Britain. The Hessian 
commander, described by Howe’s aide de camp, Captain Friedrich von 
Muenchhausen, as ‘a stiff and completely militarily minded general,’149 appears to 
have been a poor match temperamentally for Howe, who disliked formality (as his 
comment to Clinton, on finding the term ‘deference’ to be hurtful to him, 
demonstrated).150 Von Muenchhausen also reported that von Heister was unused to 
the diplomacy necessary when working alongside another general.151 
The very presence of von Muenchhausen as Howe’s aide-de-camp adds further 
detail to the relationship between Howe and von Heister. Not appointed until 18 
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November 1776, he became an indispensible link between the two generals, who did 
not share a common language (von Heister spoke French and German, Howe spoke 
only English, while von Muenchhausen was fluent in all three languages).152 It seems 
incredible that prior to this, and during engagements on Long Island and White Plains, 
Howe and von Heister had been unable to converse with each other on plans. Howe’s 
orders had required translating before they were handed to von Heister, which had led 
to delay, and the German commander mentioned that he had often received oral and 
written English orders that he did not understand.153 
Howe’s relationship with von Heister steadily deteriorated to the point where 
Howe demanded his removal, but there were no such problems with the Hessian 
soldiers themselves.154 In fact, the Hessian Jägers almost instantly established 
themselves as the elite troops under Howe’s command. Their quality enabled them to 
undertake the classic light infantry duties so necessary in the American terrain. Time 
and again in diaries of the war, mention is made of the Jäger companies spearheading 
marching columns, with the British light infantry taking a position behind them.155 
Von Muenchhausen was unimpressed with the British officers he had to work 
alongside. Aside from Howe (whom he claimed to like personally) he found the 
British arrogant and was determined never again to serve with an English general, but, 
at least among senior British officers, there seems to have been a genuine respect for 
their German comrades. Howe repeatedly praised the work of the Hessians, especially 
the Jägers, in general orders, while Clinton was described as ‘a great friend to the 	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Germans’.156 Cornwallis showed his generous nature when promising to secure 
provisions and new uniforms for a bedraggled Jäger corps after the 1776 campaign. 
The uniforms, one for each soldier at Cornwallis’s expense, duly arrived on 23 
January 1777.157 
The Hessians initially played a supporting role in operations, although there is 
no evidence that this was due to any misgivings on the part of Howe. The centrepiece 
of the battle plan on Long Island (the extensive night march to outflank the 
Americans on the Gowanus Heights) was undertaken entirely by British troops, while 
the diversionary assault from Major General James Grant, on the American right 
flank, was likewise an exclusively British affair. The Hessians merely held their 
position in the centre of the line and advanced only after the signal of two cannon 
shots signified that Howe’s column had reached Bedford, in the Americans’ rear. The 
Hessians were more involved in the next major operation, the invasion of Manhattan. 
For the landing at Kip’s Bay, Howe selected his light infantry, the Hessian Jägers and 
Hessian grenadiers, but the landing was entirely unopposed as the opening naval 
barrage forced the Americans to abandon their defensive lines. It was therefore not 
until White Plains that the Hessians had any serious fighting, against a well-prepared 
enemy, and it was here that the greatest falling out between Howe and von Heister 
occurred.158 
From its faltering start, the relationship between the two had steadily worsened. 
Following the Battle of Long Island, Howe had ordered the American fortifications at 
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Brooklyn to be razed, but von Heister refused to let his men undertake the work 
unless they were paid extra; Howe cancelled the order.159 A new Jäger contingent 
arrived in America in October 1776, but when their first action drew a sharp rebuke 
from von Heister (he believed they had acted recklessly), Howe let it be known to 
their commanding officer that he approved of their conduct, even though he made a 
mild criticism in general orders.160 Having seen how Howe had previously been 
disappointed by (and even censured) his own men’s indiscipline, it seems reasonable 
to suggest that his actions here were as much an effort to contradict von Heister as to 
signify genuine approval for over-zealous conduct. 
By the time British and Hessian forces arrived to confront Washington’s army 
at White Plains, on 28 October, the two men were clearly not working well together. 
The conventional account of what happened next is that Howe ordered an assault on a 
hill on the American’s right flank. Chatterton’s Hill was detached from the main 
American defences, with the Bronx River flowing between them, and a frontal assault 
from British and Hessian troops, together with a flanking attack from further Hessian 
units, drove the Americans from their positions. There is great controversy about what 
happened next, which was nothing. Howe’s apparent refusal to launch a general 
assault on the American lines has been seized on as evidence of his unimaginative and 
overly cautious nature, and when speaking in his own defence, at the parliamentary 
inquiry of 1779, he failed to put the matter to rest, stating only that he had intended to 
attack and was unwilling to give his reasons why the attack did not take place. The 
‘political reasons’161 Howe claimed to have for not revealing what had happened at 
White Plains have proved a puzzling issue for historians. Fortescue simply mentioned 	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it, but offered no explanation.162 Anderson proposed that Howe had come into 
possession of the plans for a rebel stronghold on Manhattan, Fort Washington, and 
considered this a more tempting target (in this unlikely scenario, the conspiracy 
theory runs that Howe did not want to reveal the name of his informant).163 
New evidence presented by the draft of Howe’s narrative, however, casts 
entirely new light on the events at White Plains. In this earlier draft, Howe included a 
paragraph that adds greatly to our understanding of his failing relationship with von 
Heister. Headlined ‘In addition to White Plains’, Howe wrote: 
The assault being intended upon the enemy’s right, which was opposite to 
the Hessian troops, I purposed the attack to General Heister, whose 
consent I could not obtain and on that account it was deferred. I 
mentioned General Heister’s dissent to General Clinton and my intention 
of making it with the British under his direction.164 
 
Doubts about the possibility of this being a misunderstanding or a case of 
miscommunication (this occurred before von Muenchhausen was appointed aide-de-
camp) would seem to be dispelled by Howe’s deliberate use of the word ‘dissent’. It 
appears that von Heister flatly refused to lead the assault that Howe desired. By the 
end of the campaign, Howe was insisting to Germain that von Heister be recalled.165 
In fact, he stated that both von Heister and the second-in-command, Lieutenant-
General Wilhelm von Knyphausen, were too old for the duties they were required to 
undertake (they were 69 and 60 years of age, respectively), although he went on to 
say that he at least believed von Knyphausen was a willing commander. Von Heister 
was, in Howe’s words, ‘exceedingly unsteady and so entirely averse to carry the 
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Hessians into action, I must be very anxious for his removal’.166 Following the arrival 
of von Heister’s recall orders at the end of June 1777, Howe made an ‘unpleasant 
visit’167 to the outgoing Hessian commander, with whom he had not spoken for 
several days. The pair clearly parted on bad terms and von Heister died shortly after 
returning home, apparently a broken man.  
Von Knyphausen proved his zeal for the service during the assault on Fort 
Washington, which followed events at White Plains. Leading the Hessian forces that 
carried out the main assault, he is reported as having led from the front, tearing down 
obstructions with his bare hands. The fort was renamed Fort Knyphausen following 
its fall and there appears to have been a much warmer relationship between Howe and 
von Knyphausen, which was noted by the Hessian troops with satisfaction.168 
However, the Hessians did not perform well during the disastrous affair at 
Trenton, which closed the year. After driving Washington’s evaporating army across 
the Delaware, Howe set up a string of posts to hold New Jersey for the winter. 
Believing that the strong loyalist element in the region deserved protection, he risked 
a lengthier chain of posts than prudence might have suggested, admitting in a letter to 
Germain that the chain was ‘rather too extensive’.169 Washington launched a surprise 
attack on Trenton, at the extreme left of the British line, and captured the entire 
Hessian garrison, undoing much of the good work undertaken by Howe’s army in the 
1776 campaign and breathing new life and belief into the Patriot cause. Howe was 
criticised for not placing British units in this important post, but in his narrative he 
pointed out that, as the Hessians’ position in the line was the left flank, they would 	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have seen the left-most posts as their rightful place and would have been disgraced if 
British troops had been placed there instead.170  
Stating that he effectively had no alternative when it came to placing the 
Hessians at Trenton could be viewed as rather lukewarm support, and Howe also went 
on in his narrative to claim that the garrison should have been able to defend the post 
successfully, having been given ample warning that an enemy attack was imminent. 
Howe did not, however, take the easy option and simply blame the Hessians entirely. 
In correspondence with Germain, Howe had been more openly critical of the Hessian 
commanders, accusing Rall of misconduct and also criticising Colonel von Donop, 
but in his narrative, he pointed out that they had performed well in the campaign up to 
that point and especially noted how effective they had been during the attack on Fort 
Washington.171 In the draft of his narrative, however, a nugget of new information is 
revealed – the fact that one of the units at Trenton was in fact a garrison battalion and 
therefore not as experienced as others. In the draft, Howe argued that this regiment 
had also performed well at Fort Washington, but in the revised version, as delivered 
to the House of Commons, any reference to their being a garrison battalion had been 
removed.172 
The loss of Trenton must have been frustrating to Howe, but there is no 
evidence that it soured his opinion of the Hessian troops in general, at least not in 
terms of their fighting ability. Relationships between Hessian and British forces 
appear to have been rather cool, with occasional critical comments appearing in letters 
and journals. Loftus Cliffe, for instance, noted that the Hessians tended to be wasteful 	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of resources, slaughtering milk cows for meat and thus depriving the army of a source 
of milk and butter, as well as indiscriminately pillaging civilian houses.173 There does 
not appear to have been much intermingling between officers of the British and 
German units; at a meal in July 1777, Howe entertained 55 British officers and not a 
single German.174 However, just prior to the fall of Trenton, Howe had laid out his 
plans for the 1777 campaign, requesting reinforcements including 15,000 foreign 
troops from Russia, Hanover or other German states, so he must have been satisfied 
with their quality. Reinforcements on that scale were never likely, and those that did 
come out to America in 1777 and 1778 were of a steadily worsening quality 
(according to Ewald they were deserters and riff-raff in 1777 and had degenerated 
into ‘the scum of the earth’175 by 1778), suggesting that this was a source that had 
been largely exhausted. Howe’s request for reinforcements opens up an entirely 
different question, and an entirely different way of judging the army under his 
command – its size. 
 
The size of Howe’s army 
The quality of the fighting men under Howe’s command is obviously a crucial 
consideration when passing any sort of judgement on his period in command, but it is 
also necessary to consider whether or not he had enough troops with which to carry 
out his plans. Arguments could go back and forth over how many men Howe actually 
would have needed to subdue the rebellion, but a far more productive line of enquiry 
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is to consider whether or not he himself believed he had enough men to put his plans 
into effect.  
Britain faced huge problems in raising a respectable army for service in 
America, but an army was raised and presented to Howe, who expressed his ‘utter 
amazement’176 at the efforts of Germain. These were not the most guarded words, and 
they may have come back to haunt him had his political opponents mounted a more 
concerted and credible attack on his period in command, but they clearly 
demonstrated that Howe believed he was being given an army suitable for the task at 
hand. Howe had initially declared that his most pressing concern was to destroy the 
rebel army under Washington and it is clear, from the lengthy delays in opening the 
1776 campaign, that he believed he needed all of his reinforcements before he could 
begin operations.177 
After the Battle of Long Island (perhaps encouraged by the ease with which his 
men had routed the Americans), Howe made very modest requests for reinforcements. 
Admitting that a second campaign would probably be necessary, he asked if a further 
800 Hessian Jägers could be found (he referred to them as ‘chasseurs’, as the English 
commonly did), no doubt impressed with the quality of these elite German troops and 
envisioning a swarm of a thousand Jägers covering every movement of his army. He 
also asked for 100 dismounted Hussars from Hesse, to be provided with horses in 
America.178 
Over the next three months, Howe’s estimate of the reinforcements required for 
the 1777 campaign ballooned from less than a thousand to 15,000. Intervening events 
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(the landing at Kip’s Bay, the Battle of Harlem Heights, the Battle of White Plains 
and the assault on Fort Washington) do not appear to offer any obvious reason for 
this. The reverse at Trenton could definitely be considered grounds for a more 
pessimistic view of the progress of the war, but that was still a month in the future 
when Howe asked for his 15,000 new men, at the end of November.179 Considering 
all elements that would have factored into the equation, it is clear that Washington’s 
army was no stronger than it had been at the start of the 1776 campaign (and was, in 
fact, a great deal weaker), while Howe’s army had not suffered greatly in pushing the 
rebels out of New York. The only other variable was Howe’s plan for the 1777 
campaign, and it is clear that this must have changed, from a policy of destroying the 
rebel army, to one of occupying territory. Howe’s communication with Germain 
reveals this quite clearly, charting a steady shift in his war aims, from a belief in July 
that destroying the rebel army was essential, to the assertion in August that he would 
need to force them out of New York before attempting to crush them and then, by 
November, the downgrading of a decisive battle to a secondary aim, something to be 
considered if the opportunity arose but not of overriding importance.180 
Howe’s initial plans for 1777 also showed a clear shift of emphasis. In the build 
up to the 1776 campaign, all talk had been of the need to establish New York as the 
focus of British operations, destroying the rebel army and linking up with the British 
army moving south from Canada.181 Although only one of those three principal 
objectives had been accomplished (the establishing of a base at New York), Howe 
outlined a plan for 1777 in which New York was just one of three elements. An 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 (TNA) PRO, CO 5/93, ff. 304-308, Howe to Germain, 30 Nov. 1776. 
180 Ibid., ff. 214-216, Howe to Germain, 7 Jul. 1776; Ibid., ff. 228-230, Howe to Germain, 6 
Aug. 1776; Ibid, ff. 294-302, Howe to Germain, 30 Nov. 1776. 
181 SRO, Dartmouth Manuscripts, William Howe to Lord Howe, 12 Jun. 1775; (TNA) PRO, 
CO 5/92, ff. 311-316, Howe to Dartmouth, 9 Oct. 1775; (TNA) PRO, CO 5/93, ff. 139-143, 
Howe to Germain, 25 Apr. 1776. 
	   107	  
offensive corps of 10,000 was to operate from Rhode Island under Clinton, moving on 
Boston and possibly taking it. A further 8,000 men were to act defensively in New 
Jersey, protecting territories gained in 1776, while in the autumn Howe would move 
on Philadelphia and open operations in South Carolina and Georgia. Only 10,000 men 
were earmarked for an aggressive move up the Hudson to link up with the northern 
army. Adding in 2,000 and 5,000 men for garrison duties at Rhode Island and New 
York, respectively, Howe was talking about a substantial increase on his 1776 
numbers. He believed he needed 15,000 reinforcements to put all the elements of his 
new, multi-faceted plan into operation, although Germain would dispute those 
figures.182 
There was much to admire in Howe’s new plan. It carried the war to the rebels 
in three separate areas (four, if the operations of the northern army were included) and 
would certainly have stretched their manpower, perhaps to breaking point. Following 
on from the remorseless advances made by Howe’s army in 1776, this major 
expansion of the war might have appeared overwhelming and would certainly have 
struck a serious psychological blow to the Patriot cause, which was already badly 
shaken at the end of November 1776. There were two serious flaws with the plan, 
however. Firstly, there was no intention to target Washington’s army, and Howe 
should have been aware that this was the physical embodiment of the rebel cause. 
Secondly, it was unlikely that reinforcements could be delivered in the quantities 
Howe believed he needed, at least not quickly enough to be useful in the coming 
campaign. Having expressed his amazement at what Germain had managed for 1776, 
and having shown that he was well aware of the drains on Britain from ‘this 
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expensive war,’183 Howe should have been aware that he was asking for too much. A 
strategy of reoccupation was not a viable one as Britain simply could not muster the 
troops necessary to garrison each of the posts as they were taken. Howe went even 
further with his next letter, claiming that 20,000 new troops were actually needed, 
although he could manage with 15,000.184 
Howe’s thinking at this point, and the validity or otherwise of his plans, while 
fascinating, are not relevant in the context of this chapter. The key point for now is 
that Germain replied that he would not be able to furnish the troops requested, and 
therefore, from 9 March 1777 (when Howe received Germain’s response), Howe 
believed he did not have an army large enough to carry out his plans. This could not 
have been stated in clearer fashion than in Howe’s letter to Germain of 2 April 1777: 
In the former campaign the force was suitable to the operation, whereas in 
the ensuing one, from the several posts necessary to be preserved, the 
offensive army will be too weak for rapid success…185 
 
Howe’s letter included the extremely pessimistic statement that, before the 
campaign had even opened, any hopes of it putting an end to the war were vanished, 
and it was in this frame of mind that Howe got to work on his second and final 
campaign as commander-in-chief. The result of this belief, that he was leading an 
army inadequate to his needs, was obvious, and the difference in Howe’s approach to 
operations in 1777 is striking. Although criticised for his slowness in 1776, he 
nevertheless attacked the Americans on Long Island, manoeuvred them out of 
Manhattan, attacked them again at White Plains, stormed Fort Washington, captured 
Fort Lee and pursued Washington’s army through New Jersey before closing the 	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campaign. In 1777 he fought a major battle at the Brandywine and occupied 
Philadelphia. He did not even open the campaign proper (aside from some 
skirmishing with Washington’s forces) before 22 July 1777. In his narrative, Howe 
spoke at length about how the failure to provide the requested troops had forced him 
to modify his plans, abandoning the aggressive move on Boston from Rhode Island, 
and how he had opened the campaign with 14,000 fewer men than he had expected. 
Von Muenchhausen agreed with the general theme that the British and Hessian force 
was insufficient for the job at hand, noting that the army was ‘strong enough to chase 
the rebels, but… far from strong enough to penetrate deep into the country’.186 Von 
Muenchhausen did not, however, agree with Howe’s sums, reckoning he had close to 
25,000 men under his command, which would only have been 10,000 short of his 
desired total.187 
Adding to Howe’s concerns (or, at least, to the list of reasons he put forward for 
wanting reinforcements) was his belief that the Americans had improved markedly 
over the course of the war. This was only to be expected – it was not only Howe’s 
troops that were benefitting from a little campaign experience. In July (still not having 
opened operations for the year) Howe again wrote to Germain, noting that the war 
was on a different scale than it had been in the previous campaign because of the 
improvements in the American army. He noted the fact that their officer corps had 
been augmented with experienced French officers, that they had a strong train of field 
artillery following the arrival of 50 brass cannon at Boston (adding to the 40 cannon 
the Americans already possessed) and that, at the same time, British and Hessian 
numbers were being whittled away by casualties even without a general action. Howe 
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even made a request for 10,000 Russian troops, which comes across as faintly 
desperate given the failure to secure Russians prior to the 1776 campaign.188 
Howe’s term in command of the British army in America therefore fell into two 
distinct phases. For his first campaign he was confident that he had a suitable army 
with which to proceed. There were some discipline problems, but for the most part all 
his men needed was a little experience, which they steadily gained as the 1776 
campaign progressed. Howe was able to undertake any operation he desired, was 
never in doubt about the superiority of his men over the rebels and had sufficient 
manpower to garrison New York, detach a force to occupy Rhode Island and then set 
up a string of posts in New Jersey to defend the territory gained that year. 
For the following campaign, Howe modified his plans, committing to a policy 
of reoccupation, and felt he needed a substantial augmentation of his forces. When the 
requested reinforcements did not materialise, he felt that his force was now 
inadequate for his plans and curtailed them dramatically. In 1776 Howe had embarked 
on a campaign that he believed, at least initially, might end the rebellion. In 1777, he 
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III 
Howe’s relationship with Lord George Germain 
William Howe’s most important working relationship was with the American 
Secretary, Lord George Germain. Howe and Germain were effectively a partnership; 
together they would plan the direction of the war and Howe would use the army that 
Germain assembled to put those plans into action. Any experience of working on a 
major collaborative effort will demonstrate how important it is that goals are shared 
and the methods of proceeding agreed upon, even if there is creative tension in the 
process. Neither was the case here.  
The standard interpretation of Howe’s dealings with Germain is of a steady 
deterioration in their relationship, with Germain gradually losing faith in his 
commander-in-chief after a harmonious start. In The American Secretary, Brown 
claimed that they each had the complete confidence of the other as Howe left Halifax 
on 10 June 1776 to begin his offensive operations against New York, and that 
Germain’s confidence only began to deteriorate in the summer of 1777.1 Gruber 
contested that problems started earlier; from March 1777, Germain had been 
concerned enough about Howe’s performance to encourage him repeatedly to inject 
more urgency into proceedings.2 One of the most recent historians to address the 
issue, Andrew O’Shaughnessy, also believed that the relationship had started to 
experience difficulties in early 1777.3 
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The relationship between Howe and German was complicated by many factors. 
Howe, although not officially a member of the opposition, was a Whig politician, 
while Germain was a Tory. Howe held considerably more moderate views on the war. 
Although it would be going too far to label him a ‘dove’, he was far more conciliatory 
than Germain.4 Add to these differences of personality the tricky nature of Germain’s 
ambitions in trying to resurrect his reputation following his disgrace at Minden in the 
Seven Years War, and this was a relationship with strong undercurrents.5 Germain has 
been criticised widely for his running of the war, with ultimate blame for the disaster 
at Saratoga being shared fairly evenly between Germain, Howe and Burgoyne (Howe 
for abandoning the Hudson strategy and therefore Burgoyne, Germain for not 
ordering Howe to stick to the agreed strategy and Burgoyne for allowing himself to be 
defeated). Bitter factionalism was a contributing factor to the demonisation of 
Germain by the Whigs as the man responsible for military failure in America, but 
Germain is open to criticism for not getting Howe to follow the coercive strategy that 
he (Germain) favoured.6  
Exactly how much criticism can fairly be aimed at Germain is debateable. The 
nature of eighteenth-century communications (a letter from America could take 
anything from four to six weeks to reach Great Britain, while its reply would 
generally take between six and nine weeks to make the return crossing)7 inevitably 
left Howe to his own devices for much of the time during his period as commander-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Gruber, Howe Brothers, pp. 58-59. 
5 Mackesy, War for America, p. 48 
6 Ibid., p. 47. Mackesy quoted F. V. Greene as calling Germain, ‘probably the most 
incompetent official that ever held an important post at a critical moment’; Black, War for 
America, p.125. Black wrote of the ‘fatal failure’ to coordinate operations in the two theatres 
of the war; W. B. Willcox, ‘Too Many Cooks: British Planning Before Saratoga’, The Journal 
of British Studies, 2 (1) (Nov., 1962), p. 56. Willcox also commented on the lack of a 
unifying concept in the 1777 campaign. 
7 Parliamentary Register, Vol. X, pp. 320-332. Various letters between Howe and Germain 
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in-chief, and it would have been unreasonable to insist that he stick rigidly to written 
orders (which may have been conceived months earlier) regardless of changing 
circumstances. Howe had to have discretion to act as he saw fit depending on, among 
other factors, enemy movements and troop concentrations. Still, Germain gave Howe 
more than discretionary powers, allowing him to formulate his own plans and giving 
his blessing to almost every one that was submitted for approval. There was still 
pressure on Howe to please his political master, but it would take time for the 
direction the war was taking to become apparent back home in Britain and this would 
act as a buffer for Howe, delaying Germain’s reaction. 
Germain did not officially choose Howe as commander-in-chief (that decision 
had been taken before he took over from Lord Dartmouth in November 1775), but he 
wholeheartedly approved of him and there is evidence that he had significant input in 
getting Howe onto the Cerberus as the de facto successor to Gage.8 As has already 
been seen, it was Howe’s experiences in North America, and his particular expertise 
in light infantry tactics, that convinced Germain that he was the man for the job.9 
Howe certainly had experience that made him a candidate for the position, but 
Germain might have considered the man himself more closely, especially when 
gauging how willing he would be to wage the sort of war Germain was planning. The 
choice of Howe had much to do with his ability to appeal to both sides of the debate 
on how to approach the conflict. His previous ties to America and his conciliatory 
nature appealed to the moderates, including Lords North and Dartmouth, while his 
experience of irregular warfare and the fact that he would be a recognised name with 
which to command the respect of the rebels appealed to the more hawkish Germain. 
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9 Lomas, ed., Manuscripts of Mrs Stopford-Sackville, Vol. II, pp. 2-3, Lord George Germain 
to Lord Suffolk, 16 Jun. 1775. 
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Howe was effectively a compromise candidate, each faction seeing in him the 
qualities they desired. Germain would prove to be the most susceptible to this 
selective vision.10 
Although Germain’s disenchantment with Howe was indeed a gradual process, 
it started much earlier than either Brown or Gruber suggested, beginning to take shape 
as early as the summer of 1776, before the offensive campaign had even started. 
Moreover, although this was an important development in the progress of the war, it 
was not the crucial one. In March 1777, a corresponding and far more destructive loss 
of confidence appeared on the other side of the relationship. In contrast to the slow 
ebbing of Germain’s belief in his general, Howe’s doubt centred on a single letter 
from Germain, written on 14 January and received by Howe on 9 March.11 That doubt 
did not focus on Germain’s abilities, but rather on Howe’s perception of how 
Germain viewed him. After receiving Germain’s letter, Howe began to suspect that 
the American Secretary had lost confidence in him.12 It was a premature doubt; 
Germain was losing patience with Howe when he responded to his request for 
extravagant reinforcements, but he still believed that he could complete the task of 
subduing the rebellion. Howe reacted as if all ministerial support and confidence had 
been ripped from beneath him in one violent act.13 Germain’s loss of confidence in 
Howe was therefore the key issue for both men, although each perceived it at different 
times, and this brought a premature end to their ability to work effectively together.  
Their relationship was complex. Germain was Howe’s political master and 
theoretically had the power to remove him from command of the army if he saw fit, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 O’Shaughnessy, Men Who Lost America, pp. 83-84. 
11 (TNA) PRO, CO 5/94, ff. 1-6, Germain to Howe, 14 Jan. 1777. Date of receipt by Howe is 
noted in Parliamentary Register; or History of the Proceedings and Debates of the House of 
Commons, Vol. X (London: Wilson and Co. 1802), p. 381. 
12 Howe, Narrative, p. 14. 
13 (TNA) PRO, CO 5/94, ff. 141-145, Howe to Germain, 2 Apr. 1777. 
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but Howe had political friends (he was himself a Member of Parliament) and was in 
favour with the King. Moreover, in a war that divided opinion in Britain, Howe was a 
popular figure with the public, offering another layer to his armour.14 There was a real 
risk that removing him from his post (without evidence of incompetence on a grand 
scale) would have devastating repercussions on the administration of Lord North, 
which was under pressure from a small but effective opposition including Charles Fox 
and Edmund Burke.15 The idea of Germain looking for a way to oust the commander-
in-chief would have seemed an unlikely scenario when Howe took over command in 
Boston and Germain stepped into the office of the American Secretary, but just over 
two years later he was receiving Howe’s appeal to resign his position without a word 
of protest. The fact that Howe (assuming he did not commit a monumental blunder) 
was essentially untouchable is an intriguing facet of his relationship with Germain, 
but this only served to prolong matters when problems arose in the running of the 
war. The problems themselves arose because the two men were waging different 
wars.16 
From the start, it was clear Germain meant to tackle the problem aggressively. 
Gage, recalled to England to report on events in the colonies (thus getting him out of 
the way so that Howe could take over), wrote to Clinton in early 1776 to declare that 
Germain was ‘indefatigable in his endeavours,’17 a sentiment that was shared by 
others in Clinton’s list of correspondents. Gruber, who put together a meticulous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Anderson, Command of the Howe Brothers, p. 43. Anderson claimed that ‘practically all of 
his [Howe’s] contemporaries bore witness to the general esteem in which he was held’. 
15 W. Cobbet, ed.,  The Parliamentary History of England, Vol. XVIII (29 Nov. 1774 to 13 
Dec. 1776), (London: T. C. Hansard, 1813), p. 991 and p. 999. Fox was described as being 
‘very severe upon administration’ on 16 Nov. 1777, while Burke characterized the ministry’s 
attitude to the colonies as ‘silly and wicked’ on 20 Nov. 
16 I. D. Gruber, ‘The Origins of British Strategy in the War for American Independence’ in 
Military History of the American Revolution, ed. S. J. Underdal (Washington: Office of Air 
Force History, 1976), pp. 43-44. 
17 WCL, Clinton Papers, Vol. XIII, f. 29, Thomas Gage to Henry Clinton, 1 Feb. 1776. 
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reconstruction of Germain’s fading confidence in Howe, dubbed him ‘the 
personification of belligerency,’18 but as events played out it slowly became apparent 
that Howe had very different ideas.19 
At first glance it appears that Howe and Germain worked well together at the 
opening of the war, and it could even be argued that they came very close to defeating 
the rebel army and possibly ending the rebellion. Closer inspection, however, reveals 
that the two were never working towards the same goal. It would take the entire 1776 
campaign (so successful on the surface) to strip away delusions. The 1777 campaign 
was then essentially thrown away as both men had come to realise they could not 
work with each other. From April 1776, when Howe first became aware that Germain 
had taken over the running of the war from Lord Dartmouth, to March 1777, when he 
realised he would not be getting the reinforcements he had requested and responded in 
peevish tones, Howe-Germain was an effective working partnership for less than a 
year. The relationship would effectively end in the divorce court of the House of 
Commons, where each attempted to shift blame onto the other.20 
 
The formulation of British strategy for 1776 
The basic parameters of the strategy Britain was to pursue in 1776 had been laid down 
before Germain replaced Dartmouth as the American Secretary. New York and the 
Hudson River had been selected as the focus of operations, having been suggested by 
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19 Lomas, ed., Manuscripts of Mrs Stopford-Sackville, Vol. II, p. 2, Lord George Germain to 
Lord Suffolk, 16 Jun. 1775; WCL, Clinton Papers, Vol. XIII, f. 31, Richard Cox to Clinton, 2 
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20 (TNA) PRO, CO 5/94, ff. 141-145, Howe to Germain, 2 Apr. 1777. 
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Howe in June 1775 and by Dartmouth in both April and August.21 Initially, the 
intention was to retain some troops in Boston to act in a diversionary capacity, but 
events conspired to make that an impossibility (the American positions on the 
Dorchester Heights, occupied in March 1776, rendered Boston untenable for the 
British). Howe appeared to be an enthusiastic proponent of the Hudson strategy, 
suggesting it as the basis for an aggressive campaign in a letter to his brother that 
found its way into Germain’s hands as he was formulating his own plans in 
anticipation of taking over from Dartmouth.22 
The letter can be viewed as an indirect appeal to be handed the reins for the 
upcoming campaign. Aware that Germain was likely to take over from Dartmouth as 
the American Secretary, Howe filled the letter to his brother with everything Germain 
would want to hear as policy for the upcoming war was discussed and finalised. 
Important elements included a modest army (Howe asked for just 19,000 men at this 
early stage) and a clear idea of how the men would be used (12,000 to act offensively 
on the Hudson, 3,500 to move up the Connecticut river at the same time, with 3,500 
remaining as a garrison in Boston). Even more alluring was an assertion that Howe 
believed a force of this magnitude could end the war in a single campaign. Howe 
went on to describe how enough men could be found from augmentation of existing 
regiments and volunteers from the militia. The Guards could provide three battalions, 
while seven regiments could come from Ireland. Under Howe’s plan, there would be 
no need to go to the expense of raising or hiring new regiments.23 
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On 9 October 1775, Howe also wrote to Dartmouth (prior to Germain taking 
over) in some detail on a revised plan, in which the essential element was now a 
linking-up with a second British army moving south, down the Hudson, from Canada. 
Howe demonstrated that he understood this perfectly, explaining how his first priority 
would be to link up with that army and establish a series of posts along the river. This 
same letter, however, revealed the first hint of what was to become an enduring 
problem during the two campaigns in which Howe and Germain worked together. In 
establishing his posts on the Hudson, to isolate rebellious New England from the 
middle and southern colonies, the destruction of Washington’s Continental Army was 
to be critical, yet Howe wrote only that ‘the reduction of the rebels in the province of 
New York must in some measure be included’.24 
Germain’s ideas were far more decisive and aggressive. He wanted a 
commander who would have the ability to think on his feet, adapt to circumstances 
and not need constant instruction from home. In fact, the vast distances between the 
politicians at home and the men in the field rendered such a commander 
indispensible. Germain also wanted to wage a punitive war, explaining his opinion 
that a naval blockade and raids would distress the colonists and force them to accept 
British mastery once more, and he knew from an early stage that the hiring of foreign 
troops (sure to be viewed with indignation by the colonists) would be necessary if 
Howe was to defeat the rebel army.25 
However Howe’s army was composed, it is clear what Germain intended it to 
be used for. He wanted an aggressive war, and Howe was in no doubt about this, 
acknowledging that his political master wanted the war to be prosecuted ‘with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 (TNA) PRO, CO 5/92, ff. 311-316, Howe to Dartmouth, 9 Oct. 1775. 
25 Lomas, ed., Manuscripts of Mrs Stopford-Sackville, Vol. II, p. 2, Germain to Suffolk, 16 
Jun. 1775. 
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utmost vigour’.26 Germain wanted the rebellion to be put down in one campaign (and 
Howe’s letter of 12 June must have persuaded him that Howe believed this was 
possible). There were various motivating factors at work in Germain’s thinking, 
among them, possibly, his own military disgrace at the Battle of Minden in 1759. 
Having failed to obey an order to bring the British cavalry into action, Germain (still 
Lord Sackville at the time) had been court-martialled and, infamously, condemned as 
unfit to serve His Majesty in any military capacity whatsoever.27 Germain’s disgrace 
was an easy target for his enemies and there were snide comments about him hoping 
to reconquer Germany in America.28 A wish to restore his reputation may have been a 
partial explanation for his hawkishness and energy for the job, but there were sound 
reasons for wanting a swift resolution to the conflict. The longer it went on, the harder 
it might become to convince the colonists to return to their previous state. The rebel 
army would gain experience and potentially become a more formidable opponent. 
Foreign powers might be tempted to lend assistance to the rebels and perhaps even 
send troops if they thought a British defeat was possible. Finally, the expense of 
mounting a military campaign at a distance of 3,000 miles, including the hiring of 
foreign troops, was sure to be enormous and could not be sustained year after year.29 
Despite Germain’s desire to crush the rebel army and end the rebellion in 1776, 
he does not seem to have explicitly conveyed this wish to Howe. Germain wrote of 
his hopes for a decisive battle in May 1776, while in June he hoped that military 
successes in Canada had opened a prospect of ending the rebellion in a single 	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27 Mackesy, War for America, p. 49. 
28 E. Gibbon, The Miscellaneous Works of Edward Gibbon Esq., (B. Blake: London, 1837),  
p. 278, Gibbon to J. B. Holroyd, Nov. 1776. 
29 (TNA) PRO, CO 5/93, ff. 139-143, Howe to Germain, 25 Apr. 1776. In this letter, his first 
to Germain, Howe acknowledged the expensive nature of the war; Ibid., ff. 189-190, Germain 
to Howe, 21 Jun. 1776. Germain revealed how the expense of the war was weighing on his 
mind even at this early stage. 
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campaign.30 Not once, however, did he convey his wishes as clearly to Howe as he 
did to other correspondents, including General Irwin, to whom he wrote that ‘I should 
be for exerting the utmost force of this kingdom to finish this rebellion in one 
campaign’.31 This was certainly a curious omission, but it set the tone for Germain’s 
style of leadership, in which he repeatedly failed to make his wishes explicit. It is 
possible to argue that Germain made his wishes clear without needing to resort to 
crude bluntness, but when matters came to a head in the House of Commons during 
the Howe Inquiry, the commander-in-chief was able to use that lack of bluntness 
against the American Secretary and accuse him of not issuing clear orders.32 
It is also reasonable to argue that, from Germain’s perspective, Howe 
apparently held exactly the same opinion on how the war should be fought. His letter 
to his brother in June 1775 was just the first of a substantial number in which he 
declared that his aim in the campaign would be to follow the Hudson strategy and 
destroy the main rebel army. It took time for Germain to realise that Howe was not 
conforming to the agreed strategy. Later in the war Germain deserved censure for 
failing to bring Howe back to the agreed plan, but in 1776 he had every reason to 
believe that he and the general agreed on how the war should be prosecuted. 
Having agreed on a strategy to follow, the two men took up their respective 
roles. It was Germain’s job to ensure Howe had an army suitable for the strategy 
agreed upon. It was Howe’s job to put that army to best use. Germain made it clear 
how he would proceed in his first speech to the House of Commons after taking over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 (TNA) PRO, CO 5/93, ff. 116-120, Germain to Howe, 3 May. 1776; Ibid., ff. 183-188, 
Germain to Howe, 11 Jun. 1776. 
31 Lomas, S. C., ed., Report on the Manuscripts of Mrs Stopford-Sackville, Vol. I (London: 
Mackie & Co. Ltd, 1904), Germain to General Irwin, 13 Sep. 1775, pp. 136-137. 
32 Howe, Narrative, p. 9. 
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as the American Secretary, on 16 November 1775.33 The key point of a short speech 
was that he considered the officers in America to be best placed to determine how big 
the army needed to be to successfully restore order in the colonies. His job would 
merely be to ensure they got the men they requested and he effectively issued a 
guarantee that this would be the case (Germain had the security of already knowing 
how big an army his commander-in-chief would request, of course). Germain was 
also clearly delineating responsibilities. Whether he was hedging his bets against 
possible failure is impossible to tell (although, given his confidence at this time, it 
seems unlikely), but his speech could be viewed as putting on record his 
responsibilities. His job, as he saw it, was to give his generals the men they requested; 
unspoken, but implied, was the idea that what they did with those forces was their 
responsibility. Germain’s speech, although it laid out methodically and calmly the 
principles on which the war would be fought, was also peppered with words such as 
‘suppress’ and ‘crush’.34 His feelings were clear. 
The size of the British army in America was to become a key debating point in 
the Howe Inquiry of 1779, in which Howe claimed he had not been given enough 
troops by Germain for the 1777 campaign.35 The pure numbers were obviously 
important, but of equal weight was the confidence Howe took from having his 
requests for troops met or even exceeded. This was demonstrated clearly in the 
differing attitudes expressed by Howe at the beginning of the 1776 campaign and 
during the planning for 1777. In the first campaign he felt he had been given more 
troops than he had asked for and was effusive in his praise. In early 1777 he was told 
he would not receive anywhere near the number of reinforcements he had requested 
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34 Ibid. 
35 Howe, Narrative, p. 12. 
	   122	  
and he became pessimistic, even truculent, and withdrew into a disastrously inactive 
campaign.36   
The conveniently round figure of 20,000 troops had long been accepted as the 
requisite amount for an aggressive 1776 campaign. Dartmouth had suggested this 
number to Gage in August 1775, before they had both been replaced as the leading 
figures in the war, and Burgoyne had also come to the same number when writing to 
the King around the same time.37 Howe accepted it as a realistic figure. Via Lord 
Howe, in September, Germain learned of the general’s belief that an army of 20,000 
men would be sufficient, 15,000 to act from New York and 5,000 to garrison Boston 
(in the same letter Germain also learned that Howe believed that if an army of this 
size could not be assembled, the British would be better off withdrawing completely 
and allowing the colonies to descend into civil war).38 Howe elaborated on his 
thoughts in a letter to Dartmouth a month later, explaining that he would use 12,000 
men in New York (five battalions garrisoning the city and the remainder moving up 
the Hudson), with 5,000 remaining at Boston to tie down rebel forces there.39 The 
remaining 3,000 men would form the backbone of the northern army (the one to 
proceed down the Hudson from Canada), to be supplemented by 3-4,000 Canadians 
and Indians. Howe was therefore suggesting that he could put his side of the Hudson 
strategy into effect with just 17,000 men. However, although expressing satisfaction 
with the figure of 20,000 men, he did go on to say that an extra 5,000 would be 
useful, to be equally split between Rhode Island and Canada.40 
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Getting enough men to act aggressively was one thing. When they would arrive 
in America was an entirely different matter. In his October letter to Dartmouth, Howe 
expressed his desire to receive his reinforcements in the following spring, believing 
this to be essential if he was to strike a decisive blow against the rebels. He hoped that 
troops would begin their transatlantic crossing by the beginning of February so that he 
might be ready to open operations by the middle of April. Germain’s reply, sent in 
November, would have been disappointing; he reported that recruitment was going 
slowly. Following the news that Catherine the Great of Russia had refused to provide 
troops, attention was shifting towards the German states. Germain did say that he still 
hoped to provide the army of 20,000, but it looked like being a frustratingly slow 
process and the Russian debacle had cost time.41 Howe’s hope to open operations in 
the spring may have been optimistic, but he was not alone in seeing the benefits that 
might come from an early start. Lord North had expressed to the King that getting 
2,000 men to Howe early in the spring would be as good as sending him 6,000 later in 
the year, while Burgoyne had pointed out that delay would enable the Americans to 
fortify New York.42 As events unfolded, it quickly became clear that the spring 
deadline would be missed. 
 
The 1776 campaign 
Although Britain enjoyed considerable success in the 1776 campaign, this masked a 
steady unravelling of the Hudson strategy as Howe pursued a policy of territorial 
occupation rather than seeking a decisive battle. Strain would be placed on the Howe-
Germain relationship as the year progressed and evidence slowly mounted that Howe 	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was not using the army in the way Germain had intended.  As was the case with 
Howe’s relationship with Clinton, things seem to have started off well. 
Correspondence was one-sided at first, as it took time for news of Germain’s 
appointment to reach America. Thus, while Germain was keeping Howe informed on 
his efforts to provide him with a suitable army, Howe believed he was still writing to 
Dartmouth, whom Germain replaced in November 1775.43 A letter from Howe, sent 
on 25 April 1776, acknowledged Germain’s letter to him of 5 January, and can be 
viewed as the date when their working relationship effectively started. Although the 
inevitable delays in communication had been exacerbated by Howe’s hurried 
evacuation from Boston and relocation to Halifax, this letter was a fitting way for the 
relationship to start. Howe’s first letter to Germain opened with optimism, including 
the well-known proclamation that a decisive action at New York would be the best 
way ‘to terminate this expensive war’.44 This, along with Howe’s stated desire to 
check the rebels’ enthusiasm following their success at driving the British out of 
Boston, must have encouraged Germain, but Howe’s letter quickly took on a less 
positive tone. Citing their ability to construct strong entrenchments, Howe predicted 
that unless he was able to get possession of New York early in the campaign, before 
his reinforcements arrived, the rebels might choose to act on the defensive and spin 
out the campaign by avoiding a decisive battle.45 In his first letter to Germain, then, 
Howe was already raising the spectre of an inconclusive campaign. 
A private letter to Germain, written the day after and sent at the same time, 
included flattery (‘the whole army rejoices in the idea of acting under your Lordship’s 
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auspices’46) but also more pessimism. Despite professing a desire to gain a decisive 
victory to encourage the loyalist element in the colonies, Howe again raised doubts 
about being able to draw the rebels into a major engagement. He went so far as to 
predict that he would find it hard to pursue the rebels if they withdrew from a battle 
due to the difficulties he expected to encounter in finding enough wagons for 
transportation. Germain may also have been struck by Howe’s declaration that he was 
ready to carry Germain’s plans into operation, which again would have suggested that 
this might not be the vigorous, resourceful man he was banking on. It also hinted at 
Howe laying the first foundation of his defence (that he was following Germain’s 
orders) should the campaign go badly.  
Howe’s first communications with Germain therefore would have given the new 
American Secretary much to ponder. There was a disturbing undercurrent of 
pessimism in Howe’s letters, but just enough apparent desire for a decisive battle to 
counterbalance it. Germain’s earlier letters to Howe had been full of encouragement, 
approving of Howe’s plans for the 1776 campaign (submitted to Dartmouth the 
preceding October).47 Germain also made it clear to Howe that he fully accepted his 
reasons for not evacuating Boston when ordered to do so by Dartmouth, and that he 
would be provided with an army greater than he had requested. A total of 17,000 
reinforcements would be sent to him, including an estimated 10,000 foreign troops (at 
the time of writing, 5 January 1776, it had not yet been finalised where the troops 
would come from).48 Less positively, an early start to the campaign was already 
looking doubtful; Germain made it clear that the first reinforcements (the newly 
raised 71st Regiment and 1,000 men of the 42nd Regiment) would not be ready to sail 	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48 Ibid., CO 5/93, ff. 1-10, Germain to Howe, 5 Jan. 1776. 
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until at least early April and recruitment for other units was going slowly.49 Almost a 
month later, Germain had better news. The Guards had showed themselves so eager to 
serve His Majesty that a thousand of them were to be given the chance to do so in 
America. As well as boosting Howe’s reinforcements, the composite battalion, drawn 
from the three elite Guards regiments, would be more valuable than a collection of 
new recruits.50 
Germain’s energy and enthusiasm for the job at hand is evident in his letters, 
but at the same time it is impossible not to register the steady ticking of the campaign 
clock. It would be another two months before Germain could confirm that an 
agreement was in place for the hiring of 12,200 German troops.51 As Germain wrote 
to Howe, at the end of March, transports were on their way to pick up these troops. 
They would have to be brought to England and then shipped on to North America, 
which, given the time necessary for crossing the Atlantic, would obviously take 
months (the first Hessian troops actually arrived in America on 12 August).52 The 
Guards were on their way to Portsmouth, but would wait there to sail with the 
Hessians, while the 71st and 42nd Regiments were now not expected to sail from the 
Clyde until 20 April. Another month would pass before Germain could report that the 
3,466 men from the two Scottish regiments were embarked at Spithead and 
(hopefully) ready to sail.53 
Delays were only to be expected in eighteenth-century military planning and, 
considering the scale of the operation, some of the slippage was undoubtedly 
inevitable. Less understandable was the delay caused by Clinton’s ill-fated southern 	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expedition, which had originally been intended to be something of a lightning strike 
early in the year. It had been hoped that the expedition might set sail before 
Christmas, giving plenty of time for the regiments involved to join Howe for his main 
offensive.54 By the end of March it was clear that the narrow window of opportunity 
for such an expedition had closed; there was no way now for troops to sail from 
England, undertake the operation under Clinton and return to Howe in time for an 
early start to the main offensive. Germain, to his credit, recognised this fact and 
informed Howe that he was ordering Clinton to call off the expedition and take the 
troops (when they finally arrived) straight to New York in order that operations there 
might open in May or the beginning of June.55 Exactly how Germain issued this 
order, however, is unclear. Clinton’s papers include no such written order from 
Germain and he makes no mention of it in his account of his service in America. 
Letters could fail to reach their destination for any number of reasons and it is quite 
possible that Germain’s order simply never arrived with Clinton. Even had he 
received no written order from Germain, however, Clinton was informed by Howe 
that he had been redirected to New York. The problem was that this letter from Howe 
was not even sent until 22 May and, as events turned out, Clinton did not head back to 
New York until the middle of July.56  
The delays in getting troops to Howe, both avoidable and unavoidable, led to 
the first strains in the Howe-Germain relationship as the weeks and months passed 
with no opening of the campaign. It appears that Germain had on at least one occasion 
attempted to venture beyond a merely professional relationship, recounting an 
amusing anecdote concerning a General Howard, apparently a friend of Howe’s. The 	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letter (presumably a private one, which does not appear to have survived) prompted a 
rather stiff reply from Howe, who thanked Germain but swiftly moved on to business 
matters without any attempt to reciprocate the spirit of the original letter.57 There does 
not appear to have been any further attempt by Germain to engage in such banter. His 
subsequent letters continued to keep Howe appraised of developments in the raising 
of his army, but also betrayed the first signs that Germain believed his general needed 
to be encouraged. Choosing to brush aside the pessimism contained in Howe’s 
correspondence, Germain instead praised him for his ‘spirit and vigour’58 in aiming 
for an early strike against the Americans. Curiously, though no doubt aware at the 
time of writing (3 May) that it was taking far longer than hoped to amass the forces 
required for the campaign, Germain then advised Howe to wait until reinforcements 
had arrived before moving. 
This seems an unusual request from a man apparently bursting with enthusiasm 
to take the war to the rebels, and it certainly gave Howe ample justification in 
delaying the start of his campaign until those reinforcements had arrived, but it is 
possible to see a method in Germain’s words; in fact he went on to offer an 
explanation himself. His desire for Howe to wait was because it would ‘render your 
[Howe’s] success more certain’.59 Germain was set on a major battle to destroy the 
rebel army and naturally saw the amassing of force as more likely to lead to that 
outcome. It is possible that Germain was nervous about Howe opening the campaign 
with a reduced force (given his stated preference for an early start) and not being able 
to secure a decisive victory. In a sense, there was a danger that Howe might simply 
put his quarry to flight rather than destroying it completely and if this was Germain’s 	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fear, then it would have been stoked by a letter from Howe on 7 June, in which the 
general declared that if he did not feel his army was large enough prior to the arrival 
of the reinforcements, he was tempted to act anyway, simply to force the Americans 
to vacate New York. This was most certainly not what Germain had in mind and 
shows that Howe was already entertaining doubts over the task of destroying the rebel 
army.60 
During the summer of 1776, Howe’s correspondence became increasingly non-
committal about the prospect of drawing the rebels into a major engagement. On 12 
May he was referring to ‘this complicated war’61 and hinting that the success of the 
campaign would rest on the quality of the foreign troops and the willingness of the 
Canadians. In June he believed a decisive battle would only be possible if the rebels 
were willing to meet him in the open field and by August he was talking of merely 
dislodging the rebels from New York.62 Reasons for his delay in moving included the 
obvious (and authorised) wait for reinforcements, but also concerns about the strength 
of American positions on Long Island and the need for camp equipment, including 
kettles. By 10 August he was expressing his mortification at still only being on Staten 
Island, adding that the advanced season now meant that he was looking only to 
occupy New York and Rhode Island by the end of the year and that another campaign 
would be necessary.63 
It is not possible to know for certain how Germain would have reacted to each 
of these steps towards an abandonment of the aggressive, active campaign he had 
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planned for, but it is possible to chart an increasing sense of urgency, even 
desperation, in his communications with Howe. In June, he hoped that positive news 
from Quebec meant that putting an end to the rebellion in one campaign was still 
possible.64 Later that month he seemed to have convinced himself that the general 
might actually have already gained possession of New York (or at least might have by 
the time he received the letter) following the expected safe arrival of the Highland 
regiments.65 By August he was attempting to fudge the issue on the reinforcements, 
implying that it had only been the intention that Howe should wait for one of the 
multiple corps on their way to him, rather than all of them.66 Another letter on the 
same day made what could be interpreted as a pointed reference to Howe’s ‘tedious 
detention at Halifax’67 and to his being ‘so long prevented from executing these plans 
which your zeal and wisdom had projected’. (Responsibility for the strategy being 
followed was still being batted back and forth.) By the end of September there was a 
distinct air of resignation (and perhaps even a note of sarcasm) when he declared 
himself  ‘too well convinced of your zeal and alertness to suppose that there will be 
any unnecessary delay in your operations’.68 
It is easy to see in Germain a capacity for self-delusion, an unwillingness to face 
facts that seem obvious to an impartial observer, but it must be remembered that the 
delays in communications (it could be anything from 10 weeks before a reply to a 
letter could be expected from America, and it was frequently much longer) often left 
him entirely uninformed on events overseas. It is poignant to note that when he was 
writing to Howe (on 21 June) in the hope that he had captured New York, the British 	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army was still sailing there. The same letter betrayed one of Germain’s primary 
concerns – the huge expense of the war. Allowing his dream of Howe’s capture of 
New York to play out, he wrote of his hope that Howe would now be able to source 
much of his supplies from Long Island and require less to be shipped out, at great 
expense, from Britain. He even went so far as to say that it would be helpful if many 
of the transports used to take Howe’s reinforcements to America could be dismissed 
from the service, due to their expense, and that Howe should take care not to keep 
more in service than was absolutely necessary.69 
The expense of the war effort was a key factor in Germain’s planning. At the 
heart of his increasing anxiety at Howe’s apparent reluctance to move was the 
knowledge that he had pushed the system to its limits to put an army together. He had 
banked on an aggressive, hard-hitting campaign and simply replacing losses for a 
further effort in 1777 would be difficult. Any hopes of finding substantial numbers of 
reinforcements to increase Howe’s army the next year were slim indeed (as would be 
demonstrated when Howe made just such a request at the end of the year).70 Germain 
had over-delivered for 1776. Asked for an army of 20,000, he had assembled one 
closer to 30,000. This had been greeted with ‘utter amazement’71 by Howe, but he had 
not shown any inclination to expand his ambitions to match his expanded army. In 
fact, Howe’s horizons had steadily contracted and as the campaigning months passed 
by it was becoming increasingly doubtful that he would have time to achieve the twin 
goals of decisively defeating Washington’s army and moving in force up the Hudson 
to link up with the northern army. He had started to edge away from any commitment 
to the first goal and had simply stopped mentioning the second altogether.  	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When Germain finally received news that Howe had opened operations with 
great effect at Long Island, his joy was almost unbounded.72 Writing in extravagant 
terms of the honour Howe had earned, he praised him for combining the ‘fire of 
youth’ with the ‘wisdom and conduct of the most experienced commander’.73 In a 
separate letter on the same day, he even went so far as to claim that Long Island was 
the first example of a perfect battle in terms of both planning and execution. The 
praise seems excessive, but the great relief felt by Germain on hearing of the victory 
is unmistakeable and understandable, especially when it is taken into account that he 
did not receive Howe’s report until 28 September. The good news brought Germain’s 
hawkish streak to the fore, as he relished the possibility of the rebel army 
disintegrating entirely, leaving Howe free to march on Philadelphia and punish the 
seat of Congress. Another subtle layer was added to Germain’s hints that a quick 
outcome to the war was required. Referring to a French naval build-up, Germain 
stated that a decisive victory in America	  would be the best form of defence against 
France.74 
Germain’s joy was to be dampened quickly. Less than two weeks after 
receiving the report of the Battle of Long Island, a further letter arrived from Howe, 
which limited itself to a request for an extra 800 Hessian chasseurs and 100 
unmounted hussars. It was not an extravagant request, but Germain would have noted 
why Howe was making it with some concern. The general believed another campaign 
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was probable.75 In November, another batch of correspondence arrived from America 
and, again, there was a positive start. Taken in chronological order, the first three 
letters reported how the British had gained possession of the city of New York, on 
Manhattan (setting fire to New York appeared to be the only semblance of resistance 
offered by the rebels), as well as occupying Paulus Hook. This appeared to be a 
rebellion that was crumbling at the first sign of stern disapproval from the mother 
country.76 
As was so often the case with Howe’s correspondence, however, the tone 
changed abruptly. As Germain read through the batch of letters, all of which arrived 
on 2 November, he would have reached one written on 25 September.77 Following a 
string of nearly unopposed successes, Howe was suddenly stricken with doubt again. 
He saw further progress during the 1776 campaign as highly doubtful and proposed 
only to occupy Rhode Island. He noted that the campaigning season was coming to a 
close and that the second division of Hessians (around 4,000 strong) had not yet 
arrived. He was not confident that Carleton would be making progress from the north 
to divert the attention of the rebel army under Washington, and loyalists had not 
proved willing to serve in the numbers he had been led to expect. The rebels were 
posted too strongly (around the Harlem Heights and Fort Washington, on Manhattan) 
to be attacked frontally and there were too many difficulties to mention to get around 
their flanks. Perhaps most worrying of all, Howe declared that he did not want to risk 
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a further action, as any setback would be disastrous for the war effort. In short, he 
wrote, there was no chance whatsoever of ending the rebellion without another 
campaign.78 
Given Germain’s customary optimism, it is reasonable to suggest that the string 
of letters from Howe, detailing the flight of the rebels from Long Island, New York 
City and Paulus Hook, had raised hopes and even expectations of ending the military 
side of the rebellion that year. Howe had taken his time to move, but he had moved 
with great effect when the campaign had finally opened. With the events of the 
campaign truncated into a few short letters, there was the unmistakeable impression of 
a campaign in full flow, sweeping the enemy aside with contemptuous ease, only for 
Howe to suddenly call a halt. Germain was then forced to wait almost two full months 
for a further report from Howe.79 Once more, Germain received what must by now 
have been a familiar mixture of news. Howe started by apologising for his lack of 
communication, but considering Germain must have been fearful that nothing was 
happening in America, given the tone of Howe’s last correspondence, he must have 
been relieved as Howe’s letter of 30 November (received 29 December) continued. 
Howe, it transpired, had been busy. The disinclination to attempt anything more that 
campaign, manifested in his letter of 25 September, had apparently been replaced by a 
burst of renewed energy. Howe had manoeuvred the Americans off Manhattan, 
engaged them at White Plains and captured nearly 3,000 prisoners following a four-
pronged assault on Fort Washington (the last remaining rebel position on Manhattan). 
A second rebel stronghold, Fort Lee (sited on the opposite bank of the Hudson and 
intended to work in conjunction with Fort Washington to prevent British ships from 
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sailing up the river), had been taken as well, and Howe’s letter ended with Cornwallis 
in pursuit of the retreating (and presumably demoralised) rebel army.80 Once more 
Howe had presented a picture of uninterrupted successes against an enemy that 
seemed entirely incapable of mounting any serious resistance. 
Germain was not allowed to enjoy the warm glow from this dizzying parade of 
military successes for long. The next day he received another letter from Howe. Once 
more, a puzzling, even baffling, full stop was being put to proceedings. Howe now 
reported that his men were on the verge of entering their winter quarters and the 
general was once more turning his thoughts to the following campaign. Just a day 
earlier Germain would have been able to conjure with images of Cornwallis pursuing 
a disintegrating rebel army, now he was asked to turn his mind to another campaign 
the next year.81 It is clear that this is the point where Germain’s patience started to run 
out. Some time later, when making notes in preparation for a possible inquiry into the 
running of the war, Germain’s first point dealt with Howe’s failure to follow up his 
success at White Plains and his subsequent failure to pursue Washington’s army 
aggressively through New Jersey. By making this the first criticism of Howe’s 
conduct, it is clear that Germain was satisfied with Howe’s performance up to that 
point, or, at the very least, that he saw no possibility of attacking it with effect.82  
Howe’s letter, however, was far from finished. He went on to propose that an 
ambitious and aggressive campaign might end the rebellion in 1777.83 This might 
have been enough to mollify Germain, until Howe proceeded to detail the forces he 
had in mind. Howe’s plan for 1777 was indeed ambitious, calling for offensive 	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operations in at least four different areas throughout the year, in addition to the 
operations of the northern army. Rhode Island (to which Clinton and Percy were en 
route with 6,000 men as Howe wrote) was to form the base for a 12,000-strong army, 
10,000 of which would threaten and possibly even take Boston. Another 10,000-
strong strike force would make the long-awaited move up the Hudson in support of 
the northern army, with 5,000 left to garrison the city of New York. A corps of 8,000 
would initially act defensively in New Jersey, switching to an offensive mode in the 
autumn, when it would attempt to take Philadelphia. South Carolina and Georgia 
could then be targeted in the winter. By attacking the rebels at so many points, this 
35,000-strong army might have been up to the task of ending the rebellion in 1777 
and the plan was certainly aggressive enough to please Germain, but Howe added that 
he would need 15,000 reinforcements (helpfully suggesting Russians or more 
Germans) to bring his army to that strength.84 It was an unreasonable request given 
the difficulties of raising men for the 1776 campaign, and it alarmed Germain. The 
way he chose to handle it would trigger Howe’s calamitous reaction, believing that he 
had lost the respect and confidence of the American Secretary.85 
When considering Germain’s reaction to Howe’s request it is important to 
remember his first public statement as American Secretary – that he would let the 
commanders in the field decide how many men they needed and then provide them.86 
Knowing that Howe wanted just 20,000 men, this had been an easy promise to make, 
but his statement now placed him in an uncomfortable position. For several reasons, it 
was extremely unlikely that 15,000 reinforcements could be found quickly enough to 
be useful in the 1777 campaign. The expense of the war was already immense (and 
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Germain’s concerns on this point had already been expressed).87 Recruiting in Britain 
had proved so hard that attempts had been made in 1775 to get the East India 
Company to suspend or limit its own recruiting activities. The attempt was 
unsuccessful, and at any rate, Lord North had only hoped to gain an extra thousand 
men through this method.88 The possibility of substantial numbers of foreign soldiers 
seemed remote. The Russians had already proved unwilling to supply men and the 
Hessian option had been largely played out (only small numbers of extra Hessian 
troops would eventually be found for 1777).89 
Although Germain’s hands were, to a large extent, tied, it is not entirely fair to 
dismiss Howe’s appeal for reinforcements as unreasonable. He had submitted a plan 
for approval and stated the number of men that would be required to carry it out. In 
his narrative, Howe stated that a simple response from Germain that it was not 
possible to find the men requested would have satisfied him.90 Germain did not offer 
such a response, choosing instead to interpret the forces already with Howe in a 
different manner, offering only 7,800 reinforcements and claiming that this would 
bring Howe’s army to 35,000.91 Howe would later claim that it was this fudging of 
numbers that led him to believe that Germain had lost confidence in him. 
I began to entertain [an apprehension], that my opinions were no longer 
of weight, and that of course the confidence so necessary to the support, 
satisfaction, and indeed, security, of every man in a responsible 
situation, was withdrawn.92 
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The situation at the end of the 1776 campaign is also interesting when compared 
with that a year later. Following the resignation of Howe and the elevation of Clinton, 
Germain wrote to his new commander-in-chief with details of extensive 
reinforcements to be sent to America.93 Not all of the new men were earmarked for 
Clinton; following the surrender of Burgoyne’s army at Saratoga, Britain had to 
reinforce Canada and there was also need for troops in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia 
and Florida. Even so, Germain spoke of new corps being voted by Parliament.94 
Various gentlemen of means, as well as cities including London and Bristol, had 
pledged to raise new regiments and help with recruitment for existing ones, while a 
new loan of £6,000,000 had been authorised to finance the war effort in the budget of 
March 1778.95 In total, Germain promised as many as 12,000 new British soldiers, 
along with (probably) one or two more German regiments.96 It is impossible not to 
notice that this would have come within touching distance of Howe’s request for 
15,000 men, made just over a year earlier, and it is reasonable to ask why such an 
effort could not have been made then. The obvious answer would seem to be that 
Germain had not anticipated such a large request and had not been planning for it. (In 
June 1775 he had commented to Lord Suffolk that it would not be possible to engage 
foreign troops for that year because of the length of time it took to organise their 
hire.)97 Germain had intended the 1776 campaign to be decisive and to have ended the 
rebellion. He had given Howe a bigger army than had been requested and had 
expected him to destroy the rebel army. The sort of campaign Howe suggested in his 	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letter of 30 November 1776, while a bold plan, was not what Germain had 
envisaged.98 He simply had not considered that there would be a need for such 
extensive operations in 1777 and the slow-turning gears of the British war machine 
had not been set in motion early enough to make it a possibility. A year later, with the 
outcome of the struggle suddenly in doubt following Burgoyne’s surrender, there was 
perhaps more of a mood for making a last serious exertion. 
 
The 1777 campaign 
Howe’s letter of 30 November 1776 provided the outline for a bold strategy to take 
the war to the rebels in multiple theatres in 1777, but the campaign never came close 
to taking the form suggested.99 Even before Germain had chance to reply, Howe was 
tinkering. On 20 December he submitted a second plan, in which hopes of substantial 
loyalist strength in Pennsylvania had led him to make that the principal objective for 
the campaign. Howe’s revised plan had one major benefit; it could be put into action 
without any reinforcements. Assessing his strength at around 19,000, he proposed 
10,000 to move on Philadelphia, with 4,000 garrisoning New York and 3,000 to act 
on the Hudson. Rhode Island was allocated a mere 2,000 men in this revised plan.100 
Simply by comparing the division of forces it was clear that the Hudson strategy 
had been superseded in Howe’s thinking by the move on Philadelphia. Howe actually 
went further. The 3,000 men earmarked for the Hudson were to act defensively, 
simply to cover New Jersey. Any cooperation with the northern army was limited to a 
vague proposal that it could ‘facilitate, in some degree, the approach of the army from 
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Canada’.101 Moreover, the Rhode Island element of the original plan had also 
overtaken the Hudson strategy in terms of priority; this was the first element that was 
to be reinstated when reinforcements arrived, meaning that any shortfall would be 
borne by the Hudson corps. In the original plan for 1777, a little less than 29 per cent 
(10,000 out of 35,000) of Howe’s army had been allocated to an offensive move up 
the Hudson river, supposedly the keystone of the entire British strategy.102 In the 
revised plan its allocation had dropped to less than 16 per cent (3,000 out of 19,000) 
and it was restricted to acting defensively. (It is worth noting that back in 1775, 
Howe’s first plan to end the rebellion had allocated more than 63 per cent of his force, 
12,000 out of a total of 19,000, for a move up the Hudson).103 This percentage would 
inevitably drop further as reinforcements arrived and were directed to Rhode Island to 
restore the offensive from that base. This shift in emphasis had occurred without any 
input from Germain and while Howe still believed he had the full confidence of his 
political master. 
Confusingly, Howe submitted a third plan for 1777 before receiving a reply to 
his first.104 On 20 January he was full of gloom regarding a surprise attack on 
Trenton, in which a small American army had captured the entire Hessian garrison. 
This had been, Howe wrote, more damaging than he had first anticipated and he now 
believed 20,000 reinforcements for the following campaign would not be excessive, 
while 15,000 should be enough to give him superiority over the Americans. (Howe 
had previously mentioned reports that the rebels would field an army of up to 50,000 
in the following campaign, a figure that turned out to be overestimated considerably. 
It is probable that Howe passed on this intelligence to bolster the strength of his 	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request for reinforcements; it does not seem likely that he could have believed such a 
figure would actually materialise, given the size of the army that had faced him in 
1776).105 Even with this more extravagant reinforcement of 20,000, Philadelphia 
would remain his primary objective. He would use the extra 5,000 troops to attack 
Philadelphia from two sides at once, by dispatching a separate corps by sea. 
Pennsylvania was now firmly established in Howe’s mind as the area where his main 
push would be made in 1777 and his letter included the familiar assertion that he 
could see no prospect of ending the war except by drawing the Americans into a 
general action. Germain may well have felt that Howe had been talking about that for 
a long time.106 
There was still time for one more prod from Howe before he received 
Germain’s response to his first plan. On 12 February he again expressed concern that 
the rebel army would number 50,000 in the coming campaign and, while claiming 
that he would not presume to press Germain on the need for the reinforcements he had 
outlined, he did just that.107 Somewhere in the North Atlantic, this letter would have 
crossed paths with Germain’s of 14 January, which reached Howe in New York on 9 
March.108 Germain’s reply needs to be placed carefully in context. At the time he 
wrote it, he was unaware of the setback at Trenton and still held the hopeful vision of 
Cornwallis pursuing the rebels through New Jersey, communicated in one of Howe’s 
letters from 30 November.109 Germain chose to open with his approval of the move to 
take Rhode Island and the hope that Cornwallis would make rapid progress in his 
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pursuit of the rebels. When he mentioned Howe’s plan, he limited himself to 
describing it as ‘well digested,’110 but declined to give an opinion until the King had 
considered it more fully (the plan had only been received in London two weeks 
previously). Germain’s statement that further communication from Howe would 
probably add to his understanding of the situation in America can easily be interpreted 
as a hope that Howe might move away from such an extensive plan of his own 
accord. 
Had Germain left matters there he may have had time to receive Howe’s revised 
plan of 20 December (received in London on 23 February), before passing any 
substantial comment on the original plan. He had certainly offered a satisfactory 
reason for not offering an opinion one way or the other and it seems reasonable to 
suggest that Howe (knowing that he had already revised his plan considerably) would 
have been happy to wait for further feedback. Germain’s decision to comment on 
Howe’s request for 15,000 reinforcements is, therefore, almost inexplicable. He had 
no need to comment on this as he had already deferred passing judgement on the plan 
that gave rise to the request. Yet, he felt it necessary to inform Howe that he had been 
alarmed by the request and could see no way of satisfying it. Interestingly, this came 
very close to the mode of refusal (a simple statement that it was impossible to find so 
many men) that Howe later claimed would have been perfectly satisfactory to him.111 
However, Germain did not stop there. Using the returns submitted by Howe, he chose 
to interpret Howe’s force as being close to 27,000. Howe would later claim that 
Germain must have included prisoners and the sick in his computations. Using this 
more optimistic reckoning, Germain calculated that reinforcements of 7,800 would 
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bring Howe’s corps close to the requested 35,000.112 Germain also wrote a second 
letter to Howe on 14 January, in which he appeared to be attempting to lay the 
groundwork for a defence of his belief that large reinforcements were not necessary 
or, at least, had not been anticipated. Thanking Howe for his provision of details on 
the losses, both in casualties and prisoners, sustained during the 1776 campaign, he 
remarked that he was very pleased to see that those losses had been so low.113 
Germain’s ‘misconceived calculation’114 on the matter of troop numbers 
prompted an extraordinary reaction from Howe. In his reply there was a clear sense 
that he was attempting to paint as bleak a picture as possible and the response was 
confused and emotional as he picked his comparison points.115 Howe sometimes 
referred to his original plan, sometimes to his revised plan and even, on one occasion, 
made a reference to his third plan (which had called for a reinforcement of 20,000).116 
Howe betrayed a lack of subtlety here. In his letter, Germain had made explicit 
reference to his hope that Howe would submit revised plans; he clearly had not yet 
received that written by Howe on 20 December and obviously could not have 
received that of 20 January. Still, Howe used both of these revised plans as reference 
points when it suited him in his attempt to make the smaller number of reinforcements 
offered seem as damaging as possible.117 He declared the Boston offensive would 
have to be relinquished, even though he had already willingly postponed it in his 
revised plan. He then claimed that his reduced reinforcements would somehow force 
him to invade Pennsylvania by sea, overlooking the fact that an early invasion of 	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Pennsylvania had first been suggested in his second plan, which Germain was 
evidently unaware of. Moreover, that plan had not required any reinforcements at all 
and so could not have been adversely affected by Germain’s reply. Most remarkably, 
Howe then made an oblique reference to his third plan. This scheme, dependent on a 
reinforcement of 20,000 men, had mooted the launching of a secondary invasion of 
Pennsylvania by sea.118 Howe lamented that Germain’s failure to provide the 
reinforcements requested would force him to abandon New Jersey, pointing out that 
in his previous plan that would not have been the case and would have left 
Washington’s army between the two British corps moving on Philadelphia. This can 
only be a reference to the additional seaborne corps of his third plan, which Germain 
would not receive until 3 March. To weaken further the prospect of any activity on 
the Hudson, Howe declared that the men to act defensively on the river would now be 
composed entirely of provincials under Governor Tryon. Only 3,200 British troops 
would be based at New York, with 300 on Paulus Hook, 1,200 on Staten Island and 
2,400 at Rhode Island. The force for the invasion of Pennsylvania would number 
11,000.119 In a return of his strength, enclosed with this letter, Howe pointed out that 
prisoners and the sick were not included (neither were artillery and cavalry) and 
calculated his strength at 18,100, plus the 3,000 provincials.120 
As well as this ripping up of the plans for 1777, Howe claimed he would now 
need to start his campaign later than planned, due to the need to evacuate New Jersey, 
and he made repeated and pointed references to ‘small reinforcement’ and ‘want of 
forces,’121 adding that while his numbers had been adequate to his needs for 1776, 
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they would not be so for the following campaign. He even suggested that when 
reinforcements did arrive, some of them would be needed to strengthen his main army 
in its move against Philadelphia, which would otherwise be too weak to make rapid 
progress, completely ignoring the fact that he now proposed to invade Pennsylvania 
with 11,000 men, while his second plan had originally called for just 10,000. To cap 
off his letter he added that there was no longer any hope of ending the rebellion in 
1777. 
One further point adds to the sense that Howe was overreacting. His third plan 
had included an intriguing paragraph at the end, in which he had stated exactly what 
the consequences would be of a smaller than expected number of reinforcements. 
Less reinforcements than he had requested (ideally 20,000, but 15,000 would suffice), 
would necessitate a reduction in the scope of his plans. No reinforcements at all 
would force him to limit offensive operations to a single body of troops in New 
Jersey, with a small corps at Rhode Island and a purely defensive force at New 
York.122 Germain’s response promised nearly 8,000 reinforcements, yet Howe reacted 
as if he had been promised none at all, limiting the New York and Rhode Island corps 
to defensive duties. In fact, he went even further, declaring he would be forced to 
abandon New Jersey and go to Pennsylvania by sea.123  
Howe’s letter is a remarkable piece of evidence. It is manifestly unfair to 
Germain and appears to seek to make an admittedly less-than-perfect scenario appear 
even worse. It must be remembered that Germain was still promising a substantial 
reinforcement of nearly 8,000 men. Howe might have been expected to adopt his own 
revised plan, simply postponing either the Boston offensive or the move up the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Parliamentary History, Vol. X, pp. 377-378, Howe to Germain, 20 Jan. 1777. 
123 (TNA) PRO, CO 5/94, ff. 1-6, Germain to Howe, 14 Jan. 1777. 
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Hudson until the 7,800 reinforcements arrived. Howe could not have been offended 
by a failure to provide as many men as he had wished for; it was not as if they had 
been promised and then not delivered. The only thing he could have truly been 
offended by was the manner in which Germain attempted to contradict his own 
assessment of the current strength of his army, and even then he could have chosen to 
view it as a clumsy attempt by Germain to avoid disappointing his general. Instead, he 
viewed it as evidence of a loss of confidence in his own abilities and a lack of respect 
for his opinions. Howe’s reaction was so extreme, and so palpably unfair, that it 
seems possible that he was already harbouring severe doubts about his ability to win 
the war. His dismantling of what had once been an ambitious and aggressive 
campaign, when in reality he only needed to concentrate his forces more narrowly 
(along lines he himself had already suggested), was self-destructive and his letter was 
clearly intended to be ‘exhibit A’ in the case for his defence. 
That defence was to be strengthened by a letter to Sir Guy Carleton in Canada, 
in which Howe cited the weakness of his army as the reason why he would not be 
able to devote a corps of men to offensive operations on the Hudson.124 Once more, 
Howe was twisting facts to suit his ends. He had chosen to prioritise an offensive into 
Pennsylvania and had even elevated an offensive from Rhode Island over the original 
plan to link up with the northern army. This had been done prior to any news on the 
numbers of reinforcements he could expect. Even when he was made aware that those 
numbers would be lower than hoped for, he had the option of using the bulk of his 
army to move up the Hudson, or to at least prioritise the reduced number of 
reinforcements for that operation when they arrived. Germain’s letter was in no way 
instrumental in Howe’s decision to abandon the Hudson strategy. He simply chose not 	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to follow it and his letter to Carleton (a copy of which was pointedly sent to 
Germain)125 was notice that he was absolving himself of any responsibility for it. 
The rupture between Howe and Germain was probably irreparable by now, but 
any chance of a reconciliation was snuffed out by Germain’s next messages. As he 
wrote, on 3 March, he had before him reports of the disaster at Trenton and a further 
action at Princeton in which the rebels had got the better of British forces. Already 
feeling that Germain had lost confidence in him, Howe might have noted an edge to 
Germain’s letter, in which he lamented that any lustre should have been taken off 
Howe’s campaign by the setback at Trenton. The American Secretary went on to 
impress upon Howe the need to treat the rebels more harshly, suggesting that the 
colonists would need to be made to suffer before they would submit.126 In a separate 
letter of the same day, Germain made his official response to Howe’s submitted plans 
for 1777. Now being in possession of the revised plan, he completely ignored the 
original extensive proposal (again making it impossible not to wonder why he had 
chosen to comment on it in his letter of 14 January). Germain signalled the King’s 
satisfaction with the scaled down plan and again pressed the issue of waging a more 
punitive war, calling for raids upon the New England coastline. Howe would have 
been disappointed by the news that his expectations regarding reinforcements were to 
be reduced even more. Germain once more attempted to blur the matter, referring 
only to the 3,000 Hessians he had promised Howe in his letter of 14 January (he had 
actually promised 4,000, plus 800 Hessian chasseurs and 1,200 Hessian recruits), and 
saying he would only be able to provide 1,280. He still hoped to find the 800 
requested Hessian chasseurs, plus 400 more from Hanau, but the 1,800 British recruits 
had melted away to just four companies of Highlanders, amounting to 400 men. In 	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126 Ibid., ff. 104-105, Germain to Howe, 3 Mar. 1777. 
	   148	  
total, Howe was now being offered just 2,900 reinforcements.127 This time, however, 
Germain made no effort to persuade Howe that he was being given what he had asked 
for, perhaps realising that any such effort would be farcical considering he was now 
offering such paltry numbers. 
The further reduction in the number of reinforcements to be provided gave 
Howe firmer ground for his belief that Germain had lost confidence in him. He had 
already reacted badly to proposed reinforcements of less than 8,000. Now he was to 
get less than 3,000. Germain may have had a case that raising 15,000 new troops and 
delivering them to America in time to make a difference in the 1777 campaign would 
have proved extremely difficult. To offer as few as 2,900 strongly suggests that he 
simply did not believe Howe really needed any more. 
Germain’s disappointing letters arrived in New York on 8 May. Howe now had 
consent to go ahead with his scaled-down campaign, but the reinforcements that could 
have been used to resurrect one of the other two offensives later in the year had been 
severely constricted, making it unlikely that any significant operations could take 
place in more than one theatre. With Pennsylvania now Howe’s chosen focus, and 
with approval from Germain, the Hudson strategy was moribund. It is therefore easy 
to pinpoint March 1777 as the time when British strategy for winning the war went 
hopelessly awry. Three weeks after approving Howe’s plan to move the bulk of his 
force on Philadelphia (and after admitting that reinforcements for the campaign would 
be few), Germain wrote to Carleton in Canada to reiterate that the northern army, now 
operating under Burgoyne, was to push southwards down the Hudson river and link 
up with Howe. Germain went so far as to state that ‘it is become highly necessary that 
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the most speedy junction of the two armies should be effected,’128 yet under the newly 
authorised plan, Howe would not be providing an army to push northwards to meet 
Burgoyne. 
The many failures of British planning here have been well documented and 
examined.129 More important in the context of this thesis is the breakdown in Howe’s 
confidence that he was being supported fully by Germain. By 7 July he was in a 
defensive frame of mind, seeking to add layers to his defence in advance of what he 
now appeared to consider a campaign that was unlikely to produce any significant 
advances. He begged to inform Germain that the war was now on a much bigger 
scale, that the Americans had improved greatly as soldiers and were now benefitting 
from the experience of French officers. They had also, according to reports, recently 
received 50 brass cannon at Boston, giving them a strong artillery train. In what must 
have been simply an attempt to get another request on record (he surely could not 
have believed it was possible) he asked for 10,000 Russians and suggested that such a 
reinforcement would make it possible to end the rebellion in another campaign, 
although he was not clear if he meant the upcoming 1777 campaign or the following 
year. Finally, to be on the record once more about his plans regarding cooperation 
with the northern army, he confirmed that Clinton would be ordered to act defensively 
with his small corps at New York and that the principal purpose of that corps was to 
hold New York. Perhaps to shift responsibility, Clinton would be given the power to 
act as he saw fit considering changing circumstances.130 
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Howe’s intentions were made even more clear in a letter of 16 July (received by 
Germain on 22 August, along with that of 7 July).131 Here, Howe remarked that 
Washington’s movements suggested he was trying to get between the two British 
armies, to frustrate any effort they might make to link up on the Hudson. Howe’s 
response to this was notable for its detachment. It would, he stated: ‘no further affect 
my proceeding to Pennsylvania than to make a small change in the distribution of the 
troops’.132 He anticipated that the greatest impediment Burgoyne would experience in 
moving southwards was the difficulty in moving his supplies through difficult terrain. 
Communication between Howe and Germain was now completely 
dysfunctional, as each man persisted with his own agenda without properly listening 
to what was coming back from the other. Howe had repeatedly asked for more 
reinforcements, while Germain had persisted in his attempts to get Howe to act with 
more aggression. At the same time, Howe had dismantled the keystone of the British 
strategy, while Germain had insisted he had enough men to enact his most ambitious 
schemes. Finally, despite Howe repeatedly making it clear that he expected no 
decisive outcome to the campaign, as late as 18 May Germain was able to express his 
disappointment that Howe felt his force was insufficient for the following campaign 
at the same time as professing his belief that the war could still be ended that year.133 
Howe’s defence of his conduct in 1779 went into some detail on this exchange 
of letters from the end of 1776 into the summer of 1777, an exchange that marked the 
breakdown of a working relationship between two men who had apparently not 
understood each other properly from the start. Howe’s confusion came through 
clearly in the draft of his narrative, showing how he was unsure of the exact numbers 	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of troops promised and received. As he wrestled with the numbers (originally 
claiming he had received just an eighth of the force he had requested, before changing 
it to a fifth, then claiming that only 2,000 of the promised 2,900 reinforcements had 
actually arrived), figures in the draft are repeatedly struck through and revised. 
Finally, Henry Strachey’s hand appears in the margin asking ‘were the 2,000 
arrived?’,134 suggesting that he was also struggling to follow Howe’s computations. 
Betraying a lack of skill for political infighting, Howe attempted to pour scorn 
on Germain’s persisting optimism that the war could be ended in 1777, commenting 
in condescending terms how anyone, even someone with less military experience than 
Germain, could understand that while an army might be sufficient for one campaign, 
it would not necessarily be so for the next. 
… the force which had been sufficient to take possession of New 
York, and other strongholds of the enemy, could not, after the 
necessary divisions for preserving the variety of posts we had gained, 
be equally suitable to the making of new conquests. For is it not self 
evident, that the power of an army must diminish in proportion to the 
decrease of their numbers? And must not their numbers for the field 
necessarily decrease, in proportion to the towns, posts, or forts which 
we take, and are obliged to preserve?135 
 
Germain, eager by then for the whole affair to be brushed away quickly and 
quietly so as to draw as little attention as possible to his own performance in office, 
did not offer the obvious rebuttal to Howe on this point. Howe was not meant to have 
waged a war of conquest. He was not meant to have taken towns, posts and forts. He 
was meant to have targeted and destroyed the rebel army. Howe’s clumsy defence of 
his term as commander-in-chief suggests that, more than two years after his 
relationship with Germain had soured, Howe still did not properly understand what 
had gone wrong. 	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IV 
Howe’s experience 
Howe has presented an easy target for historians. Safe in the knowledge that he failed 
to defeat the rebel army under Washington, he has been pilloried as incompetent, 
stupid, dull, unimaginative and lazy.1 Any attempt to get an idea of the personal 
qualities of the man is hindered by the lack of primary source material that might have 
cast a little extra light on some of his most contentious decisions. Howe’s only 
biographer, Bellamy Partridge, opened his work with Howe’s arrival in Boston in 
1775 and offered only the briefest flashbacks to add a few details to his life before 
that, but to be fair, very little is known about his early years.2 The same holds true for 
the bulk of Howe’s private life – the lack of papers making it extremely difficult to 
make an assessment of his personal qualities. The accepted picture of Howe has 
become something of a caricature, with some historians feeling no need to dwell on 
such well-known characteristics. Weldon A. Brown wrote that Howe ‘needs no 
identification in this study because his traits, good and bad, have often been set 
forth’.3 Physically, he is generally portrayed as having been tall and swarthy, although 
it is uncertain where this originated. Primary source materials do not make reference 
to his physical appearance and references in secondary works draw almost exclusively 
from earlier histories.4 It is more certain that he was a bon viveur, his love of the 
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social scene being recorded by his Hessian aide, von Muenchhausen.5 He is not 
credited with being a great intellect or an innovative thinker on strategy or tactics, but 
he is generally agreed to have been brave and a strong leader of men and his prowess 
with light troops was demonstrated by his training camp at Salisbury.6 Some 
historians have attempted to fill in the gaps of this description, Fischer portraying 
Howe as a melancholy figure attempting to blot out the horrors of war through over-
indulgence in drinking, eating, gambling and womanising. Although this is not an 
unreasonable supposition (and the assessment of the rebel general Charles Lee bears 
some similarity to Fischer’s), there is nothing but circumstantial evidence to back it 
up.7  
Our understanding of Howe draws mainly on his military service in North 
America, and it is inevitably coloured by the knowledge of his ultimate failure. It is 
therefore easy for any explanations Howe offered for his decisions to be brushed 
aside. His failure to attack at Brooklyn and White Plains in 1776, his decision to focus 
his efforts on Pennsylvania in 1777 and his apparent abandonment of Burgoyne that 
year all appear disastrous when viewed as part of an ultimately unsuccessful strategy. 
Howe has been described as nothing more than a conventional eighteenth-century 
general, acting within the confines of his own military education.8 There may not be 
enough documents to construct a psychological study of Howe, as Wyatt and Willcox 
did with Clinton, but it is possible to consider his experiences and at least attempt to 
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come to a better understanding of the man behind the decisions.9 The draft of his 
narrative again offers valuable new information in this regard, but even without this it 
is possible to see a pattern in Howe’s behaviour and to come to new conclusions on 
his decision-making processes. 
Although Howe’s leadership was often open to criticism, the charge of outright 
incompetence (made most notably in the bitter pamphlet war following his period in 
command),10 does not seem to be justified. It is true that he displayed some of the 
attributes highlighted by Norman Dixon in his study of the phenomenon (passivity 
and indecisiveness, a lack of creativity, a tendency towards procrastination) but many 
others were absent (an underestimation of the enemy, an inability to learn from 
mistakes and a love of the frontal assault).11 Dixon also outlined a further 
characteristic of the incompetent general: an imperviousness to the loss and suffering 
of the rank and file or a level of compassion that hindered operations. Dixon’s 
meaning here was that a general must not callously throw the lives of his men away, 
but nor can he hope to keep them entirely safe from harm. One of the greatest 
difficulties faced by a commander is judging when he must risk his men’s lives for the 
overall aim of the war. Howe certainly appeared to value the lives of his men, 
demonstrated by his repeated urgings to maintain discipline and avoid unnecessary 
casualties, but whether this was taken to the extreme and became an impediment to 
action is open to debate.12 He obviously was not totally averse to ordering them into 
action, as engagements at (among others) Long Island, White Plains and Fort 
Washington prove. 	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Intriguingly, Dixon highlighted a key failure in the Second Boer War (in which 
Sir Redvers Buller earned his place in the pantheon of incompetent generals) that 
chimes almost perfectly with Howe’s period in command over a hundred years 
earlier. On Buller, Dixon wrote: ‘His first step towards disaster was to shelve the 
official British strategy’.13 By unilaterally abandoning the Hudson strategy in 1777, 
Howe contributed to Burgoyne’s defeat, which, arguably, turned what was still a 
winnable war into an unwinnable one. Dixon also suggested that the militarily 
incompetent general tends to be overly sensitive to criticism, which could be argued 
in Howe’s case. His extreme reaction to Germain’s failure to provide him with the 
reinforcements he requested at the end of 1776 certainly appears to be a case of over-
sensitivity.14 Dixon identified the eighteenth century as a time when war was evolving 
and becoming more complex, adding new areas of potential failure in terms of 
planning and logistics.15 Although Howe’s failures stand out most starkly on the 
battlefields of America, his excruciating slowness to move was also a factor in the 
frustration of the British strategy. As early as 1903, Henry Cabot Lodge was able to 
remark on Howe taking two months to advance 30 miles.16 The logistical efforts 
involved in preparing for the offensive on Long Island, the landing on Manhattan and 
the 1777 invasion of Pennsylvania were immense and it seems beyond doubt that 
Howe struggled to cope with them. The tortuously long voyage to Philadelphia in 
1777, in which many of his army’s horses died and the majority of the remainder 
were severely debilitated, is a clear indication of a failure in planning. Von 
Muenchhausen noted that the horses had been given very little space on board the 
ships because a short journey had been expected, while Loftus Cliffe reported that his 	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regiment embarked at New York on 9 July, but did not sail until 23 July, claiming, 
‘that interval was taken up only in consuming our fresh stock, very scantily laid in 
indeed’.17 The horses had begun to die by 7 August, and by 27 August even the 
survivors were not fit for service. Overall, around 400 horses (both wagon stock and 
cavalry mounts) were lost.18 
Studies of generalship through the ages do not include Howe among their 
subjects, but can still offer illumination. Keegan’s The Mask of Command jumps 
rather jarringly from Alexander the Great to Wellington, leaving a 2,000-year gap 
between the heroic and anti-heroic leadership styles embodied by each. Keegan 
accepted the notion of intrinsic qualities in generals throughout the history of warfare, 
but saw the differing circumstances in which each fought as an overriding factor.19 
Howe’s lead-from-the-front style, exhibited on the ascent to the Plains of Abraham in 
1754, Bunker Hill in 1775 and even (as shall be seen) Long Island in 1776, was closer 
to Alexander’s than Wellington’s. Howe was obviously not as reckless as Alexander, 
but that was mainly due to the fact that, by the eighteenth century, generals were no 
longer expected to launch themselves into the mêlée. Even so, and although Howe did 
not actually charge into the enemy’s ranks, he still went too far in this regard, eliciting 
concern from subordinates that he was putting his personal safety at risk and drawing 
a mild reproof from Germain following the Battle of Long Island.20 Germain’s 
wording was important in this respect. Stating that Howe had proved his courage 
before, he claimed he was now too important to risk himself in battle. No such reproof 
had followed the Battle of Bunker Hill, where it appears every member of Howe’s 
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staff was killed or wounded, leaving him spattered with blood and, at one point, 
standing alone on the battlefield.21 Howe may have had difficulty in modifying his 
behaviour when in overall command. He disliked the deference that came his way as 
commander-in-chief (as he revealed in conversation with Clinton) and the comment 
from Gruber that he was more suited to command of a regiment than that of an army 
holds weight because of this.22 
Close analysis of documents, including new evidence in the draft of his 
narrative, suggests Howe was an even more cautious commander than is generally 
believed and that his emotions were often volatile.23 There is also strong evidence to 
suggest that he was lacking in political astuteness. His frequent ill-judged statements, 
his terribly botched handling of his own inquiry (his narrative was hopelessly 
inadequate to rescue his reputation and his questioning of supposedly sympathetic 
witnesses was weak) and his own temper meant that he was sometimes his own worst 
enemy.24 He was certainly naïve in his correspondence and his reputation might have 
been completely destroyed during the inquiry had his opponents made a systematic 
and concerted effort to lay the blame for the failure to end the rebellion squarely at his 
feet. 
The most compelling assessment to come from one of Howe’s contemporaries 
was that of the former British general Charles Lee, who fought for the Americans 
during the revolution and was a prisoner of Howe’s for some time, having been 
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captured by British dragoons on 13 December 1776.25 Lee’s opinion of Howe, 
contained in a private letter, is remarkable for its subtlety and complexity. Lee 
avoided broad brush strokes, refusing to present a caricature. Though critical of many 
aspects of Howe’s character, he also scrupulously noted the admirable qualities as 
well. Lee admitted to liking Howe from the moment he first met him, finding him 
‘friendly, candid, good natured, brave, and rather sensible than the reverse’.26 On the 
debit side, Howe was lazy, poorly educated (although Lee commented that this was 
common, even fashionable, at the time) and completely unequipped, intellectually, for 
the job of commander-in-chief. Lee believed that Howe was a good man placed in a 
bad situation. Given that Lee served with the Americans it is understandable that he 
would consider the British cause to have been suspect, but it is interesting to read that 
he believed Howe was unable to follow anything other than the simplest line of 
reasoning, concluding that the war must be just because the desire for it flowed down 
from the King, through government, and on to the armed forces, who could do 
nothing but obey.27 (Lee may have been harsh on Howe in this respect, as the line of 
reasoning alluded to was far from unreasonable; Howe in fact used just that excuse, 
the inability to disobey an order, when defending his decision to serve in America 
having previously assured his constituents in Nottingham that he would never do 
so.)28 Lee went on to claim that Howe had actually come to the realisation (he was 
writing in June 1778) that he had been employed in an indefensible policy.29 
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Henry Clinton’s opinion on Howe was equally complex. Willcox suggested that 
Clinton actually indulged in a form of hero worship where Howe was concerned, but 
this does not seem to be borne out by Clinton’s frequent venomous jottings.30 In one 
of the most bitter of these he declared, ‘I do not esteem the man I serve under,’31 but, 
in a personal letter from 1778, Clinton put forward a theory that the Howe brothers 
together were far more formidable than when separate, going so far as to label them 
irresistible, suggesting more admiration for Howe’s qualities than he had shown 
previously. It is also possible that Clinton was referring mainly to the harmonious 
relationship between the army and navy ensured by having the brothers in the 
respective commands, harmony that Clinton (following his southern expedition of 
1776) was all too aware could not be taken for granted.32 
 
Howe’s early life 
Howe’s education included several years at Eton.33 Despite this, Partridge claimed 
that Howe was not proficient in Latin or Greek (stating that the various Latin 
elements of the extravagant event staged to mark his handing over command of the 
army in 1778 would have been incomprehensible to him).34 This seems questionable, 
given that the learning of Latin and Greek was practically the only education 
delivered at Eton at the time. As part of a 17-hour working week, the boys would 
spend seven hours reciting Latin and Greek and 10 hours translating. Work would 
include Latin composition and upper school boys were encouraged to read widely 
during their free time. Progress from one year to the next was dependent on passing 	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an examination of the works they had studied the previous year and failure would lead 
to being ‘kept back’, which was considered shameful. Howe did not go on to study at 
university, so it is possible that he failed to make much progress through his years at 
Eton, but it is equally possible that he simply wanted to proceed with a career in the 
army as soon as possible. Neither of his older brothers (who both also attended Eton) 
went on to university.35 
Howe’s attendance at Eton (he left to become a Cornet in the 15th Dragoons in 
1746, at the age of 17)36 coincided with the last days of a barbarous practice known as 
the ‘ram hunt’, in which a horde of students would chase a ram through the streets of 
Eton and Windsor and batter it to death with cudgels. By the time Howe reached Eton 
the practice had been modified, but not out of any squeamishness over the treatment 
of the ram. It was the boys’ health that was the concern. Considering it dangerous for 
them to exert themselves too severely during the summer months, the ram was 
hamstrung and then beaten to death. The ram hunt was abolished the year after Howe 
left Eton and is revealing of opinions prevalent at the time; physical exertion was 
viewed with suspicion.37 Lyte noted a tendency in society to be both late to bed and 
late to rise, and this characteristic was reported in Howe himself. (The naval captain 
Andrew Snape Hamond was appalled to discover, on reaching the Eagle at 10am for a 
conference with the Howe brothers, that William was still in bed.)38 At Eton, the boys 
would be able to lay in bed until nine o’clock on school holidays. The worry that they 
should not overexert themselves in hot weather is also important and ties in with 
Howe’s concerns in this respect while commanding in America. Eton does not, 
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therefore, appear to have been a particularly taxing environment in the eighteenth 
century. A 17-hour working week, long lie-ins and a wariness of exertion in hot 
weather would not necessarily have instilled a tendency towards indolence in Howe, 
but they would have done little to dispel one that was already there.39 
 
Howe’s military education 
Despite Howe’s alleged connections with royalty (his grandmother had been  a 
mistress of George I and his mother, Mary Sophia Kielmansegge, was believed to be 
an illegitimate sister to George II) his military career was impressive enough to need 
no help from a royal patron. Having started service as a cornet in 1746, he made 
lieutenant the following year before switching to the 20th Regiment, where he served 
under James Wolfe.40 Howe’s qualities as a soldier became discernible during the 
French and Indian War (1754-63), in which he served with some distinction. His 
leadership of the light troops that scaled the Heights of Abraham in 1759, and his 
solid performance in the battle for Quebec that followed, earned him recognition as an 
officer of great potential and he emerged from the war with a reputation for expertise 
in light infantry tactics.41  
Experiences in the 1762 siege of Havana were also important. In the Havana 
campaign, Howe was put in command of an elite unit, but it was composed of two 
grenadier battalions, rather than light infantry.42 Under the command of George, the 
3rd Earl of Albermarle, Howe received an education in a different form of warfare 	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from the one he had experienced under the mercurial Wolfe in Canada. Albermarle 
was cautious and opted for a siege rather than risk a potentially costly assault on the 
Spanish defences at Havana.43 Howe was also part of the force, nearly 4,000 strong, 
that landed on a Cuban beach in two waves of flat-bottomed boats (Howe had the 
distinction of leading his grenadiers in the centre of the first wave).44 He showed his 
ability to learn from his experiences when making a request for flat-bottomed boats in 
1775. Suggesting that they should be made slightly smaller than those employed 
during the previous war, he declared that this would make them sturdier and therefore 
more reliable.45 
Howe performed well at Havana, feeling out Spanish defences at La Cabaña 
during the night of 8 June and unsettling the defenders to the point that they spiked 
many of their guns and abandoned their position, leaving only militia behind, while 
on 15 June he was entrusted with the critical mission of securing a water supply for 
the besieging army, at Chorera.46 Clearly, Howe was something of a rising star. It is 
possible, however, that his abiding memory of the Havana campaign would have been 
the terrible effects of sickness. In an operation that saw the army lose 560 men killed 
or fatally wounded in action, more than 4,700 died from disease, perhaps making his 
refusal to start offensive operations around New York in the summer of 1776 until the 
necessary camp equipage had arrived from England more understandable.47 Among 
the British forces at Havana was the Connecticut Brigade, a force of provincials 
whose sufferings during the epidemic were recounted in Gothic style by the Reverend 	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John Graham. The brigade included the 1st Connecticut Regiment, six companies of 
troops from New York, three from Rhode Island, two from New Jersey, four 
independent companies and two companies of ‘Gorham Rangers’.48 Just 13 years 
later, Howe would be leading British troops against men from the same colonies and, 
in some cases, the same men themselves; Israel and Rufus Putnam, who went on to 
hold prominent positions in the rebel army during the revolution, were both present at 
Havana.49 
 
Howe’s aims  
It is impossible not to wonder, considering his sluggishness of movement, failure to 
commit to a decisive battle and general pessimism, exactly what Howe hoped to 
achieve by gaining command of the British army. Yet it is beyond doubt that he 
wanted the command, as his letter to his brother (15 June 1775), carefully outlining an 
attractive and simple strategy for Germain’s attention, demonstrated.50 This is an area 
where the lack of primary sources is a real and insurmountable impediment to our 
understanding of Howe. He may have genuinely believed he could end the war as 
easily as he professed in the letter to his brother. He may not have given the matter 
much thought at all (there was nothing new in the strategy he outlined), or might have 
considered the rebels to be an insignificant opponent and focussed instead on the 
laurels to be won by a swift quelling of the rebellion. As seen in Chapter 1, British 
officers saw no shame in plainly stating their desires for advancement in the army, 	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and he may have simply viewed the command as the next step upwards on the ladder 
of his military experience. Howe does not appear to have been as demanding on this 
front as many of his fellow officers, but there were occasions when he revealed that 
he harboured his own ambitions. Notable in this respect was his gloomy musing on 
the possibility of storming a rebel position at Phip’s Farm, which would (he believed) 
be viewed as merely ‘a victory of cannon,’51 and would therefore not bring him any 
honour. Clinton, at the time, made the remark that any victory was worthwhile, but it 
is interesting to note that Howe felt unmotivated to take military action if it was 
unlikely to bring him personal honour. 
Howe also betrayed an uncertainty over his position should he join forces with 
Carleton’s army along the Hudson during the 1776 campaign – a critical point when 
that was the keystone of the strategy for the year. Howe was concerned that linking up 
with another British army might diminish his role and even lead to his being 
superseded by a superior officer (as Carleton was). To Germain, on 12 May 1776, 
Howe stated that he believed a junction with the second British army on the Hudson 
was one of the key targets for the campaign to come.52 Less than a month later, on 7 
June, he expressed doubts about the mechanics of such a link-up. Despite claiming to 
have no problem with the idea of working under a superior officer, he suggested 
writing to Carleton to reassure him of this fact, strongly implying that the 
circumstances of such a junction were very much on his mind. He went on to point 
out that he would hope to still be able to run his own army after the junction and even 
suggested that they might remain in separate camps. On the possibility of Carleton 
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redistributing regiments within the combined army, Howe stated that he believed this 
would not be possible without his consent.53  
The motivation for this letter to Germain stemmed from the news that two 
regiments, the 29th and 47th, had arrived at Quebec earlier than expected, along with 
Burgoyne and equipment necessary for crossing large bodies of water.54 Howe clearly 
felt that the northern army was about to move and might do so quickly. His concerns 
about losing his authority when linking up with Carleton, despite his protestations to 
the contrary, are clear and it is interesting to note that Howe himself made no effort 
whatsoever, in either of the two campaigns in which he commanded, to move up the 
Hudson. 
One final factor must be considered when assessing what Howe had hoped to 
achieve by taking the reins of command. His position as peace commissioner as well 
as commander-in-chief suggests that he may have harboured hopes of negotiating a 
peaceful settlement. How realistic those hopes were is debateable, but the peace 
commission (in which Howe served in tandem with his brother) could offer little that 
might tempt the rebels into climbing down, offering merely to grant pardons and 
declare the colonies once more at peace.55 Germain even wanted to insert a clause 
stating that the colonists would need to declare formally their acceptance of 
Parliament’s right to pass laws regulating all aspects of colonial life, before any 
negotiations on perceived grievances could begin.56 Kathleen Burk dismissed the 
Howes’ dual roles as ridiculous, believing that one of the tasks must inevitably have 	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been neglected.57 Characteristically, Howe failed to shed any light on this during his 
narrative. Acknowledging the fact that some people believed his role as commissioner 
had interfered with that of commander-in-chief, he went on to mangle the issue 
completely and assure the committee that it was ‘next to an impossibility that my 
military could materially interfere with my civil duty’.58 Whether he was attempting 
to be clever or had simply become confused is not clear, but his narrative did not 
betray many signs of cleverness elsewhere. 
Gruber saw the peace commissioner role as the key to the staccato progress of 
the war under Howe, charting how the many pauses in activity coincided with 
renewed attempts to bring the rebels to the negotiating table. Even so, Gruber 
accepted that it was Richard Howe who was most optimistic about the peace 
commission, while William was doubtful that it could work before military success 
had been achieved.59 Howe saw the Declaration of Independence as rather obvious 
evidence that the colonists no longer considered themselves to be under the authority 
of the King or of Parliament.60 It seems unlikely, however, that he harboured any 
serious hopes that a decisive victory on the battlefield might open the doors to a 
negotiated peace; he certainly made no effort to secure one, despite his many 
declarations that this was what he sought.61 Both of the Howe brothers appear to have 
had very little faith in the possibility of the peace commission bearing fruit, even if 
they could secure that all-important decisive victory. As quoted by Gruber, they 
painted a very gloomy picture for Germain from the very start. 	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As things now are, the whole seems to depend upon military and naval options. 
The ensuing campaign may possibly be decisive. Success (of which there are 
the greatest hopes) will naturally make room for negotiation and peace. But the 
infatuated expectations and perseverance of the present rulers of America 
appear so much beyond reason and nature, that no common powers of 
penetration can determine the effect of even the completest victory.62 
 
The possibility that Howe was attempting to treat the rebels gently, so as not to 
make a peace settlement impossible, deserves consideration, but a policy as delicate 
as that would require great subtlety and it seems unfeasible that Howe would have 
made no reference to it in his letters to Germain. Hugh Bicheno raised the interesting 
idea that historical figures should only be viewed by their actions and not their letters, 
which were written with ‘an eye on the historical record,’63 and could therefore not be 
considered reliable. No doubt letters would not always reveal everything a general or 
politician was thinking or planning, but to pursue one policy while writing repeatedly 
of another would be foolhardy, especially when, as was the case during the Howe 
Inquiry, those letters would be the principal evidence on which to base a defence of 
one’s conduct. 
 
Howe’s personal qualities 
There is no doubt that Howe was a brave soldier. As shall be shown, evidence 
abounds of his courage under fire and his willingness to expose himself to the same 
risks he asked his men to face. This went a long way to making him popular with his 
soldiers. Marine lieutenant John Clarke claimed that Howe addressed his men prior to 
the Battle of Bunker Hill, saying: ‘I shall not desire one of you to go a step farther 
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than where I go myself at your head’.64 If Howe did indeed say this, then it appears he 
was as good as his word, and he offered an even more striking example of his bravery 
the following year.65 Reconnoitring a crossing of the Delaware near Trenton, on 8 
December, Howe, Cornwallis and a small unit of light infantry and Hessian Jägers 
advanced through the town to discover that the Americans had erected batteries on the 
opposite bank of the river. Howe’s Hessian aide, von Muenchhausen, wrote in his 
journal that the rebels opened up on the small group with 37 guns, inflicting 13 
casualties. Despite this proof of the efficiency of the rebel guns, Howe, Cornwallis 
and three aides, including von Muenchhausen, remained under fire (having sent the 
troops out of harm’s way) as they calmly surveyed the situation. Von Muenchhausen 
claimed to have stayed under fire in this manner for an hour, but it is possible it only 
seemed that long. One cannonball apparently sprayed dirt onto Howe’s clothes and 
face, while another removed a leg from von Muenchhausen’s horse, before they 
withdrew. Howe showed great generosity in giving his Hessian aide a ‘superb English 
horse’66 as a replacement. Von Muenchhausen (unsurprisingly, given the above 
incident) believed there was a great risk that Howe would be killed in the war and 
thought this would cost Britain the colonies.67 
Lee’s opinion of Howe is worth returning to in this regard. The former British 
army officer believed Howe to be ‘brave and cool as Julius Caesar,’68 an opinion that 
Howe himself might have disputed. Howe may have been able to present a picture of 
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coolness when under enemy artillery fire on a reconnoitring mission, but in the heat of 
battle it was a different matter entirely. Recollecting a moment after Bunker Hill, 
Clinton recalled that Howe had admitted he could not control his temper in battle and 
would sometimes snap at subordinates. Clinton believed he saw a further example of 
this temper when Howe, upset over the Hessian defeat at Trenton, had written his 
inflammatory letter to Lord Percy.69 
This personal bravery in battle appears to have been allied with a generally 
pessimistic outlook. Howe’s period in command of the British army was notable for 
its stop-start progress, and the letters he sent back to Germain were a puzzling mix. 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Howe’s correspondence followed a 
repeating pattern of positive news interspersed with pessimism. This does not appear 
to have been a case of a fluctuating mood (as Anderson claimed).70 Howe never 
sounded optimistic in his correspondence, even when reporting very significant 
successes. He detailed the events, liberally handing out praise to all whom he deemed 
deserving of it, but his successes never led him to make a claim that he felt more 
optimistic about the progress of the war as a consequence. The evidence rather 
suggests that Howe was constantly pessimistic and that even the most striking 
successes (such as on Long Island or the capture of Fort Washington) were not 
enough to change that. Throughout 1776, Howe repeatedly made reference to the fact 
that a decisive battle was needed if the war was to be won, but he never actually said 
he believed it would be possible to gain one. What at first glance appear to be letters 
bursting with purpose and optimism were, on closer inspection, actually non-
committal and loaded with qualifications. This was the case in his first letter to 	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Germain, on 25 April 1776, in which he admitted that a decisive victory at New York 
would be the key to terminating the war, but went on to claim that he would not be 
able to secure one unless he was established at New York early in the year.71 His 
private letter of the next day again accepted the need for a decisive victory before 
offering reasons why he might not be able to win one.72 In June he stated what 
appeared to be an obvious fact – that if the rebels offered battle he must not refuse it – 
and in July he claimed that peace would not be restored until the rebel army was 
defeated.73 Despite these assertions, in August and October he would apparently spurn 
exactly the sort of battles he had been hoping for, at Long Island and White Plains. 
It is tempting to dismiss as mere modesty Howe’s claim (reported via his 
brother in September 1775)74	  that he felt inadequate to command the British army, yet 
it found an echo in the assessment of Lee, who claimed that Howe was ‘confounded 
and stupefied’75 by the task. Lee went on to describe a man who was simply trying to 
get through a war he had no idea how to win, following his orders, fighting his battles 
(with closed eyes) and resorting to his mistress and the bottle to blot out the details of 
a painful situation. It is an intriguing assessment and coming, as it does, in a letter 
filled with praise for Howe’s personal qualities, it is not possible to dismiss it as 
simple bitterness from the man Howe had held prisoner. 
Only twice, in fact, in all the surviving correspondence from Howe, was he bold 
enough to claim that he could win the war in one campaign. The first instance was in 
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his letter to his brother, Richard, while still at Boston in June 1775.76 The second 
came when making his request for substantial reinforcements at the end of November 
1776.77 Considering that Howe made no other statement to that effect during more 
than two years in command, it seems that either each letter must have been the 
product of an uncharacteristic burst of optimism, or that there were other motives at 
work on each occasion. It is easy to see that his letter of 12 June 1775 was an attempt 
to ingratiate himself with Germain, but an assertion that a war can be ended in one 
campaign is not one to be made lightly and Howe included no qualifications; the 
victory was not dependent on the activities of the rebels, the timely arrival of 
reinforcements or any other factors that found their way into later letters.78 Unlike the 
first example, Howe’s second declaration that he could win the war in one campaign 
was attached to a very large proviso indeed – the arrival of 15,000 reinforcements.79 
There are two ways to consider Howe’s request. Either he genuinely believed he 
could finish the job with an army of 35,000 men, or he felt he had no hope of 
accomplishing the feat with anything less. A conspiracy theorist might be able to look 
at his request as deliberately destructive, a demand that he knew had little hope of 
being complied with and which would, therefore, absolve him of responsibility for 
failure to end the war, but Howe did not appear to lose confidence in his position until 
he had received Germain’s reply, several months later.80 There is no evidence that he 
was coldly calculating a way out of what he viewed as an untenable position any 
earlier that that. 
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It is not difficult to see the importance of the fact that the first letter was written 
before the Battle of Bunker Hill, and before a long winter spent in Boston. The impact 
of Bunker Hill on Howe has long been a part of American Revolution lore and it is 
part of his legend that the experience made him timid in the face of American 
fortifications. Although it is tempting to challenge any long-accepted version of 
events, the impact of Bunker Hill cannot be dismissed. While it is true that Howe 
showed a willingness to attack fortified positions (on the Dorchester Heights and, 
later, at Fort Washington) even after the horror of his assault on Breed’s Hill, it could 
not fail to have made some impact on him. Howe left the battlefield having watched 
his force suffer heavy casualties and it seems possible that every member of his staff 
was killed or wounded.81  If it could be shown that Howe was an unfeeling, 
unemotional man, then perhaps a case could be made that he would have been able to 
shrug this off, but his correspondence does not reveal such a man. The evident 
distress conveyed in his account of the Battle of Bunker Hill to Edward Harvey 
(‘when I look at the consequences of it… I do it with horror’)82 is evidence of a more 
sensitive personality. 
Howe offered an earlier example of this during the French and Indian War. In 
1758, the young Howe was apparently devastated by the death of his eldest brother, 
George Augustus, at Ticonderoga. Writing to his brother, Richard, he admitted that 
the news had been more than he could bear, suggesting that he had broken down. 
Howe went on to urge his brother to exercise caution in his own conduct so that the 
family would not be made to suffer again.83 Gruber viewed this as evidence of a lack 
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of self-confidence in Howe, but that seems to be a harsh judgement.84 This rather 
touching and completely unguarded letter suggests an emotional side to Howe that is 
seldom mentioned. His words were certainly heartfelt, and this was echoed in a letter 
to the Earl of Buckinghamshire almost 18 years later. Howe showed sensitivity in 
referring to the ‘infinite pain’85 the Earl and his wife must have suffered on the deaths 
of two infant boys in quick succession, but then plunged into a recounting of military 
events in North America. There was an awkwardness to this letter, a sense that Howe 
was naturally sympathetic but felt constrained in his ability to display it. The rawness 
of his letter 18 years previously, written by a younger man in circumstances of terrible 
personal loss, was absent, but the sensitivity was still there. 
As well as being a traumatic experience, Bunker Hill may also have made an 
impact on Howe’s beliefs about the possibility of winning the war quickly. Coming, 
as it did, just five days after his letter to Lord Howe, claiming that he could end the 
war with an army of 19,000, it is reasonable to suggest that there must have been at 
least some reassessment of his opinion. Howe was given ample time to brood upon 
the consequences of such a costly victory as the siege of Boston drew out into the 
following year. It was nine months before Howe extricated his army from Boston, and 
the time spent there would not have been pleasant.86 Apart from the ignominy of 
being besieged by the rebel army, there were shortages of fresh provisions and 
firewood.87 Clinton’s memos of conversations with Howe show the commander-in-
chief to have been in a dour mood throughout the months in Boston, occasionally 
suggesting diversionary raids but never putting them into operation. He also 	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expressed fears regarding potential rebel activity (fearing that they might burn the 
British barracks on Bunker Hill, for instance) and worried over problems real or 
perceived.88 His previously mentioned concerns over driving the rebels from a 
position at Phip’s Farm were remarkable, because the rebels had no such position at 
the time he expressed his concerns to Clinton; Howe was merely speculating, rather 
gloomily, on what might happen if the rebels built works there.89 The impression is 
unavoidable – that Howe was preoccupied with potential setbacks. Anticipating 
difficulties is part of the job of a commander-in-chief, but it does appear that Howe 
was at times dominated by his pessimism and failed to take action to forestall 
problems that he had foreseen. The rebel move to occupy the Dorchester Heights in 
March of the following year, for instance, could easily have been prevented by timely 
action on his part. He had mentioned it as a desirable objective as early as 12 June 
1775, but had done nothing to secure it.90 
Howe’s mood at this time would seem to be encapsulated by his statement that 
the British were ‘liable to attack from the whole world’.91 His pessimism would prove 
to be prophetic, but it would be more than two years before other nations entered the 
war on the side of the Americans. During the same conversation, Howe confided in 
Clinton that he had learned of the opinion of the Secretary at War regarding the 
rebellion. According to Clinton, Howe revealed this in confidence, never having told 
anyone else. Clinton did not elaborate on what (according to Howe) Viscount 
Barrington’s thoughts were, but it is accepted that he advocated a seaborne strategy, 
believing an effective blockade would force the rebels to come to a negotiated 	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settlement and doubting the possibility of achieving victory through land operations. 
(Responding to Lord North’s news that Barrington doubted enough reinforcements 
could be found to amass a suitable army for the American war, the King had pointed 
out that his pessimism had much to do with his preference for a purely naval 
strategy).92 If Howe had serious doubts about the possibility of winning a land-based 
war, he would not have been encouraged by the knowledge that other prominent men 
shared those doubts. 
A bloody battle followed by a nine-month siege comprised a dispiriting 
introduction to the war for Howe. The confinement in Boston must have been 
frustrating as he intended to leave and establish a base at New York in order to make 
an early start to the 1776 campaign, only to be frustrated by a shortage of shipping.93 
The siege was frequently punctuated by the formulation of schemes to test the rebel 
army, none of which was ever put into operation. Howe himself, in a rare display of 
energy during this period, suggested a detailed plan to burn rebel barracks and 
Admiral Howe suggested an expedition to take Rhode Island.94  
Even after escaping from the confinement at Boston, Howe remained a cautious 
commander, as evidenced by the frequent lengthy pauses between actions. Following 
the Battle of Long Island, on 27 August 1776, Howe waited 19 days before landing on 
Manhattan, then almost a full month before his next move, to Throg’s Neck. The 
Battle of White Plains came 16 days later and Fort Washington was not taken until 19 
days after that. Logistical reasons offered a partial excuse for this staccato progress 
(most major movements made by the British involved combined operations that 	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would have required a great deal of planning), but not a complete one. Lee’s 
assessment that Howe simply had no idea how to wage his war is a persuasive one, 
but Howe’s underlying caution must also be considered. Despite his great personal 
bravery in battle, Howe was concerned that he should not pay too great a price for his 
victories.95 This is an admirable trait and would have earned him the respect of his 
men, but Howe may have taken it too far. His famous decision to halt the assault of 
his grenadiers on the American lines at Brooklyn is a key point here. Howe admitted 
freely (in one of his customarily unguarded comments in correspondence with 
Germain) that he believed his men would have taken the redoubt, but only at the risk 
of high casualties.96 In his narrative, Howe dealt with this issue in some depth, 
insisting that he may have been labelled criminally negligent had he permitted the 
attack to continue. It was his duty, he argued, not to throw the lives of his men away 
carelessly, especially where the objective was not important enough to justify the 
cost.97 
The draft of Howe’s narrative casts a little new light on this episode. Instead of 
saying that he would have been condemned as inconsiderate or even criminal, he 
originally intended to offer the much stronger phrase: ‘I should have been deemed a 
madman had I encouraged the attack in question’.98 Howe’s caution was even more 
forcefully evident in a heavily re-worked sentence from his narrative regarding the 
failure to launch a full-scale assault at White Plains. No doubt aware that his words 
would be closely analysed, he repeatedly crossed out and re-wrote this sentence. 
Initially, he seems to have intended to start with, ‘I am free to own I would never 
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hazard the assault of lines’.99 Perhaps quickly realising that this was a dangerous thing 
for a general to admit, the sentence was partially struck through and Howe proceeded 
to write, ‘I am free to own if I could remove an enemy from a very advantageous 
situation without the hazard of an attack I should certainly embrace it.’ This was still 
too strong a wording, and Howe revised it yet again to: 
I am free to own if I could remove an enemy from a very advantageous 
situation without the hazard of an attack where the object to be carried 
was not adequate to the cost of men to be expected from an assault upon 
strong lines, I should certainly embrace it in the hopes of meeting him 
upon more equal terms.100  
 
Even this cumbersome wording, now loaded with extenuating phrases, was 
eventually considered unfit for service. Perhaps the implication of welcoming an 
opportunity to avoid battle also caused Howe to re-think, because ‘embrace it’ was 
replaced by ‘adopt that cautionary conduct,’101 and the mention of strong lines was 
removed altogether, possibly because it carried the troublesome implication that he 
might never be willing to attack a well-positioned enemy.  
It is impossible to argue with Howe’s assertion that it would have been reckless 
to risk casualties for an objective that would not justify the losses. The key factor 
here, of course, was Howe’s judgement of exactly what would constitute an important 
enough objective. Howe’s decision at Long Island will be considered in detail in the 
following chapter, but it is clear that many of his contemporaries, including his own 
second-in-command, Clinton, believed the objective was important enough to justify 
the risk.102 Howe’s understanding that any casualties suffered on campaign would be 
hard to replace (he described his army as ‘the stock upon which the national force in 	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America must in future be grafted’)103 is, again, a mark in his favour, but it begs the 
question of exactly where he thought Germain was going to find the 15 or 20,000 
reinforcements he requested at the end of 1776.104 
Howe’s cautionary conduct appears to have prevented him from acting with the 
vigour Germain would have liked to see and he also proved himself unwilling to wage 
the kind of war Germain envisaged. Howe’s distaste for punitive warfare was detailed 
in Chapter 1, in so far as it clashed with Clinton’s views on the prosecution of the 
war, but this is also another area in which the draft of Howe’s narrative is 
illuminating.105 In his clumsy speech, Howe acknowledged the criticism levelled at 
him for attempting to wage a campaign of conciliation rather than devastation and 
spoke of his intention not to ‘irritate them [the colonists] by a contrary mode of 
proceeding’.106 The draft shows that he initially intended to go further, by adding 
‘which I am sorry to say seems now to be intended’.107 The final narrative proceeded 
with, ‘Had it been afterwards judged good policy to turn the plan of war into an 
indiscriminate devastation of that country, and had I been thought the proper 
instrument for executing such a plan, ministers, I presume, would have openly stood 
forth, and sent clear, explicit orders.’ Once more, the draft shows that Howe had 
originally planned a much more revealing phrase, with ‘had I been thought the proper 
instrument for executing such a plan’ originally reading ‘had I been capable of 
executing that sanguinary plan…’. This not only conveyed more fully Howe’s 
personal distaste for such a method of warfare, it also suggested that there was a point 
at which he might not have been willing to obey orders. The implication is clear that, 	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had he indeed received explicit orders to devastate the country, he would have had 
difficulty following them. 
The burning of Falmouth highlighted Howe’s repugnance of such a mode of 
warfare.108 Interestingly, Germain himself reacted with surprise to news of the raid 
(there was some confusion over who had ordered it, as it took place around the time 
of Howe taking over as commander-in-chief and Germain as American Secretary). 
Brown credited Germain with inquiring into the incident, but it seems unlikely that 
Germain could have had any genuine objections to a mode of warfare that he went on 
to press upon Howe repeatedly.109 Howe was certainly eager to be absolved of any 
responsibility; when Germain asked him for a report on the details of the raid, Howe 
was blunt in laying responsibility at Gage’s door.110 
The Falmouth incident gave Howe ample justification in avoiding Germain’s 
encouragements to raid the New England coast. The reputation of the naval officer 
commanding the raid, Lieutenant Henry Mowat, appears to have suffered as a 
consequence, and Howe originally intended to make reference to this in his narrative, 
referring to ‘animadversions upon the conduct of a sea officer for burning a town on 
the coast’.111 Howe amended this passage to instead refer to ‘a circumstance not now 
necessary to dwell upon’.112  If Howe thought it might be unwise to resurrect a matter 
over which suspicion had initially fallen on him, then it was a rare example of 
astuteness on his part. For most of his time in command in America, and during the 	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fractious years afterwards, he displayed naivety and even clumsiness in his dealings 
with inferiors and superiors alike. The result was that he was extremely vulnerable by 
the time he returned to England. Criticism of his conduct in America was most 
vociferous in a series of pamphlets, but there also appears to have been a whispering 
campaign against him and Howe certainly believed that Germain was making his 
dissatisfaction clear in private, if by no other method than neglecting to defend him.113 
Howe appears to have had no inkling that statements he made in letters to 
Germain might be used against him if events went badly (alternatively, he may have 
had no doubts that he would be successful in America and that no defence of his 
actions would ever need to be made). When careful consideration of what he said 
would have been prudent, he often made rash declarations, betraying what might be 
called a lack of political awareness. He certainly provided plenty of ammunition for 
anyone who wanted to criticise his conduct. Examples of this are plentiful in his 
communications with Germain. His repeated reassurances that he saw a decisive 
battle as the surest route to victory in the war laid him open to criticism for not 
securing one, and even for turning down two apparent chances for just such a battle, 
on Long Island and at White Plains. In June and October 1775, and in January, April, 
June, July and November 1776, Howe touched on the subject of the desirability of 
bringing Washington’s army to battle and defeating it.114 He does not appear to have 
ever fully realised the dangers inherent in this, even when heavily qualifying his 
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statements about the need to destroy the main rebel army. It is remarkable (given that 
Howe clearly recognised the many problems involved in attempting to secure a 
decisive victory) that he could keep referring to his desire for a major battle in his 
correspondence. It would be compelling evidence in any case against him should the 
war go badly.  
More specific examples of this lack of awareness in his communications include 
his rash statement, in June of 1776, to have been amazed at the achievements of 
Germain since taking office.115 Such lavish praise for the man presenting him with his 
army would obviously negate any possibility of defending himself on the grounds of 
having had insufficient force for the 1776 campaign. It is not so much that Howe 
ought to have been constantly looking to his own defence in case he did not win the 
war, but given his constant references to a decisive battle, freely acknowledging the 
fact that he had an army fit for purpose was dangerous. He clearly entertained doubts 
(liberally detailed in his letters to Germain) about the possibility of forcing a decisive 
battle, yet he made it clear he understood how important it was and that he had an 
army substantial enough to achieve it. Political enemies would have been able to turn 
that against him had they chosen to. 
Howe demonstrated that he had no forebodings about this after the Battle of 
Long Island. In his report, he mentioned halting the impetuous attack of the 
grenadiers and 33rd Regiment on the American lines at Brooklyn, adding ‘Had they 
been permitted to go on, it is my opinion they would have carried the redoubt’.116 This 
was certainly a candid admission, but it was not a wise one, given that, at the time of 
writing, Howe knew that the bulk of the rebel force on Long Island had been able to 
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evacuate on the night of 29 August. A chance for a more comprehensive victory had 
been allowed to slip away and admitting that his men would probably have 
successfully stormed the redoubt meant that he would have to bear full responsibility 
for failing to capture a major part of Washington’s army. During the parliamentary 
inquiry, Howe expressed indignation at this phrase being turned against him, insisting 
that he had only meant to convey his high opinion of the soldiers in question. This is 
questionable, given Howe’s witnessing of the same grenadiers falling into disarray on 
Breed’s Hill. The sight of another undisciplined assault from them was more likely to 
have filled him with dread rather than admiration for their fighting zeal. Howe’s 
defence displayed once more his lack of facility with words, outlining the situation on 
Long Island in such confusing terms that even careful study of contemporary maps 
cannot clarify what he meant beyond doubt.117 
Following the fall of Fort Washington and Fort Lee, as Cornwallis led a 
vigorous pursuit of what little remained of Washington’s army, Howe allowed the 
British force to stop at Brunswick rather than ordering it to continue and, potentially, 
capture or completely disperse the rebels. Bearing in mind Howe had repeatedly 
acknowledged the importance of destroying Washington’s army (and almost as 
frequently lamented the fact that he would have great difficulty in achieving it), his 
letter to Germain on this matter was another example of Howe’s lack of astuteness. 
He admitted that his aims had extended only as far as gaining possession of East 
Jersey, and that he had therefore ordered Cornwallis to proceed no further than 
Brunswick (which he reached on 1 December). Howe was admitting that territorial 
gain was now the only goal he had in mind. Worse than this, it took him five days to 
realise that a continued pursuit of the rebels might be worthwhile. The British and 	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Hessians have often been labelled slow-moving and cumbersome (von Muenchhausen 
commented on Howe’s slowness, while the amount of baggage carried by a regiment 
was a genuine impediment to speed),118 but in this case Howe’s letter also revealed 
that Cornwallis’s men had dumped their baggage to allow them to pursue the 
Americans more readily. The impression created was one of Howe again calling his 
men back when the destruction of the rebel army seemed possible.119 
Perhaps the most puzzling example of this trait came in the same letter, with 
Howe’s observation to Germain that the chain of posts he had set up in New Jersey 
was ‘rather too extensive’, but adding ‘I conclude the troops will be in perfect 
security’. If Howe had genuinely had a foreboding that his string of outposts was too 
thinly stretched, he should have altered their arrangement. If he genuinely believed 
they would be in perfect security, he had no need to mention his concerns. Howe 
could be considered unlucky in the sequence of events that followed (the Hessians 
garrisoning Trenton, on the extreme left of the chain of posts, allowed themselves to 
be surprised, while the Americans displayed a fighting spirit that had previously been 
lacking), but the fall of Trenton, boosting rebel morale and puncturing the air of 
invincibility that had been gradually building around the British and Hessian forces, 
was a serious blow. Again, Howe’s defence of this episode was clumsy. In his 
narrative he concentrated mainly on the decision to place Hessian regiments at 
Trenton, ignoring the fact that it was the isolation of the post and the size of the 
garrison, rather than its composition, that had been its essential weakness (the nearest 
support had been based five miles away). Rhetorically, he asked the House where he 
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could have used the Hessians better, even though this was not the pertinent 
question.120 
The inquiry itself is evidence of Howe’s limitations in the political arena. His 
attempts to goad Germain into making a rash comment that might justify the Howes’ 
demands for an inquiry into their conduct were crude. On a motion (raised on 4 
December 1778) to condemn an apparent switch to a more punitive form of warfare, 
following the entry of France into the war, Howe took the opportunity to push for his 
inquiry, asserting that the war would never go well while Germain was running it.121 
It was an unsophisticated, unsubtle goading, and one that Germain refused to rise to, 
replying only that he was surprised at such an unexpected attack and had believed that 
nothing but the motion itself would be discussed that day. Germain, who was a highly 
capable speaker, professed his unpreparedness to defend himself, but proceeded to 
deliver a concise and highly effective rebuttal of Howe. It was so effective, in fact, 
that Howe should have realised that Germain’s defence was solid, yet he persisted 
with his demands for an inquiry. By April 1779 Cornwallis was writing in 
exasperation that Howe was determined to have his inquiry, even though he had 
advised him against it. 
Sir William Howe, in spite of all that can be said to him, will have a 
parliamentary inquiry into his conduct. He is himself prosecutor and 
defendant… People of all parties seem to think that it is an ill judged business, 
and can answer no purpose for Sir William.122 
 
Cornwallis, whose wife had recently died, was distressed that Howe intended 
calling him as a witness. The fact that Howe could call, as his star witness, a man who 
did not wish to be there and who did not believe the inquiry could serve any useful 	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purpose, shows a clear lack of perception on the part of Howe. The narrative with 
which he opened the inquiry was confused, rambling and failed to answer any of the 
questions surrounding his conduct. Perhaps even worse than this, when he started to 
put questions to Cornwallis it became clear that there had been no preparation 
whatsoever between the two. Cornwallis opened by ignoring Howe’s first question 
and insisting that he would not answer any questions that were a matter of opinion. 
When Howe arrived at the critical questions regarding his failure to storm the lines at 
Brooklyn, Cornwallis refused to be drawn into giving an opinion. Howe’s first 
witness would not testify that Howe had been right to halt the assault on the lines. He 
went on to refuse to comment on the importance of taking New York (even making 
the pointed observation that his opinion was not important because the inquiry had not 
been set up to examine his conduct). He declined to answer a question on the decision 
to focus on Pennsylvania for the 1777 campaign, refused to give details of private 
conversations with Howe and refused to answer a question on how strongly Howe had 
pushed for a decisive battle at the Brandywine.123 
Cornwallis’s reticence worked in Howe’s favour when he was cross-examined 
by supporters of the ministry (for instance, he refused to say whether the American 
lines at Brooklyn had been manned, or whether Clinton would have been able to get 
behind them). The impression created was very different when he refused to answer 
many of Howe’s questions. At times he appeared to be a hostile witness, strongly 
suggesting that Howe had not conferred with him in any detail on the nature of his 
questioning. Howe had demanded the inquiry and should have been aware that there 
was a possibility that it could go badly for him. His military career was at stake, and 	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also his personal reputation. In spite of this, his defence was laboured, confusing and 
appeared to have been badly organised. To have been able to stand in front of a 
committee comprising the entire House of Commons with such inadequate defences 
suggests that Howe had either woefully misjudged the strength of his case or that he 
felt sure no effective attack would be made on him. His principal opponent would be 
Germain, who had made it clear during debates on the necessity of an inquiry that he 
did not want one. He had refused to rise to Howe’s goading and, during the long 
discussions over whether witnesses should be heard following Howe’s narrative, he 
had declared he saw no point in the inquiry going on as he held the general in high 
regard. (On 3 May 1779, Germain stated that the House appeared satisfied with 
Howe’s conduct, and that he cheerfully acquiesced in that opinion.)124 Howe may also 
have drawn comfort from the fact that the opposition had its sights set on Germain 
and would thus speak in his (Howe’s) favour. It remains the case that an effective 
cross-examination of Howe would have easily uncovered the many flaws in his 
narrative.125 
One final aspect of Howe’s character deserves investigation. An alleged 
tendency towards laziness and pleasure-seeking has been cited, with some claiming 
that it detracted from his ability to carry out his duties effectively.126 His fondness for 
female company (he kept a mistress throughout the war, although this was not 
unusual at the time) has attracted particular comment, and in one instance gave rise to 
one of the enduring myths of the war. ‘Mrs Murray’s Strategy’ was one explanation 
offered for Howe’s slowness in moving across Manhattan after landing at Kip’s Bay. 	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The failure to seal off the city of New York allowed thousands of rebels soldiers to 
escape and the delay was ascribed to the quick-thinking of a local widow, Mrs 
Murray, famed for her hospitality. The legend asserted that she invited Howe and his 
staff to take refreshments with her and so entertained the general that he completely 
forgot his military duties. The tale appears entirely unfounded, as Howe had no 
intention of moving quickly across Manhattan (the second wave of troops landed 
hours after the first and Clinton had been ordered only to secure the high ground at 
Inclenberg or Murray Hill with the first wave).127 As Henry Belcher perceptively 
pointed out, when it came to assessing Howe’s conduct, ‘fairy tales hang round his 
adventures’.128 
There is further evidence that Howe was not quite so susceptible to womanly 
wiles as sometimes claimed. Having observed a series of balls staged at Rhode Island, 
Lord Howe’s personal secretary, Henry Strachey, commented in a letter to his wife 
that ‘I have not seen even the smallest symptom [in William Howe] of that sort of 
gallantry which your scandalous news papers attribute to him’.129 Strachey also noted 
that Howe was a devoted correspondent with his wife, putting his fellow officers to 
shame. Howe would take any opportunity to write a few lines, saving the many scraps 
of paper until a packet became available and then sending them off together. These 
letters could sometimes reach 16 pages.130 
Howe did enjoy the comforts available to an eighteenth-century commander-in-
chief, but they do not appear to have been excessive. It was not unusual for officers 
on prolonged duty away from home to keep a mistress, while a liking for drinking and 
gambling at cards were also not uncommon. It does, however, seem that the pursuit of 	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happiness did sometimes take precedence over business. When rebels threatened Fort 
Independence on Manhattan, in early 1777, Howe intended to visit the garrison at Fort 
Knyphausen (originally Fort Washington and renamed after its capture in honour of 
the Hessian general) to deliver orders. Preferring, however, to stay at New York, 
where a party was planned to celebrate the Queen’s birthday, Howe sent his Hessian 
aide instead. Von Muenchhausen reported on the brief artillery bombardment that 
subsequently drove the rebels from their position and how he had then returned to 
New York in time for fireworks and a ball. ‘A crazy life it is,’131 was his succinct 
comment on the affair. 
Von Muenchhausen also had first-hand experience of Howe’s personal ship, the 
converted East Indiaman Britannia. Described as big enough for a crew of 400, it was 
instead manned by just 30 and two decks had been converted into halls, complete with 
state rooms. With white lacquered walls, gold skirting boards, mirrors and copper 
engravings built into the walls and oversized portholes offering spectacular views, the 
halls were packed with luxurious furniture and the upper hall had been extended, with 
a gallery leading out onto the quarterdeck so that guests could promenade in the open 
air. Von Muenchhausen was, in fact, almost killed on the Britannia, when it was 
struck by lightning during the passage to Chesapeake Bay. Only the force of the main 
mast collapsing, which forced the prow of the ship underwater, extinguished the 
flames and saved the ship and her passengers (Howe himself was travelling with his 
brother on the Eagle).132 
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Conclusion 
Howe is difficult to assess without the benefit of a generous collection of personal 
papers, but elements of his character can be deduced from careful examination of his 
personal interactions and correspondence. The picture that emerges is of a sensitive, 
emotional man, generally pessimistic in his outlook. Possessed of great personal 
bravery in battle, he was concerned for the welfare of his men and determined not to 
risk them needlessly. This cautious attitude was sometimes taken to the extreme and 
he did not seem to possess the vision to recognise when the few opportunities to win 
the war might have fleetingly presented themselves. He does not appear to have been 
intellectually gifted, but he had a solid grounding in military practices. As a 
commander he was stolid rather than dashing, despite his experiences with light 
infantry. His approach, in battle and in personal matters, was simple and lacking in 
subtlety. 
Coupled with what has already been shown of Howe’s great patience when 
dealing with the difficult character of his second-in-command, it is clear that Howe 
was a considerate commander and it is easy to see why he would have been popular 
with his men; he brought them an almost unbroken sequence of victories without 
(with the notable exception of Bunker Hill) suffering unduly heavy casualties. It is 
also clear that this was not the general to implement the coercive policy favoured by 
Germain. Howe had a great personal repugnance for punitive warfare, treated the 
rebels with respect and refused to widen the scope of the war into one of devastation. 
He was not the dull, coarse man some have described, but nor was he gifted enough to 
find a way to win a difficult war. 
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V 
Howe’s Decisions 
Historians have grappled with Howe’s enigmatic period in command of the British 
army for over two centuries.1 Although almost every decision made by the general 
has been investigated at one time or another, several elements have emerged as the 
most contentious and controversial. Most contentious of all were his decision to halt 
the British assault at the Brooklyn Heights and his failure to launch a full-scale attack 
at White Plains, both in 1776. In addition, the overall strategy that he adopted, 
especially in 1777, has been scrutinised. The problem historians have faced is that 
Howe appears to have been inconsistent in his command, and a theory that explains 
his conduct at every point has proved elusive. This problem presents itself most 
clearly in the assault of Fort Washington, exactly the sort of costly attack on a 
prepared defensive position that Howe had previously shown himself unwilling to 
make. In this chapter the various influencing factors already discussed will be brought 
together and Howe’s decision-making will be examined in detail. 
 
I: The Battle of Long Island 
The strategic importance of New York was recognised by British and American 
military commanders alike. Both saw the theoretical possibility of the rebellious 
colonies being divided by British control of the Hudson River. Washington saw it as 
the obvious destination for Howe’s army after he evacuated Boston and was 
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determined to stop the British from possessing it.2 The British had earmarked it as the 
keystone for their entire strategy in 1776, with Howe aiming to establish a base in the  
city and then send forces north, to meet with an army penetrating southwards into 
New York State from Canada.3  Whether it would actually have proved possible to cut 
the New England colonies off from the middle and southern colonies is debateable 
(the Hudson is 315 miles long), but it was at least a plausible strategy.4 
New York was a poor defensive position for the American forces, especially 
considering the overwhelming strength of the Royal Navy. Admiral Lord Howe had a 
fleet of over 400 ships at his disposal, with 30 ships of the line (major warships 
mounting more than 60 guns).5  The Americans could mount no resistance at all to 
this fleet (privateers disrupting the shipping of British supplies was the only naval 
effort made at the time). Indeed, the Continental Navy did not get its first ship of the 
line until near the end of the war.6 In 1776, New York City occupied the bottom tip of 
Manhattan (Figure 1). The North or Hudson River divided Manhattan from New 
Jersey to the west, while the East River separated it from Long Island to the south and 
east. At the northern tip of Manhattan, two bridges connected it with Westchester 
County. Manhattan, vulnerable to being cut off by an amphibious force moving up 
either the Hudson or East Rivers, was a difficult enough position to hold. The 
situation was made even worse by the fact that the city was overlooked by high 
ground (the Columbia Heights, commonly referred to as the Brooklyn Heights)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 J. Rhodehamel, ed., Writings (New York: The Library of America, 1987), pp. 200-205, 
Washington to Joseph Reed, 14 Jan. 1776; Ibid., pp. 218-223, Washington to John Augustine 
Washington, 31 Mar. 1776. 
3 (TNA), PRO, CO 5/92, ff. 200-206, Dartmouth to Gage, 2 Aug. 1775; SRO, Dartmouth 
Manuscripts, f. 6, William Howe to Lord Howe, 12 Jun. 1775. 
4 Encyclopaedia Britannica, online version, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/274713/Hudson-River, accessed 18 Sep. 2013. 
5 Gruber, Howe Brothers, p. 101. 
6 J. R. Dull, ‘Diplomacy of the Revolution, to 1783’, in The Blackwell Encyclopedia of the 
American Revolution, ed. J. P. Greene and J. R. Pole (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1991), p. 
328. 
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  Figure	  1:	  Map	  of	  New	  York	  City	  and	  of	  Manhattan	  Island,	  in	  Johnston,	  The	  Campaign	  of	  1776.	  
on Long Island, making it also necessary to hold this land if New York City was to 
remain tenable (in a similar situation, the Americans had exploited Boston’s 
vulnerability by occupying the Dorchester Heights the previous year and forcing 
Howe to evacuate).7 In turn, the works on the Brooklyn Heights needed to be 
protected against a possible landward assault, so a chain of fortifications, linked by 
entrenchments, was established across the neck of the Brooklyn Peninsula.8 
Henry Clinton believed New York was impossible to hold and Washington 
himself had doubts, but recognised the importance of the city to the British.9 Charles 
Lee was given the task of surveying the city and its surroundings and coming up with 
a plan for its defence, but he also expressed misgivings when he reported to 
Washington in March 1776. Noting that New York was surrounded by navigable 
waters, he acknowledged the difficulty in preventing enemy ships from going 
wherever they wanted. Overall, he felt that it would be difficult to make the city 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 (TNA), PRO, CO 5/93, ff. 87-92, Howe to Dartmouth, 21 Mar. 1776. 
8 H. P. Johnston, The Campaign of 1776 Around New York and Brooklyn (New Jersey: 
Scholar’s Bookshelf, 2005), pp. 67-68. 
9 WCL, Clinton Papers, Vol. XIII, f. 38a, Remarks on New York, 8 Feb. 1776; Rhodehamel, 
ed., Writings, pp. 218-223, Washington to John Augustine Washington, 31 Mar. 1776. 
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genuinely tenable, but believed the British could be made to pay a steep price in 
casualties for shifting the Americans from it. Lee described a strategy of fortifying 
Manhattan along its entire length, making the British fight every step of the way to 
gain control.10 (This, of course, would depend on Howe obligingly hurling his men at 
those defences.) Washington shared Lee’s belief that exacting a heavy price on the 
British was the key to success. In fact, he doubted his men would be able to follow 
any other strategy, believing them to be incapable of fighting in the open field.11 In a 
situation where there was a real danger of being outmanoeuvred by British naval 
forces, therefore, Washington felt constrained to divide his army and place his men in 
static positions. They would be terribly vulnerable to being picked off systematically 
by the British, if Howe chose to follow such a course of action. 
Clinton advised against attacking the Americans in their prepared defences, 
advocating the landing of forces either on Manhattan or, preferably, in Westchester 
County, where they could dominate the two bridges leading off Manhattan. The latter 
option would effectively trap the main rebel army and, considering the dominance of 
the Royal Navy, it is difficult to see how Washington could have extricated himself.12 
Although the Americans had a major fortification, Fort Washington, at the northern 
end of Manhattan, its inability to prevent British shipping from passing had already 
been demonstrated when two ships (the Phoenix and the Rose) had sailed up the 
Hudson on 12 July without suffering serious damage. However, rather than viewing 
this as a green light for operations by a more substantial naval force, Howe saw this 
merely as a means of interrupting the flow of supplies onto Manhattan.13 The British 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 P. K. Walker, ed., Engineers of Independence: A Documentary History of the Army 
Engineers in the American Revolution, 1775-1783 (Washington D. C.: U. S. Army Corps of 
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11 Rhodehamel, ed., Writings, pp. 207-208, Washington to Joseph Reed, 1 Feb. 1776 
12 WCL, Clinton Papers, Vol. XIII, f. 38a, Remarks on New York, 8 Feb. 1776. 
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commander had already decided on a more direct route, landing on Long Island and 
attacking the rebel positions there.14 
By July, the Americans had established yet another line of defences on Long 
Island, about two miles in front of the chain of redoubts that, in turn, protected the 
fortifications guarding the East River. This new line of positions, along the Gowanus 
Heights (a steep, heavily wooded slope formed by the terminal moraine of the glacier 
that had advanced across Long Island thousands of years previously)15 was considered 
formidable by the British and Washington eventually modified his plan to make it the 
mainstay of his defences. His best troops would be placed there, with the intention of 
stopping the British or at least inflicting heavy casualties on them.16 
Washington’s position was rendered more difficult by his uncertainty over 
where the British would land first. There was a danger that they might land on Long 
Island and Manhattan simultaneously, so the Americans were forced to divide their 
army. Out of a total force numbering around 28,000 (with only about 20,000 fit for 
duty) Washington had initially placed only eight regiments (with a paper strength of 
around 3,500) on Long Island.17 The American commander was particularly 
conscious of the fact that his men on Long Island could do nothing more than wait in 
their lines, surrendering the vast majority of the island, including its abundant 
supplies, to the British.18 Howe landed a force on Long Island on 22 August, quickly 
reinforcing them up to a total of around 15,000. When the Hessians followed a few 	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Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 4. 
16 (TNA), PRO, 5/93, ff. 214-216, Howe to Germain, 7 Jul. 1776. Howe’s discovery of these 
American positions persuaded him to land his force on Staten Island, rather than at Gravesend 
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Governor Trumbull, 24 Aug. 1776. 
	   195	  
days later, Howe’s army on Long Island numbered close to 22,000.19 Washington 
countered by sending over 14 more regiments with a paper strength of around 6,000 
and the stage was set for the largest battle of the war.20 
 
The controversy 
The British plan for the Battle of Long Island (Figure 2) appears to have been 
suggested by Clinton. He claimed it as his idea, although it seems possible it may 
have been first suggested by a British spy two months earlier.21 It is reasonable to 
suggest that both men could have arrived at the same basic plan, but while the spy, 
apparently a former sergeant in the Royal Artillery, may well have informed the 
British of the layout of the area, it was Clinton who realised that Washington had left 
unguarded a pass through the Gowanus Heights. Clinton, having scouted the 
American position after the British landing on Long Island, discovered this serious 
weakness and constructed a plan accordingly. The Jamaica Road (which ran through 
the unguarded pass) headed directly for the Brooklyn Heights, via the village of 
Bedford. Clinton recommended a substantial column should move through this pass 
under cover of darkness and therefore get behind the Americans’ advanced line. 
Although Clinton believed his plan was not well received by Howe, it was finally 
adopted (it is difficult to see what objection could have been made to such a simple 
plan, which promised to unhinge the American defences without the risk of a frontal  
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  Figure	  2:	  The	  Battle	  of	  Brooklyn	  (Long	  Island),	  in	  Schecter,	  The	  Battle	  for	  New	  York,	  p.	  133.	  
assault). On the evening of 26-27 August, a column of 10,000 British soldiers began 
the march to the Jamaica Pass.22 
Diversionary actions were staged by British and Hessian forces at two of the 
guarded passes through the Gowanus Heights, to pin the American defenders and 
attract reinforcements from the Brooklyn defences. The plan worked flawlessly. 
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Having reached Bedford around 8.30am, Howe’s force fired two shots to alert the rest 
of the army that they were in position. The diversionary actions by the British and 
Hessian forces were then turned into serious assaults and the Americans were soon 
driven from their defensive works, to be met by Howe’s troops in their rear. The 
fleeing rebels attempted to get back to their lines across the Brooklyn peninsula while 
British infantry and dragoons attempted to block their line of retreat.23 
This was the moment when a force of grenadiers and the 33rd Regiment 
launched an unauthorised assault on one of the American redoubts at Brooklyn. Fort 
Putnam, as the most advanced point in the American line, is believed to have been the 
position attacked.24 This was perhaps the key moment of Howe’s career. The event is 
shrouded in doubt, with eyewitnesses offering wildly differing opinions on the 
strength of the American defences and Howe’s own testimony, at the parliamentary 
inquiry, only adding more layers of confusion. Few elements of the affair are free 
from doubt. There is no doubt that it was a grenadier battalion, together with the 33rd 
Regiment, that was involved in the assault; Howe explicitly identified these units in 
his report to Germain after the battle.25 There is also no doubt that it was a determined 
attack, requiring repeated orders before it was halted, as Howe’s report confirmed. 
Finally, there is no doubt that the troops had exceeded their orders. Clinton admitted 
that he knew the British were not supposed to press their attack up to the American 
lines, but claimed that he had not issued a recall because he believed the assault 
would have been successful and that it would have led to the collapse of the entire 
rebel position on the island.26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 (TNA), PRO, CO 5/93 ff. 257-260, Howe to Germain, 3 Sep. 1776. 
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Howe does not appear to have felt the need to defend this decision before his 
speech at the parliamentary inquiry, almost three years later. In his initial report to 
Germain, he claimed that it was a concern over taking heavy casualties that caused 
him to call off the attack, and that the lines could have been taken easily by building 
siege works rather than storming them. At the inquiry, he added more detail (although 
it served to confuse matters), explaining his decision in the following manner: 
The rebels had a body of men posted in front of the lines, to guard 
against a attack from Flat-Bush, and from the lower road upon their 
right. These troops were defeated with considerable loss. The remainder 
of the corps was posted behind the lines, the main army being then on 
York-Island; so that admitting the works to have been forced on the day 
of action, the only advantage we should have gained would have been 
the destruction of a few more men, for the retreat of the greatest part 
would have been secured by the works constructed upon the Heights of 
Brooklyn, opposite to New-York, and their embarkation covered by a 
number of floating batteries.27 
 
 
Historians have struggled to understand Howe’s decision. Mackesy described 
the recall of the attacking troops as ‘a puzzling episode, never satisfactorily 
explained’.28 However, his personal opinion was made clear by his contemptuous 
description of the strength of the lines under assault. Mackesy considered Howe’s 
evidence at the inquiry as important, suggesting that the British general had believed 
there was a second line of defensive works in place, which would have covered the 
retreat of the men in the redoubt his grenadiers were assaulting. Fortescue took 
Howe’s initial explanation for his decision at face value, arguing that the British 
commander had genuinely felt the lines were too strong to risk a frontal assault. 
Fortescue astutely pointed out that the opening of siege works by the British was most 
definitely not what the Americans had hoped for; they had wanted to force Howe into 
another frontal assault, hopefully with a similar outcome to that on Breed’s Hill, and 	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Howe’s decision might therefore have held some merit simply by foiling the rebels’ 
battle plan.29 Anderson wrote sympathetically, explaining that Howe could not have 
been certain of the strength of the defences and that he may even have believed there 
was a large body of men posted behind the lines.30 Gruber acknowledged the missed 
opportunity, as well as the differences of opinion among the British officers, but made 
the curious assertion that everyone agreed that the rebel lines were formidable, which 
was certainly not the case.31 More recently, Bicheno made the simple observation that 
the entire affair proved why armies need commanders-in-chief, to prevent unplanned 
and potentially costly attacks.32 Black also contended that Howe was right to call a 
halt to the attack, but only ‘for the wrong reasons,’33 citing the ability of the Royal 
Navy to trap the remaining rebels on Long Island as rendering an assault unnecessary. 
Debate among British and Hessian officers largely focused on the strength of 
the American defences and the question of whether or not Howe had allowed a 
decisive victory to slip through his fingers. In The American Rebellion, Clinton 
claimed that the Americans had just 800 men in the lines at Brooklyn.34 In notes 
following the delivery of Howe’s narrative he wrote that the lines themselves were 
nothing more than ‘an unfinished ditch without pickets or abbatis’.35 Charles Stedman 
disagreed with this assessment, believing that abbatis were in place, along with spears 
or lances to hinder the approach of infantry, but he still believed the defences would 
not have been able to resist a determined attack, being manned by badly shaken 
troops, while those under Howe’s command were relatively fresh.36 Major General 
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James Robertson (who commanded the First Brigade during the battle and later gave 
evidence at the inquiry) testified that the lines had turned out to be manned by only a 
few troops (he stated 300 and also claimed to have approached within 150 yards of 
the lines), but that Howe could not have known that. Robertson also stated his belief 
that Howe had not been able to make an accurate assessment of the strength of the 
lines before calling the assaulting troops back.37 
The Hessian officer Major Baurmeister contradicted these opinions by declaring 
the lines could have resisted an assault by 50,000 men and were fronted by a picketed 
double trench.38 Baurmesiter’s account is puzzling, considering he was present at the 
battle and would, presumably, have seen the lines for himself. No map or testimony 
from other eyewitnesses supports his assertion that the rebels had ‘one work behind 
another as far as the sea’. Baurmeister was not alone in approving of Howe’s caution, 
however; according to Mackesy, Lieutenant Frederick Mackenzie of the Royal Welch 
Fusiliers believed that most officers felt Howe’s prudence had been justified.39 
Perhaps the strongest support for Howe came from Captain John Montresor, who 
served as his aide-de-camp on Long Island. An engineer with (at the time of the 
battle) 26 years’ experience, Montresor appeared as a witness at the inquiry and 
declared that the rebel lines were indeed complete and reinforced by five redoubts 
protected by strong abbatis. Montresor also attested to the fact that Howe had been 
close enough to make an informed judgement on the strength of the lines and that he 
(Montresor) agreed completely that an assault would have been extremely costly. The 
abbatis were so formidable, in fact, that Montresor reported experiencing great 
difficulty in getting through them after the rebels had evacuated their lines, the 
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obvious implication being that to get through them while under fire would have been 
even more difficult.40 
As was the case in so many instances, Howe’s narrative failed to answer the 
questions surrounding his decision and actually added more confusion, by suggesting 
that the position being stormed by his troops was backed up by further lines behind it. 
This was not the case, and Howe’s statement has several possible explanations. It is 
possible that he could simply have been misremembering, speaking, as he was, nearly 
three years after the event. It is possible that Howe was aware of American plans to 
construct just such a secondary line of defences, incorporating Fort Stirling and 
Cobble Hill Fort with a third position, planned and laid out but not constructed.41 
Howe made use of spies during his time on Long Island and it is feasible that their 
reports may have included details on this proposed line.42 It is equally feasible that he 
may have been unaware that the line was unfinished. It is possible that Howe 
misunderstood the nature of the works behind the Brooklyn lines. Cobble Hill Fort 
mounted just four guns, while Fort Stirling, the first position built on Long Island, 
was intended to menace British shipping entering the East River. They could not have 
covered a retreat via Brooklyn Ferry of over 6,000 men while a British army of close 
to 20,000 advanced on them.43 Finally, it is possible that Howe’s testimony was 
accurate and that the accepted layout of the American defences at Brooklyn is 
incorrect. 
To aid his recollection, Howe would have had recourse to maps while 
composing his narrative (as a British victory, maps of the battle were produced 
quickly for sale to an inquisitive public), which should have compensated for any 
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lapses in memory. An example of such a map, produced only months after the battle, 
was one by Samuel Holland (Figure 3) and showed a single line of defences.44 	  
There was great scope for inaccuracy, however, as the British destroyed the rebel 
works soon after the battle (although the Hessian general von Heister refused to let his 
troops undertake the work, it is believed that local inhabitants did the job of levelling 
the lines, and Cornwallis attested that they had been almost completely destroyed by 
the time he saw them).45  
Clinton made the comment that Howe may have been in receipt of intelligence 
that persuaded him not to allow the attack on the rebel lines. It seems obvious that this  
 Figure	  3:	  Detail	  from	  The	  Seat	  of	  Action,	  between	  the	  British	  and	  American	  Forces	  (S.	  Holland,	  1776),	  Library	  of	  Congress.	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was not a genuine attempt to validate Howe’s decision; it was more likely written to 
highlight the fact that, had any such intelligence existed, it had been inaccurate.46 
Howe’s statement on the matter in his narrative indirectly suggests he may have had 
such information, but he made no specific claims regarding receipt of intelligence. 
Had he indeed heard that the rebels intended building a final fortification, bigger than 
all the others on Long Island and connected via entrenchments with Cobble Hill and 
Fort Stirling, then it is possible the British general believed the work might have been 
finished. In fact, the final fort had only been marked out on the ground and was 
finally constructed by the British, after they took control of New York. Even then, it 
was not completed until 1781, at which time it housed 18 guns.47 
The final possibility, that the accepted layout of the American defences is 
inaccurate, seems to be unlikely, but there is evidence to support it. The most detailed 
representation of the American lines was that compiled by Henry P. Johnston (Figure 
4). This map (based on one produced by the British engineer Bernard Ratzer a decade 
earlier and United States Coast Survey maps) showed the American works as an 
uninterrupted line linking three forts and two redoubts. British troops under Vaughan 
were depicted (marked ‘B’ on the map) as advancing towards the line, apparently to 
assault Fort Putnam. Johnston’s reconstruction of the American lines was painstaking, 
detailing (from left to right on Figure 4) an unnamed redoubt, Fort Putnam, an oblong 
redoubt, Fort Greene and Fort Box. Although variations on exact placement are 
evident in the various maps of the battle, this five-position alignment, linked by 
entrenchments, has become the standard interpretation.48 Behind this main 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Willcox, ed., American Rebellion, pp. 43-44. 
47 Johnston, Campaign of 1776, pp. 76-77; H. R. Stiles, A History of the City of Brooklyn, 
Vol. I, (Brooklyn: Published by Subscription, 1867), pp. 313-316. 
48 Johnston, Campaign of 1776. The map of the Battle of Long Island (Figure 3) is included 
as a separate document with this book; Depictions of the five defensive works, in a single 
line, appear in S. B. Griffith, The War for American Independence: from 1760 to the 
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  Figure	  4:	  Plan	  of	  the	  Battle	  of	  Long	  Island,	  in	  Johnston,	  The	  Campaign	  of	  1776.	  
line was Cobble Hill Fort and Fort Stirling, overlooking the East River.49 In creating 
his map, Johnston also had to draw on evidence of the placement of defences along 
the same line during the War of 1812. The British demolition of the lines immediately 
after the Battle of Long Island was effective and Johnston admitted that the 1812 
works had helped to suggest where the 1776 positions may have been sited. Certainty 
was not possible.50  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Surrender at Yorktown in 1781 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002), p. 305; Schecter, 
The Battle for New York, p. 133; and Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, p. 96. 
49 Field, Battle of Long Island, p. 217. 
50 Johnston, Campaign of 1776, pp. 69-78. 
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  Figure	  5:	  Detail	  from,	  A	  Plan	  of	  the	  Environs	  of	  Brooklyn	  Showing	  the	  Position	  of	  the	  Rebel	  Lines	  And	  Defences	  
On	  the	  27th	  of	  August	  1776	  (G.	  F.	  Sproule,	  1781),	  William	  L.	  Clements	  Library,	  University	  of	  Michigan.	  
Two contemporary maps present different alignments that could offer an 
explanation for Howe’s confusing testimony. The loyalist engineer George S. Sproule 
surveyed the field of battle in September 1776 and produced a map in 1781 (Figure 5)  
that differed in one key respect: the addition of a sixth redoubt. (It also included the 
position of the British fortification completed in 1781, marked ‘B’, in between Forts 
Stirling and Cobble Hill, demonstrating how it could have covered a retreat to 
Brooklyn Ferry had it been completed on the day of battle). The sixth redoubt was 
depicted as an offshoot of Fort Putnam, connected to it at the rear by a trench, but 
unconnected with the remainder of the American lines. The representation of 
topography on this map is detailed and the site of this sixth defensive work seems 
natural. In fact, it is difficult to see how the Americans could have neglected placing a 
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work there if the map did indeed display the terrain accurately. Such a discrepancy 
would not be compelling evidence on its own, but of particular importance is the 
hand-written annotation, by Clinton, in the top left corner of this map. Clinton, 
unwilling or unable to let a perceived injustice lie, evidently seized upon this map as 
proof of Howe missing his golden opportunity to decisively defeat the rebel army. He 
wrote:	  
This map proves that there were no rebel works near the water side of Brooklyn 
27 Augt. 76 & consequently S[ir] W[illiam] H[owe] was misinformed & that 
we might have taken possession at the close of the action and made the Island 
and all in it ours.51 
 
Perhaps Clinton was fixated on the issue of further defensive works behind the 
main line (the key point in Howe’s explanation for his decision to call back the attack) 
and failed to take note of the extra redoubt on this map, but he was usually fastidious 
in his attention to detail. Ratzer’s map (Figure 6), used as the basis for Johnston’s 
reconstruction of the lines, included detail of hills, highlighting the obvious points for 
forts and redoubts. It is interesting to note that the topography of Sproule’s map 
	  Figure	  6:	  Detail	  from	  Plan	  of	  the	  City	  of	  New	  York	  (B.	  Ratzer,	  1770),	  Brooklyn	  Historical	  Society.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 G. F. Sproule and H. Clinton, A Plan of the Environs of Brooklyn Showing the Position of 
the Rebel Lines And Defences On the 27th of August 1776, 1781. 
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mostly conforms with that of Ratzer’s and the area where Sproule’s sixth position is 
sited is prominent in both, as is the high ground to the right of it, shown on Sproule’s 
map as the position where the British started their approach works.52 
The second contemporary map (Figure 7) is dated 1776 and was found in the 
chest that held the Clinton Papers, now housed at the William L. Clements Library at 
the University of Michigan. (R. G. Adams believed the writing on the map was in 
Clinton’s hand, although it is now believed to be that of the cartographer, Francis 
Rawdon-Hastings).53 This map displayed just five rebel works, but one of the largest 
of them was shown as being completely detached from the main line. A red line,  
	  Figure	  7:	  Detail	  from	  Sketch	  of	  the	  position	  of	  the	  army	  on	  Long	  Island	  upon	  the	  morning	  of	  the	  26th	  of	  August,	  
1776;	  with	  the	  march	  on	  the	  ensuing	  night;	  and	  the	  action	  of	  the	  27th	  (F.	  Rawdon-­‐Hastings	  ,	  1776),	  William	  L.	  Clements	  Library,	  University	  of	  Michigan. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Johnston, Campaign of 1776, pp. 69-70; B. Ratzer, Plan of the City of New York, 1770. 
53 R. G., Adams, British Headquarters Maps and Sketches used by Sir Henry Clinton while in 
command of the British Forces operating in North America during the War for Independence, 
1775-1782 (Ann Arbor: The William L. Clements Library, 1928), p. 41. 
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denoting British troops, is shown aligned as if to assault this work (presumably this 
would be the grenadier battalion and the 33rd Regiment). A comment on the time it 
had taken for Howe to open the 1776 campaign can be read into the line ‘Iam demum 
movet arma Leo’, written at the bottom of the map, which roughly translates as ‘at 
last the lion moves into battle’.54 
The importance of these two contemporary maps, each showing a rebel work 
either completely detached from the main line of defence, or connected only at the 
rear, is that they potentially support Howe’s confusing testimony during the inquiry. 
From the British position in front of the lines, it seems possible that a redoubt 
connected to the rest of the line only at its rear (as in Figure 5) might have appeared 
to have been supported by a defensive line behind it. A redoubt entirely isolated (as in 
Figure 7) would undeniably have been supported by the line behind it. Obviously, 
even these two maps disagree on the layout of the American defences and therefore 
neither can be considered entirely reliable. 
 
The strength of the American defences 
Even if it is assumed that these two maps were inaccurate in their depiction of the 
lines, and that Johnston’s reconstruction came closer to the actual layout, a question 
remains in relation to the strength of the lines and number of men the rebels had 
posted there to resist an attack. Washington is believed to have had between 7,000 
and 9,000 men on Long Island on the morning of 27 August (the paper strengths of 
the regiments, taken from the returns of 12 September and including sick, was around 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 F. Rawdon-Hastings and H. Clinton, Sketch of the position of the army on Long Island upon 
the morning of the 26th of August, 1776; with the march on the ensuing night; and the action 
of the 27th, 1776; WCL, Clinton Papers, Vol. XIX, f. 34, Clinton memo (partly in cipher), 
1776. 
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9,500).55 Given that about 2,800 were holding the Gowanus Heights, this left the 
Americans with approximately 4-6,000 men with which to man their main defensive 
line.56 (It must be remembered that Washington himself was unsure of how many men 
he had committed to the defence of Long Island, due to the absence of proper returns 
at the time.)57 Both Clinton and Robertson claimed the lines were thinly manned 
when the grenadiers and 33rd Regiment made their unauthorised assault, yet it seems 
inconceivable that the Americans, who were hoping to inflict heavy casualties on a 
frontal assault by the British, had neglected to man the lines they had prepared in the 
months leading up to the battle to their full capacity.58  
Having thrown up respectable works overnight at Breed’s Hill and later on the 
Dorchester Heights, in Boston, they had enjoyed quiet months to perfect the lines and 
the string of redoubts at Brooklyn. Lee had submitted his plan for the fortification and 
defence of New York in March 1776, mentioning the need for a battery on the 
Brooklyn Heights to command the East River.59 Captain Jeduthan Baldwin then 
documented the progress of fortifications on Long Island throughout March and 
April. (Baldwin had also been present at Boston and had assisted in the building of 
fortifications on the Dorchester Heights, referring to them with justifiable pride as ‘a 
very great work for one night’.60) It is possible that the Americans worked best when 
under pressure, because the constructions around New York progressed more slowly 
(the British army was not there to impose a deadline), but Baldwin specifically 
mentioned working on numerous fortifications on Long Island in April, meaning that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Johnston, Campaign of 1776, pp. 126-131. 
56 ‘Account of the Battle of Long Island’, South Carolina and American General Gazette, 2 
Oct. 1776, cited in Johnston, Campaign of 1776, Part II, pp. 158-60. 
57 Ford, ed., Writings, Vol. IV, pp. 369-371, Washington to the President of Congress, 26 
Aug. 1776. 
58 Willcox, ed., American Rebellion, p. 44; Parliamentary Register, Vol. XII, p. 396. 
59 Walker, ed., Engineers of Independence, pp. 114-116. 
60 T. W. Baldwin, The Revolutionary Journal of Col. Jeduthan Baldwin, 1775-1778 (Bangor: 
De Burians, 1906), p. 29. 
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the rebels had at least four months to construct their defences before the British 
landed on 22 August.61  
How many of the soldiers behind the lines at Brooklyn would actually have 
been able to man them (in other words, what capacity the defensive works had) is not 
certain, but estimates can be made. The clearest indication of the numbers of men 
each position could accommodate is contained in general orders from Nathanael 
Greene, on 1 June. Greene ordered five companies to take position in Fort Box, five 
in Fort Greene, three in the oblong redoubt, five in Fort Putnam and three in the final, 
unnamed redoubt on the left. In addition, Greene mentioned a further three companies 
to take position ‘upon the right of Fort Greene,’62 presumably manning the 
entrenchments between Forts Box and Greene.  The three regiments involved (there 
were eight companies per regiment), were Colonel Varnum’s, Colonel Hitchcock’s 
and Colonel Little’s, of Brigadier General John Nixon’s Brigade, numbering an 
estimated 391, 368 and 453 troops, respectively.63 (These numbers are based on the 
returns from 12 September and include sick, of which there was a large proportion in 
Washington’s army at the time. The actual number of men present in the lines may 
therefore have been reduced by anything up to a third.) This would give a total of 
approximately 700-1,050 men in the five works, with a further 100-150 in the lines 
between Forts Box and Greene. 
This estimate of around 800-1,200 total troops is enlightening, as it is 
potentially a perfect match for Clinton’s estimate, although it would still dwarf that of 
Robertson. There would also have been capacity for further men in the entrenchments 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Baldwin, Revolutionary Journal, pp. 31-34; (TNA), PRO, CO 5/93, ff. 257-260, Howe to 
Germain, 3 Sep. 1776. 
62 Johnston, Campaign of 1776, Part II, p. 15, Gen. Greene’s Orders, 1 Jun. 1776. 
63 Ibid., p. 130; R. K. Wright, The Continental Army (Washington D. C.: Center of Military 
History, 1983), p. 47. Wright confirmed the standard eight-company format of a Continental 
Army regiment in 1776, with a theoretical total of 728 officers and men, but acknowledged 
that unit strengths were usually far below this. 
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connecting the rest of the fortifications. The exact distributions ordered by Greene 
were not maintained (Varnum’s regiment was relocated to Fort Defiance on Red 
Hook prior to the battle, although Little’s remained in Fort Greene), but it seems 
likely that roughly equal numbers of men would have been assigned to the lines on 27 
August; there was no shortage of troops and by the time the British reached the lines 
the battle had been underway for several hours.64 It is uncertain how many men could 
have been usefully placed between the five strongpoints, in the connecting 
entrenchments (the composition of these trenches is simply not known in great 
enough detail), but if 150 could be placed between Forts Box and Greene, then at least 
that number would seem possible for each of the two connecting lines between Fort 
Greene, the oblong redoubt and Fort Putnam. This was the very heart of the American 
lines, crossing the road that led down to Brooklyn Ferry. These estimates may be 
conservative, but it is clear that only a portion of the approximately 4-6,000 troops 
available could have effectively manned the chain of forts and redoubts, almost 
certainly less than half. 
When jotting down his thoughts on Howe’s narrative (almost three years after 
the battle), Clinton made the remarkable assertion that Fort Putnam was the only 
fortification in the line of defences that was manned, and that the connecting 
entrenchments were only manned to the left of Fort Putnam (i.e. between Fort Putnam 
and the unnamed redoubt).65 A separate note also made the claim that just one of the 
rebel redoubts had been manned.66 His final version of events, as laid out in The 
American Rebellion, made no such claim, and the Rawdon-Hastings map (Figure 6), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 J. M. Varnum, A Sketch of the Life and Public Services of James Mitchell Varnum of Rhode 
Island (Boston: David Clapp & Son, 1906), pp10-11; Johnston, Campaign of 1776, Part II, p. 
43, Col. Moses Little to his son, 1 Sep. 1776. 
65 WCL, Clinton Papers, Vol. CXXXVI, f. 12, Clinton’s notes on Howe’s Narrative. 
66 Ibid., Vol. XVIII, f. 29. Although filed in an earlier volume, these notes make clear 
reference to Howe’s Narrative, dating them in the second half of 1779 at the earliest. 
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clearly marked rebel troops in place both in the forts and redoubts and behind the 
connecting entrenchments, with further bodies of troops behind in reserve. Clinton’s 
private notes on Howe’s narrative and the text that formed the basis for The American 
Rebellion were produced by a man who was determined to exonerate his own conduct 
(this was always the case with Clinton, but especially so after he had been recalled as 
commander-in-chief in 1782), even at the expense of others. The possibility exists, 
therefore, that in his recollection of Long Island, Clinton was not entirely truthful. It is 
possible to accept that he genuinely believed there were only 800 men in the 
defensive lines (that would depend on how close an inspection he had been able to 
make), but it is not possible to accept that Fort Putnam was the only position with any 
garrison at all. Colonel Little, in Fort Greene, reported witnessing the advance of 
British infantry and cavalry before they ‘retreated being met with a smart fire from 
our breast works,’67 proving that Americans had manned other sections of the line. 
The Rawdon-Hastings map offers support for this assertion, clearly marking the 
advance of infantry and a body of cavalry (the 17th Light Dragoons was the only 
cavalry with Howe’s army at the time) towards Fort Greene. It seems clear that the 
grenadiers/33rd Regiment assault was not the only example of British troops 
approaching the rebel lines, and this second tentative assault appears to have been 
called off without any need for intervention from Howe – he certainly did not mention 
it in any documents or in his narrative. Therefore, as well as common sense 
suggesting that the Americans would not have left their defensive works mostly 
empty on the day of battle, there is also evidence supporting the assertion that the 
lines were manned.  
The quality of the men in the lines is another matter and was influenced by the 
manner in which the Americans’ defensive strategy evolved over the summer. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Johnston, Campaign of 1776, Part II, p. 43, Col. Moses Little to his son, 1 Sep. 1776. 
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Initially, the intention appears to have been to force the British to mount a costly 
frontal assault on the Brooklyn lines.68 Later, the Gowanus Heights were incorporated 
into the plan as an advanced line and by the end of August Washington had changed 
the focus of his plan entirely, intending to stop the British from penetrating the 
Gowanus Heights and thus ordering Putnam to place his best troops on the passes 
through these advanced positions to ‘at all hazards prevent the enemy’s passing the 
wood, and approaching your works’.69 The Brooklyn lines were therefore 
downgraded and were to be manned only by militia (Washington certainly saw this as 
a downgrading; his orders to Putnam made it clear that he felt the militia were his 
worst troops and only good enough to man defensive lines). The battle report of 
Captain Stephen Olney supported this, and went further. According to Olney, the 
Brooklyn lines were ‘poorly manned with sick and invalids’.70 It is not clear what the 
plan was should the British force a way through the Gowanus Heights, but Olney 
believed that Washington expected to be able to pull the defenders back into the 
Brooklyn lines. This would have been risky, as men forced from one defensive line 
might be badly shaken by the time they had retreated to a second. It would also make 
the failure to defend the Jamaica Pass even more inexplicable. If Washington had 
indeed hoped that his men would be able to retire in reasonable order from the 
Gowanus Heights, then the sudden appearance of thousands of British troops between 
them and the Brooklyn defences would throw such a plan into chaos. In the event, 
what might have been planned as an organised withdrawal into the Brooklyn lines 
instead became a disorganised scramble and many witnesses testified to the fact that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Johnston, Campaign of 1776, Part II, p. 17, Gen. Greene’s Orders, 17 Jun. 1776. Greene 
ordered that the lines were to be defended ‘to the last extremity’. 
69 Ford, ed., Writings, Vol. IV, p. 368, Washington to Putnam, 25 Aug. 1776. 
70 Field, Battle of Long Island, p. 518. 
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they had been forced to make their way through the marshy ground at the western end 
of the Brooklyn lines (several men drowned during the crossing).71 
These retreats via the marshes appear to have been an improvisation. Colonel 
Samuel Miles reported attempting to retreat directly to the lines, only to find the way 
blocked by British troops, while Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Brodhead claimed that he 
had been able to reach the lines just before the British cut his men off. Major 
Benjamin Tallmadge’s report also told how his men had been able to retire within the 
Brooklyn lines upon the advance of the British.72 This evidence meshes with the 
original battle report of Howe, in which he described how the grenadiers had pursued 
fleeing rebels towards their main redoubt and had then turned their pursuit into an 
attempted storming of that redoubt.73 If rebel soldiers were retreating in disorder 
directly into their lines, and if some of them were successfully taking up positions 
within those lines, it would suggest that the abbatis in front of them were not as 
impenetrable as Montresor’s evidence claimed. Brodhead’s report strongly suggests 
that it was Fort Putnam that he and his men retreated to. Immediately after getting 
back into a redoubt, he claimed his men had to repel a British assault and were then 
moved a mile and a half to the right of the line to cover the retreat of American troops 
retiring over the marsh. As the entire extent of the rebel line was about a mile and a 
half it seems likely that Brodhead’s men had retreated into Fort Putnam and then 
helped to resist the assault of the grenadiers and 33rd Regiment, before being shifted 
to the opposite flank. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Johnston, Campaign of 1776, Part II, pp. 50-51, John Ewing to Judge Yeates, 14 Sep. 1776; 
Ibid., pp. 51-52, Col. John Haslet to Hon. Caesar Rodney, 31 Aug. 1776; Ibid., pp. 60-63, 
Journal of Col. Samuel Miles. 
72 Ibid., pp. 60-63, Journal of Col. Samuel Miles; Ibid., pp. 63-66, Lieut. Col. Daniel 
Brodhead to unknown, 5 Sep. 1776; Ibid., pp. 77-81, Major Tallmadge’s Account of the 
Battles of Long Island and White Plains.  
73 (TNA), PRO, CO 5/93, ff. 257-260, Howe to Germain, 3 Sep. 1776. 
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The second element to consider when assessing the strength of the rebel 
defences is the quality of the lines themselves. Almost incredibly, given the many 
months the Americans had to construct their defensive works, evidence abounds that 
the lines had been incomplete even on the morning of battle. Colonel Gold Silliman 
wrote to his wife on 24 August, including the information that his men were engaged 
in completing breastworks in the defensive line, while Tallmadge noted that the lines 
were so weak on the day of battle that he was amazed the British had not stormed 
them.74 Brigadier General John Morin Scott, who was ordered to Long Island after the 
battle had commenced, wrote how the lines had still been incomplete when he 
arrived: ‘they were unfinished in several places when I arrived there, and we were 
obliged to hastily finish them’.75 Scott’s testimony, shocking enough already, went on 
to reveal that the lines were even incomplete across the main road leading through the 
works (and down to Brooklyn Ferry). In other words, the most obvious route of 
approach for the British was undefended at the moment when American troops were 
being pushed back from the Gowanus Heights. The hastily built line was weak in 
Scott’s opinion, and three of his battalions were placed behind it (the paper strengths 
of the four battalions in Scott’s brigade were noted as 510, 297, 459 and 261).76 Scott 
further attested that this central section of the lines was in a vulnerable position, being 
commanded by an area of higher ground just 40 yards to its front. In fact, he claimed 
that anyone posted on that higher ground would have been able to shoot under the 
belly of his horse as he stood behind the lines. 
Further corroborating evidence comes from the decision to evacuate Long 
Island on 29 August. Sixth among the reasons for evacuating noted by the council of 
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1776; Ibid., pp. 77-81, Major Tallmadge’s Account. 
75 Ibid., p. 37, Brig. Gen. Scott to John Jay, 6 Sep. 1776. 
76 Ibid., p. 127. 
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war was the weakness of the lines. The forts and redoubts themselves were 
acknowledged as being strong, but the entrenchments between them were anything 
but, with weak abbatis. They could not provide suitable cover for the men behind 
them and the Americans feared they would be forced if the British attacked. The 
council also noted that the positions on the Gowanus Heights had been the principal 
position in the entire Long Island defences.77  
The American position on the Brooklyn Heights was, therefore, undeniably 
weak and Clinton appears to have sensed this, as shown by his willingness to allow 
the British troops to exceed their orders and begin an assault on the lines. Evidence 
suggests that Howe was also close enough to the lines to make an estimate of their 
strength. Montresor attested that he had accompanied the general in his role as aide-
de-camp for the entire day and, as he himself had been close enough to make a 
judgement on the rebel lines, Howe presumably had been as well.78 Further 
circumstantial evidence rests on the accepted sequence of events. Howe stated, and it 
was confirmed by Clinton, that it had taken a direct order to halt the assault of the 
British troops. Howe did not deliver that order personally (Clinton noted that it was 
Captain Balfour that delivered Howe’s order),79 but he had been close enough to the 
action to decide that intervention was called for. Had he been at a great distance from 
the critical point he would first of all have been unable to know exactly what was 
going on closer to the lines and, secondly, would not have been able to get a message 
to the rampant troops quickly enough to stop them. It is also telling that, among 
Germain’s many letters to Howe in the aftermath of the battle, was the one in which 
he passed on the King’s concern that he (Howe) ought not to be so willing to risk his 
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79 WCL, Clinton Papers, Vol. XVIII, f. 29. Notes written after the publication of Howe’s 
Narrative. 
	   217	  
own safety when leading his army. It is not clear what the King had heard of Howe’s 
conduct at the battle that prompted this, but it seems likely he had read or heard of 
Howe being in the thick of the action.80  
 
Howe’s decision 
In Chapter Two it was shown how a level of indiscipline within his army may have 
influenced Howe’s thinking at this point. It is possible to argue that the strength or 
weakness of the American defences at Brooklyn did not even enter into Howe’s 
decision; he may have simply been unhappy that his precise orders not to assault the 
lines were being ignored. In the heat of battle, as he saw troops advancing towards a 
rebel fort, he would have had little time to weigh up the options and carefully 
consider the risks. If he was to recall the men before they got too close to the fort, the 
decision would need to be quick, almost instinctive. Clinton’s gut reaction to the 
situation was to allow the troops to attack. Howe’s was to restrain them. His decision 
evidently was a speedy one; combined casualty returns for the grenadiers and the 33rd 
Regiment indicate a total of just two fatalities, with 20 wounded, indicating that they 
had not approached the redoubt too closely before being ordered back.81 (Although it 
is not certain which of the four grenadier battalions was present at this point, the 
Second Battalion was certainly not, being with Cornwallis and taking part in the 
separate attack on the American right flank. The casualties quoted omit those of this 
battalion.)82 
It is again important to stress that there is no indication that Howe doubted his 
men could successfully storm the redoubt in question. His own statement in his report 
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Mrs Stopford-Sackville, Vol. II, pp. 42-43, Germain to Howe, 18 Oct. 1776. 
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to Germain, that he believed they would have taken the redoubt, seems to have been 
an honest one. Howe’s concern was that an unplanned, indisciplined assault, without 
proper back-up from other units, might prove costly. By the time he came to defend 
his decision at the parliamentary inquiry, his thinking may have become muddled. 
Even if the layout of the American defences had created the impression of a 
secondary line of works, justifying that curious assertion in his narrative, there is 
more evidence that his understanding of the battle he had fought was flawed. The 
draft of his narrative contains several differences from the final version, illuminating 
Howe’s concern over this point and also a level of confusion. From his draft, it is 
clear that Howe had originally intended to tackle the criticism of his decision head on, 
acknowledging that his critics claimed: 
… that had I directed the attack on the enemy’s lines, the consequence 
would have been the demolition of the rebel army, and the 
consequence of that, a termination of the war.83 
 
It is possible that, after writing this, Howe saw the enormity of the charge 
against him (nothing less than having failed to take an opportunity to end the war). He 
deleted the above passage, inserting instead the famous quotation from his letter to 
Germain, which focused solely on whether or not a single redoubt might have been 
taken.84 Having thus taken care to downplay the importance of the decision, he went 
on to give his confusing testimony on the layout of the rebel defences. The draft 
shows that Howe had originally intended to estimate the rebel strength on the 
Gowanus Heights as ‘about 6,000,’85 a grossly inflated number that suggests Howe 
may not have had a clear understanding of the battle. This impression is reinforced by 
an assertion in the draft that the rebels suffered losses of approximately 2,700 in 
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killed, wounded and captured men. This inaccurate assessment (the rebels lost 1,097 
prisoners according to Howe’s own report and are generally reckoned to have 
suffered total losses of less than 1,500)86 was replaced with the more restrained 
assertion that the rebels had suffered ‘considerable loss’.87 
Howe’s confusion about the layout of the rebel lines is highlighted by another 
amendment. In referring to the supposed second line of rebel defences ‘upon the 
heights of Brooklyn, opposite to New York,’88 Howe had originally intended to be 
more specific, writing ‘upon the heights of Brooklyn, upon the crest of the hill 
opposite to New York’89. This could only refer to Fort Stirling, the original 
fortification constructed on Long Island, designed to prevent British shipping from 
entering the East River. Although it could possibly have mounted some resistance to a 
British movement towards Brooklyn Ferry, it was nowhere near big enough to have 
protected the remains of Washington’s army. Composing the narrative some time 
after the actual events, it is therefore clear that Howe was uncertain about key facts of 
the battle. 
Elements that helped to shape his period in command (his fallings out with 
Clinton, von Heister and Germain) had yet to manifest themselves fully at the time of 
the Battle of Long Island. On the day of the battle, the most recent correspondence 
from Germain was that of 11 June, received by Howe on 12 August. This would 
mostly have made for comforting reading; Germain praised everything Howe had 
done and everything he was planning to do. However, there was one hint of pressure, 
right at the end of the letter, when Germain suggested that the defeat of the rebels at 
Quebec might once more open a window of opportunity for ending the rebellion in a 
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single campaign.90 As shown in Chapter 3, Howe had been backing away from his 
initial claim, made back in June 1775, that he could finish the war in one campaign. 
Just two days prior to receiving Germain’s letter, Howe had sent one himself, 
admitting that he fully expected to need a second campaign and he may have been 
concerned by Germain’s perspective on the matter.91 At this, stage, however, there 
was still a solid working relationship between the two men, even if it was built on a 
mutual misunderstanding of the other’s aims and intentions.  
Clinton had returned from his southern expedition in a prickly mood and was 
keen to press ideas on Howe, partly to prove that his late arrival had not adversely 
affected the 1776 campaign. Howe had no reason at this stage, however, to think that 
he had lost the respect of his second-in-command; this was a process that had only 
just started. Likewise, although Howe and von Heister were never to work well 
together, Long Island came very early in their relationship and although Howe 
appears to have taken an instant dislike to the Hessian general, there was only slight 
friction (concerning von Heister’s insistence that his troops be rested before going 
into battle) between them. 
It therefore seems that Howe had as free a hand as he was ever to enjoy when 
executing his plans at the Battle of Long Island. His army was stronger than he had 
originally requested. It does not appear that there were any external considerations 
that were weighing unduly on his mind or potentially affecting his judgement. The 
battle plan was executed flawlessly and there is no reason to believe that anything 
other than the wellbeing of his troops was at the heart of his decision to call back the 
unauthorised assault on the rebel lines. Howe later made it clear that he was aware of 
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how important his army was and how difficult it would be to replace substantial 
losses.92 
Considerations of whether Howe ought to have realised that the battle was 
presenting an opportunity to deliver a mortal blow to the American army, or whether 
he should have been more prepared to take a calculated risk given what was at stake, 
are interesting debating points, but there is no way of knowing exactly what he had 
seen of the rebel lines when he made his decision. In many ways, Howe was the 
victim of the quite shocking performance of the American army. His limited 
experience of operations against them, at Bunker Hill and to a lesser extent on the 
Dorchester Heights, had given him ample reason to respect them, at least when placed 
behind defensive works.93 There was no reason for him to suspect that the lines at 
Brooklyn would have been any less formidable, or would have been defended any 
less stubbornly, than those at the top of Breed’s Hill had been. There was no reason 
for him to suspect that, having had months to perfect their works, the rebel lines had 
actually been incomplete on the very morning of the battle, or that they had been 
thinly manned by the weakest troops under Washington’s command. Only the 
knowledge of these facts after the event contrive to make Howe’s decision seem 
questionable. 
What can be surmised is that this battle was the most revealing of Howe’s 
temperament as a military commander. The many factors that were gradually to erode 
his confidence in his position had not yet come into play – he had no garrisons to 
maintain and no casualties to deal with, he enjoyed the support of political superiors 
and junior officers and he had almost complete freedom of movement thanks to his 
brother’s fleet. He faced a considerably weaker enemy that obligingly offered battle. 	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That Howe, under these almost perfect conditions, chose to act with caution rather 
than with dash, is as strong a testimony to his inherently cautious nature as can be 
found.  
 
II: The Battle of White Plains 
Following the Battle of Long Island, Howe employed a policy of manoeuvring the 
Americans off Manhattan rather than seeking battle. Despite Clinton again pressing 
for a landing in the Americans’ rear, Howe chose to land his troops at Kip’s Bay on 
15 September 1776 (Figure 8).94 Washington had already evacuated the bulk of his 
army from the city, moving them to the Harlem Heights at the northern end of 
Manhattan, meaning that Howe’s choice of landing place only threatened to cut off 
the 5,000 or so troops remaining in the city. In the event, these troops were also able 
to evacuate on the day of Howe’s landing. The British army took possession of the 
city that evening, but were unable to inflict any losses on the Americans.95  
It was to be almost a month before Howe moved again, and once more his 
chosen mode of proceeding was an amphibious operation, this time landing at Throg’s 
Neck, in Westchester County. This allowed Lord Howe to demonstrate his skill, 
navigating the fleet through the dangerous waters of Hell’s Gate in the East River 
with the loss of just one artillery boat, but the landing spot turned out to be unsuitable, 
being cut off from the mainland at high tide.96 It was easily held by a small party of  
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  Figure	  8:	  New	  York	  Campaign,	  August–October	  1776,	  in	  Bicheno,	  Rebels	  and	  Redcoats,	  p.	  43.	  	  
rebels and Howe was forced to re-embark his men five days later, landing them 
instead at Pell’s Point.97 The delay gave Washington the opportunity to evacuate 
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Manhattan and relocate to White Plains. Howe shadowed the movements of the 
American army, which eventually took up a defensive position on a line of hills and 
awaited the approach of the British.  
 
The Controversy 
On 28 October, Howe ordered his men to take possession of a hill on the extreme 
right of the American lines (Figure 9). This position, Chatterton (or Chatterton’s) 
Hill, was isolated and vulnerable, being separated from the rest of the American 
forces by the Bronx River. The fighting on the hill was severe and Howe’s losses 
were steep, but the controversy over White Plains focussed on the subsequent failure 
	  Figure	  9:	  White	  Plains,	  28	  October	  1776,	  in	  Bicheno,	  Rebels	  and	  Redcoats,	  p.	  43.	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to launch a full-scale assault on the American lines.98 This was the first entry in 
Germain’s notes for the handling of a possible inquiry into Howe’s command.99 As 
was the case with Long Island, Howe did not seem to have felt any need to defend  
his actions prior to the inquiry itself. His report to Germain mentioned that he had 
twice intended to launch major attacks. The first, on 29 October, had been deferred 
because the rebels had strengthened their defensive works and Howe had felt the need 
to call up reinforcements from the New York garrison. The second had been planned 
for the afternoon of 31 October, but bad weather had intervened and the Americans 
had withdrawn to stronger positions during the night. Howe made the comment that 
he was now sure that Washington was avoiding a major battle and saw little point in 
pressing on. He made no further efforts to bring Washington to action and the Battle 
of White Plains was over. 
During his narrative, Howe completely ignored the planned attacks on 29 and 
31 October, instead focussing on the perception that he had missed an opportunity to 
launch a major assault on 28 October, the day of the action on Chatterton’s Hill. 
Whereas he had defended his recall of the troops at Long Island through confusing 
and possibly inaccurate testimony regarding the layout of the American defences, 
when it came to White Plains, he simply stated that a major assault had been intended 
on the 28th, adding: 
The committee must give me credit when I assure them, that I have 
political reasons, and no other, for declining to explain why that assault 
was not made. Upon a minute enquiry those reasons might, if necessary, 
be brought out in evidence at the bar.100 	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Howe went on to offer the familiar-sounding reasoning that even had the assault 
been made and the rebel lines taken, Washington’s army would have been able to 
retreat without major loss. Howe’s ‘political reasons’ have obviously been considered 
by historians, but few have offered a judgement. Bellamy Partridge believed that the 
statement was an improvisation, an act of desperation by Howe, who found himself 
struggling and reached for ‘a trump card’.101 Partridge’s assertion is undermined by 
the draft of Howe’s narrative, which proves that this was a planned part of the speech. 
Fortescue made no attempt to hazard a guess as to what the political reasons may have 
been, but again took Howe at his word in so far as the Americans’ ability to retreat 
was concerned.102 Barnet Schecter believed that the heavy toll Howe had paid for 
possessing Chatterton’s Hill had dissuaded him from further offensive movements, 
while Mackesy echoed Howe’s sentiments that Washington was by now adopting a 
Fabian strategy, refusing to be drawn into a major engagement. Mackesy also noted 
that Howe was having to proceed with caution due to a lack of adequate maps of the 
area.103 Anderson believed Howe was referring to the receipt of intelligence from a 
spy regarding the layout of Fort Washington, and that he had turned away from White 
Plains to take a far easier prize, but this did not seem likely even before the new 
evidence in the draft of Howe’s narrative.104 
This new evidence goes beyond the simple statement by Howe that von Heister 
had refused to order the Hessians to attack (as covered in Chapter 2).105 The 
manuscript source also suggests strongly that Howe, even though he removed the 
passage directly blaming von Heister, would have been able to get his point across 	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perfectly well in the House of Commons. A section in the draft that survived revisions 
appears innocuous in printed versions of Howe’s narrative, in which he is quoted as 
saying that ‘… an assault upon the enemy’s right, which was opposed to the Hessian 
troops was intended.’106 The draft shows that Howe intended to emphasise two of the 
words in this sentence, by underlining them. The draft therefore reads, ‘‘… an assault 
upon the enemy’s right, which was opposed to the Hessian troops was intended.’107 
Assuming Howe retained this emphasis in the delivery of the final version of his 
speech, it seems apparent that anyone listening would have realised that he was 
attributing blame to the Hessians, while not wishing to state it outright. Howe 
originally intended to make things even clearer by following his refusal to elaborate 
on his political reasons with the sentence ‘I shall here only say, that they would in no 
degree affect my honour or my conduct’.108 Howe obviously felt that neither this extra 
sentence, nor the fuller explanation of von Heister’s dissent, were necessary to get his 
point across. This seems to have been amply justified in the reaction he received. 
Partridge claimed that this section of Howe’s speech ought to, and may well have, 
caused uproar in the House, but there is no evidence to support this.109 Questioning of 
witnesses after Howe’s speech suggests that his message had been received and 
understood. Cornwallis was the first to be examined, and as well as his reluctant 
answers to Howe’s questions, he was also asked by an unspecified member of the 
house about the affair at White Plains. Cornwallis replied: 
What I call political reasons relates to no order from hence, or any thing 
in which English politics are concerned; perhaps the word political is 
not a proper one, but I do not know what word to substitute in its 
place.110 
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Cornwallis was then asked point blank: ‘Did the Hessian infantry refuse to 
charge?’111 Cornwallis equivocated in his response, insisting that the Hessian troops 
had displayed great bravery in America, but neglecting to deny that they had refused 
to attack. This question strongly suggests that Howe had got his message across and it 
now seems clear that his political reasons referred only to the fact that a strong 
Hessian contingent was still serving in America. Openly blaming them for the failure 
to attack at White Plains might seriously damage the working relationship between 
the British and Hessian forces in a war that was not yet lost.  
The new evidence in the draft of the narrative does not, however, completely 
resolve the matter. There remains the question of exactly when Howe issued this 
order to von Heister. In his original report to Germain, Howe gave reasons why major 
assaults had not been made on 29 and 31 October, yet in his narrative he only 
defended his decision not to launch an assault on 28 October, immediately after the 
move to take Chatterton’s Hill. The deleted passage from the draft of the narrative 
claimed that Howe had asked von Heister to attack the right wing of the Americans, 
and that he had refused, but no date for this was specified. Howe went on to state that, 
following von Heister’s refusal, he had spoken to Clinton, asking him to lead the 
assault with British troops.112 Clinton wrote at some length on the events at White 
Plains in his own narrative of the war, but did not mention any such conversation with 
Howe. There was, however, the intriguing statement that he had been present during 
the assault on Chatterton’s Hill. This is important, because the assault was undertaken 
by the left wing of Howe’s army, while Clinton was commanding the right wing, 
opposite the centre of the American lines and therefore at least a mile from 
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Chatterton’s Hill.113 Clinton wrote in detail about the assault on the hill (noting 
especially how the British officer leading the attack had stopped to fire a musket, 
causing the advance to lose momentum and, finally, to be repelled).114  
What Clinton was doing so close to the assault, when his original station had 
been with the right wing, is a question that is answered by one of his memoranda. 
This explained how, as soon as his column took its place on the right wing of the 
British position, Howe had arrived to tell him that an attack was to be made on the 
Americans’ right flank and that he (Clinton) was to lead it.115 This tallies perfectly 
with the account of proceedings in the deleted paragraph from the draft of Howe’s 
narrative. It therefore seems clear that the attack that von Heister refused to make was 
actually the assault on Chatterton’s Hill, not a full-scale assault on the main rebel 
lines. Moreover, by the time Clinton (with Cornwallis in tow) arrived at the British 
left flank, the assault was already underway. Clinton reported this with no hint of 
disapproval, but it seems possible, given the fact that Howe had personally visited 
Clinton to inform him of his plans (Clinton explicitly wrote: ‘The instant I came to 
my ground with the right column, Sir William Howe came to me, informed me he had 
determined on attacking the enemy’s right over the Bronx, and desiring me to lead the 
attack’116) that this was yet another instance of British troops launching an attack 
upon the rebels before receiving the official order to advance. The troops undertaking 
the assault, the 28th and 35th Regiments, supported by the 5th and 49th, were soon also 
supported by Hessian units, grenadiers crossing the Bronx and joining in the attack, so 
von Heister had presumably thought better of his decision. Units under Colonel Rall 
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were also involved, apparently taking the initiative to seize another hill that threatened 
the flank of the Americans on Chatterton’s Hill and attacking them from there.117 
Clinton made an enigmatic comment in his note of the affair, suggesting that 
when he came upon the scene of battle and noticed that von Heister had stirred 
himself into action, his thoughts had turned to the dormant commission he held over 
the German general. (A dormant commission was one that only came into effect if a 
superior officer was killed or disabled. In this case, had Howe been incapacitated, von 
Heister would have been technically in overall command of the British army in 
America, and this obviously unsatisfactory arrangement would be sidestepped by 
Clinton having a dormant commission to place him above von Heister in rank).118 
Clinton made it clear that he had not considered invoking this commission to be a 
proper course of action, but the fact that he had even considered it can only be 
explained by his having knowledge that von Heister was in some way guilty of 
misconduct. Given that Howe explained in the deleted paragraph that he had informed 
Clinton of von Heister’s dissent, there seems no doubt that this is the episode referred 
to. 
The sequence of events is therefore mostly clear. Howe asked von Heister to 
launch an attack on Chatterton’s Hill and von Heister refused. Howe then personally 
went to find Clinton and inform him of the Hessian general’s dissent. By the time 
Howe and Clinton had returned to the left flank, an assault was underway, with both 
British and Hessian troops engaged. Although von Heister’s refusal to order his men 
to attack was a serious incident, and one that would undoubtedly have shaken Howe’s 
confidence in the man (which, as has been shown, was already low), it was not the 
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Chatterton’s Hill. It is possible, therefore, that Howe removed this paragraph from his 
narrative because he knew it was not entirely fair and did not address the matter of the 
full-scale assault.  
Even so, the implication was still clear in the final speech delivered to the 
House of Commons that it was the Hessians’ fault that the main assault had not been 
launched, yet close analysis of the events following the storming of Chatterton’s Hill 
does not offer evidence to support this. There was no mention of any intention to 
launch a full-scale attack on 28 October in Howe’s report, nor did Clinton leave any 
comment suggesting that one was planned. The first assault mentioned in Howe’s 
report, the one planned for 29 October, appears to have been deferred simply due to 
the Americans’ strengthening their lines on the night following the action on 
Chatterton’s Hill. Howe had believed the rebels were now so strongly posted that he 
called up reinforcements (the 4th Brigade and two battalions from the 6th), under Lord 
Percy, from the New York garrison.119 
Clinton made no mention of this, moving straight on to deal with the plans for 
an attack on the morning of 31 October. With respect to this, he reported that Howe 
had asked him to reconnoitre the American lines on 30 October. Clinton’s report was 
that the American position could be threatened by the possession of a ‘bald hill’120 on 
their right flank. He also suggested diversionary actions in the centre and the right 
(against the Americans’ left flank). However, Clinton did not mention all the details 
of his report. In a memo partly in cipher (perhaps suggesting that he felt 
uncomfortable with the contents being easily accessible) he outlined a meeting with 
Howe on 30 October, at which he delivered an exhaustive list of reasons (covered in 
Chapter 1) why a full-scale assault on the rebel lines was inadvisable. Clinton 	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suggested that taking the bald hill might ‘stir’121 the Americans and Howe (at least 
according to Clinton) declared that he would be satisfied with that. Clinton was 
therefore suggesting a move almost exactly the same as that of 28 October, an attempt 
to put pressure on the American lines by seizing a piece of high ground on their flank, 
thus forcing them to retire. It was exactly the sort of limited warfare Howe had been 
employing repeatedly, but on this occasion it appears he wanted more. Despite his 
apparent assertion that he would be satisfied with stirring the rebels, Howe surprised 
Clinton in the night following their meeting with orders to prepare for an assault 
against the centre of the American lines the following morning. Clinton was taken 
aback, especially as Howe’s plan included no provision for diversionary actions from 
either flank.122 
Howe’s frontal assault against the heart of the rebel lines never materialised, 
thanks to the bad weather of the night of 30/31 October. Howe reported that this led to 
the attack being postponed and then called off when the Americans withdrew to 
another position on the night of 1 November. (Clinton asserted that the attack was 
actually put in motion before it was discovered that the Americans had moved their 
lines.123) Whatever the exact sequence of events, the major question raised by this 
episode is how strongly Clinton objected to the frontal assault planned by Howe. In 
his ‘official’ version of events, the one contained in his narrative of the war and 
intended for public scrutiny, Clinton was careful not to mention his misgivings other 
than pointing out that he had recommended diversionary attacks to be made at the 
same time. Commenting on Howe having asked for his opinion on the advisability of 
continuing with the attack after heavy rains had started during the night of 30 
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October, he merely stated that the commander-in-chief was ‘already possessed of my 
opinions with respect to the general expediency’124, neglecting to mention that those 




There seems to be no doubt that Howe had intended to launch a full-scale assault on 
the American lines at White Plains. Having first concentrated his forces against an 
isolated position on the Americans’ right flank, he had decided to attack the American 
centre. Washington had offered battle once more, again hoping to force the British 
into a costly frontal assault, and Howe finally was willing to accept the invitation. The 
situation was different now, however. On Long Island, Howe had been free to act 
almost exactly as he saw fit. Two months later he had a garrison to maintain in New 
York, so that he faced Washington at White Plains on roughly equal terms, both men 
commanding around 13,000 men (in marked contrast to Howe’s numerical superiority 
on Long Island).126 This directly affected events, because when the rebels 
strengthened their lines on the night of 28 October, Howe did not feel that he had 
enough men to enact his planned offensive the following day. It took more than a day 
for reinforcements to arrive from New York City and by the time they arrived the 
weather had turned and forced Howe to postpone his attack once more.127 As Howe 
pointed out in his narrative, it was inevitable that the number of men available for 
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offensive operations would diminish as the requirements of garrisons for forts, towns 
and posts grew.128  
Howe would not have been feeling pressure from home at the time. On 23 
October, just five days before the battle, he had received a batch of letters from 
Germain from as early as 21 June. These letters mostly gave approbation for all of 
Howe’s decisions and plans, with only two points that might have caused any 
disquiet. On 21 June, Germain had commented that he had heard nothing from Howe 
since his letter of 12 May, pointing out that several private persons had written in the 
meantime on such matters as the arrival of supply ships.129 It is unlikely that Howe 
could have taken offence at such a mild chiding, but he was more likely to have noted 
Germain’s insistence, in the same letter, that he should dismiss as many transport 
vessels as possible from the service as soon as the second Hessian division had been 
delivered to America, in order to cut the expense of the war.130 This was subtle 
pressure, but pressure nonetheless. More pleasing to Howe would have been the news 
that Germain had taken on board his concerns over linking up with Carleton’s army 
from the north. Germain enclosed a copy of a letter to Carleton in which the 
commander in Canada had been instructed to give his army over to Burgoyne and 
then return to Quebec. Burgoyne was then to place himself under Howe’s command 
when the two armies joined on the Hudson.131 Howe must have taken satisfaction 
from the fact that he would not face the possibility of losing overall command 
following a link-up with the northern army and it was also evidence that Germain still 
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had confidence in his abilities and concerns for his peace of mind. It is also notable, 
however, that this reassurance did nothing to persuade Howe to move up the Hudson 
towards Burgoyne. 
In contrast to the comfortable state of affairs with Germain, Howe’s relationship 
with Clinton was clearly under pressure, although it is not certain how aware Howe 
himself would have been at this time. As detailed in Chapter 1, by the time of the 
Battle of White Plains Clinton had started to write notes and letters laced with 
genuine disdain for his commanding officer. Conferences between the two men were 
becoming predictable: Howe would propose a course of action and Clinton would 
disagree. This certainly occurred on 1 October, when discussions over the landing at 
Throg’s Neck took place. Clinton was dismissive of the choice of landing point, 
saying ‘If you don’t want to attack them [the rebels] you are too near; if you do want 
to attack them you are too far off’.132 Clinton had also urged against any offensive 
move whatsoever at that point, believing that Howe should wait to hear from the 
northern army first. It is reasonable to assume that a similar difference of opinion 
marked an earlier conference regarding the landing at Kip’s Bay on York Island. 
Although no memoranda of this conference exists (it was suggested by Howe on 14 
September) a further note from Clinton from 15 September is full of scorn for Howe’s 
plan, suggesting that the meeting had taken place. Although Clinton would almost 
certainly not have been so frank in a face-to-face chat with Howe, his disapproval of 
the plan was evidently so strong that it is unlikely he would not have expressed it and, 
most probably, offered an alternative plan.133 Finally, the conference of 30 October 
had once more revealed the two men to have vastly differing opinions on how to 
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proceed. Howe (at this stage) wished to be aggressive, while Clinton again urged 
caution.134 
As predictable as these conferences were, the results were no less so. In each 
case (regarding Kip’s Bay, Throg’s Neck and White Plains) Howe ignored the advice 
of his second-in-command. Even if it is not possible to claim that Howe was 
becoming exasperated with Clinton’s constant disagreements (there is no evidence to 
support this and Howe appears to have remained patient with Clinton throughout their 
working relationship) it is clear he did not particularly value his input on operations. 
Following the adoption of Clinton’s plan for the Battle of Long Island (and following 
Clinton’s flagrant disregard for Howe’s orders not to press the attack onto the rebel 
lines at Brooklyn) Howe appears to have ignored his input on every occasion. Even 
Clinton’s recommendation for diversionary actions by the British right and left flanks 
at White Plains was ignored.135 
If Howe’s relationship with Clinton was deteriorating, that with the Hessian 
general von Heister had not even enjoyed a honeymoon period. Following an 
inauspicious start, matters had worsened.136 Howe had been peeved by von Heister’s 
refusal to allow his men to dismantle the rebel lines at Brooklyn and appeared to 
engage in deliberate needling of the German general regarding his censure of a Jäger 
detachment (as covered in Chapter 2).137 Howe therefore appears to have had little 
faith in the German general before White Plains, and he almost certainly had none 
whatsoever afterwards. Even if von Heister’s refusal to attack proved to be only 
temporary (and this again raises the question of whether he had fully understood 
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Howe; this was still almost a month before von Muenchhausen was appointed as a 
liaison between the two men) he had refused to comply with Howe’s battle plan. As 
the Hessian contingent was such a sizeable part of his army, Howe must have been 
concerned at the thought that he might not be able to count on them. 
Howe was therefore in a considerably different situation from that he had faced 
on Long Island. His army was becoming dispersed as the campaign continued, he was 
in constant disagreement with his second-in-command and he had no faith in the 
commander of the sizeable Hessian contingent. Having decided to launch an attack at 
White Plains he was faced by outright refusal to comply from von Heister and an 
unequivocal lack of enthusiasm from Clinton. Consider also the fact that he was 
facing an entrenched enemy of equal strength, in contrast to the huge superiority in 
numbers he had enjoyed on Long Island, and it is perhaps remarkable that Howe 
shrugged off all of these difficulties and decided to press on. Only the withdrawal of 
the Americans to stronger lines appears, finally, to have dissuaded him from 
attacking, but the lack of support from his two main subordinates must have been 
unsettling. 
One final question remains regarding White Plains. It does not seem that von 
Heister’s dissent was the reason behind the failure to launch a full-scale assault, yet 
the draft of Howe’s narrative shows that he had originally intended to blame the 
German general explicitly. It is possible that Howe saw the Hessians as an easy target, 
a way to very cheaply deal with the controversy and move on. It is possible that his 
recollection of events (as seems to have been the case regarding Long Island) was not 
entirely accurate. In the two and a half years between the Battle of White Plains and 
the delivery of his narrative to the House of Commons, von Heister’s dissent may 
have assumed greater significance in Howe’s mind, but Cornwallis (in one of his few 
displays of unity with Howe during his testimony at the inquiry) also referred to the 
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‘political reasons’, going on to state to his inquisitor that ‘I cannot satisfy the 
honourable gentleman’s curiosity, but I will venture to assure him upon my honour, 
that if he knew the reasons he would be perfectly satisfied’.138 Howe was lucky that 
Cornwallis had been present (and thus willing to testify on the matter during the 
inquiry) during the critical events at White Plains. The fact that Cornwallis went 
along with Howe’s testimony in this instance is telling. If the Hessians were not 
merely scapegoats, then there may have been further disagreements with von Heister, 
although no evidence of this exists. The question of Howe’s ‘political reasons’ has 
therefore only partly been resolved. 
At White Plains, Howe revealed himself to be far more willing to engage the 
rebel army than has previously been credited. Far from always looking for an easy 
option, a way of manoeuvring the Americans from one position after another, he 
displayed a stubborn determination to bring the Americans to battle. Even in the face 
of a lack of cooperation from von Heister and constant disagreements from Clinton, 
he planned to attack Washington’s army, persevering to the point of calling 
reinforcements from New York City and showing a willingness to continue with his 
plan for an attack even when bad weather intervened. Howe’s testimony at his inquiry 
(yet again) confused the issue, indirectly placing the blame at the door of the 
Hessians. Howe’s motives for doing this are unclear, but it does seem that he himself 
has been unfairly criticised for the failure to launch a full-scale attack. He was very 
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III: Fort Washington 
The British assault on Fort Washington, on 16 November 1776, does not feature in 
the standard list of Howe’s controversial decisions. He barely mentioned it during his 
narrative, it did not feature on Germain’s list of points to consider for the inquiry and 
historians have been uniformly positive in their considerations of the battle.139 This is 
perhaps an inevitable consequence of the success of the assault on the fort. With so 
many hesitations and failures punctuating Howe’s period in command, a well-
conceived and well-executed attack with genuinely important consequences was 
always likely to escape serious scrutiny, and yet this was actually one of the most 
puzzling episodes in Howe’s career, one that certainly justifies closer scrutiny. 
Following the failure to bring Washington to battle at White Plains, Howe chose 
to break off his pursuit of the main rebel army and return to Manhattan, where 
Washington had left a sizeable garrison at Fort Washington. The Americans’ 
confidence in their fort appears to have been unjustified. The fort and external works 
appeared strong enough (Johann Ewald was impressed when asked to reconnoitre the 
position on 14 November, noting that the area around the fort itself had been cleared 
of trees to the range of rifle fire, while ravines, woods, steep slopes and abbatis 
combined to make the approach to the fort extremely hazardous).140 However, the 
garrison of 2,900 was much too small to hold all of the outer works, yet much too 
large for the fort alone. In addition to this, although well supplied with dried 
provisions, the fort had no well and water had to be brought up from the Hudson 
River.141 
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Much has been made of the fact that Howe received intelligence on the layout 
of Fort Washington prior to the attack (Anderson believed this was at the heart of 
Howe’s ‘political reasons’ for refusing to divulge why he had not attacked at White 
Plains), but any knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of Fort Washington 
would surely have pointed out a siege as the least costly manner of forcing the 
garrison to surrender.142 Washington was convinced that Howe would proceed with 
siege works, and was concerned that he might detach a corps to invade New Jersey at 
the same time. The American commander may also have touched on a pertinent point 
when he mentioned that Howe might have been feeling the pressure to achieve 
something important, writing: ‘for what has he done as yet with his great army?’.143 
Having given the garrison of Fort Washington the opportunity to surrender, on 
15 November, Howe prepared a three-pronged attack, with the possibility of a fourth 
supporting assault if needed (Figure 10). This was a major undertaking, utilising both 
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pp. 193-196. 
143 Ford, ed., Writings, Vol. V, pp. 7-8, Washington to Governor Livingston, 7 Nov. 1776.  
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Hessian and British forces. The three main attacks were carried out by Hessian troops 
under Lieutenant General von Knyphausen (marked ‘1’ on Figure 10), British light 
infantry, guards, grenadiers and the 33rd Regiment under Cornwallis and Brigadier 
General Mathew (2) and a combined force of Hessian and British regiments under 
Lord Percy (3). The fourth force (initially intended to act as a diversion) comprised 
the 42nd Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Stirling and two supporting battalions 
(4). HMS Pearl would offer support from a position on the Hudson, while further 
artillery support would come from a battery sited on the opposite bank of the East 
River from the American positions (also at 4).144 
Von Knyphausen’s Hessian force ran into the stiffest resistance. With a 
skirmishing line of Jägers, grenadiers and picked men in front, the twin columns came 
under heavy fire from woods in front of the American positions and also had to 
contend with steep hills and abbatis. Von Ewald described a four- or five-hour 
firefight before the rebels were driven back to the fort.145 Cornwallis and Mathew 
landed their two light infantry battalions from 30 flat-bottomed boats and instantly 
stormed the American positions in front of them, driving them back quickly. The 
remainder of this corps was then landed and the whole advanced towards Fort 
Washington. Lord Percy made quick progress on the opposite flank and Howe 
decided to send in the 42nd Regiment to attempt to cut off the retreating Americans, 
which they did, capturing around 170 men in the process.146 Hessian and British units 
then converged on Fort Washington, with Colonel Rall (who had attracted notice for 
his performance at White Plains) apparently taking his regiment as close as 30 
paces.147 There appears to have been some possibility of the Hessians, who had come 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 (TNA), PRO, CO 5/93, ff. 294-302, Howe to Germain, 30 Nov. 1776.  
145 Tustin, ed., Diary of the American War, p. 16. 
146 (TNA), PRO, CO 5/93, ff. 294-302, Howe to Germain, 30 Nov. 1776. 
147 Uhlendorf, ed., Revolution in America, pp. 70-71. 
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under the heaviest fire during the attack, putting the garrison to the sword, but there 
was no massacre and the fort was quickly surrendered with a total loss of around 
3,000 men (around 150 casualties, with the rest taken prisoner) and vast amounts of 
stores, armaments and ammunition.148 
 
The controversy 
Historians considering the fall of Fort Washington have generally concentrated on the 
lack of judgement shown by Washington in allowing the garrison to remain in 
place.149 Washington realised that the fort was vulnerable and could serve no purpose 
in terms of blocking the Hudson to British shipping. ‘I am therefore inclined to think,’ 
he had written to Nathanael Greene, ‘that it will not be prudent to hazard the men and 
stores at Mount Washington.’150 Disastrously, he allowed Greene, as the commander 
on the spot, to make the final decision. By the time Washington arrived to inspect the 
situation, on 14 November, British forces were already gathering (von Knyphausen’s 
Hessian brigade had commenced the build-up, taking up a position on the northern tip 
of Manhattan on 2 November).151 It seems likely that Washington was mainly 
concerned with the possibility of evacuating the garrison following the inevitable 
siege. From his experiences on Long Island and at White Plains, there was no reason 
to suspect that Howe would mount an assault on a prepared defensive position.152  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 (TNA), PRO, CO 5/93, ff. 294-302, Howe to Germain, 30 Nov. 1776. 
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Washington’s leadership was indeed suspect on this occasion, but Howe’s 
decision to attack appears uncharacteristically aggressive. In fact, it went against 
almost every principle he had espoused during the campaign up to that point. His 
letters to Germain, and his subsequent defence at the inquiry, were most notable for 
his repeated assertions that he would not attack prepared defences. It is especially 
interesting to consider the reasons he had given just two months previously for not 
attacking the very same lines that defended Fort Washington. On 25 September he 
had written to Germain claiming that the rebel defences on the Harlem Heights (the 
area around Fort Washington) were too strong to attack. His exact words were: ‘The 
enemy is too strongly posted to be attacked in front, and innumerable difficulties are 
in our way of turning him on either side.’153 As Howe’s army took up positions 
around Fort Washington in November, they were facing a garrison of 3,000 rather 
than Washington’s entire army, which would certainly have factored into Howe’s 
decision. The second division of Hessians (4,000 men under von Knyphausen) had 
also recently arrived, and Howe had cited their absence as a reason for his pessimism 
over future operations in the letter to Germain of 25 September.154 
The American positions around the Harlem Heights and Fort Washington were 
therefore undoubtedly more vulnerable, and the position could not be ignored as the 
garrison could threaten New York City with raids and possibly a major assault. 
Howe’s stated reasons for assaulting it, however, simply did not make sense.  
Fort Washington… was covered by very strong ground, and exceeding 
difficult of access; but the importance of this post, which, with Fort Lee 
on the opposite shore of Jersey, kept the enemy in command of the 
navigation of the North River, while it barred the communication with 
York by land, made the possession of it absolutely necessary.155 
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Hessians (along with a regiment of Waldeckers) as arriving on 18 Oct. 
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Fort Washington had proved inadequate to prevent British shipping from sailing 
up the Hudson in July, when the Phoenix and Rose had both cruised past, suffering 
only minor damage.156 Since then, the addition of Fort Lee, on the New Jersey side of 
the Hudson, had also failed to close the river to the British, as made clear by the fact 
that the Pearl, took station above both forts on 16 November to support the assault. 
The flat-bottomed boats to be used in the attack, 30 of them, had also passed between 
the two forts under cover of darkness on the night of 14 November.157 Washington 
realised perfectly well that the forts, along with the hulks and other sunken 
obstructions, had failed to close the river to the Royal Navy. The presence of the 
Pearl would have prevented the Americans from evacuating the garrison of Fort 
Washington by boat, and there was no other possible route of escape. Howe, 
apparently in possession of detailed plans of the fort, could therefore have invested 
the position and waited for their supplies to run out. As Washington realised, this 
would require only a portion of the army to accomplish, leaving the major part of 
Howe’s force free to move into New Jersey.158 
The decision to assault the works, rather than lay siege, is further called into 
question by the casualties Howe’s army sustained in the attack. In his report to 
Germain he avoided putting a figure on the operation, although he did include 
ominous phrases such as ‘his corps was for a considerable time exposed to the fire of 
three pieces of cannon’, ‘the light infantry moved, and landed under a brisk fire’ and 
‘he immediately advanced his boats under a heavy fire’.159 The casualties were 
severe, totalling 78 killed and 374 wounded.160 Howe did include a tally of the 
American losses in his report, and they were far lower: 53 killed and 96 wounded, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 (TNA) PRO, CO 5/93, ff. 217-218, Howe to Germain, 8 Jul. 1776. 
157 Ibid., ff. 294-302, Howe to Germain, 30 Nov. 1776. 
158 Ford, ed., Writings, Vol. V, p. 10, Washington to Major General Greene, 8 Nov. 1776. 
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although they also lost almost 2,900 prisoners. The total of British and Hessian losses 
was greater than those incurred at the Battle of Long Island (452 compared to 367)161, 
yet only a small corps of Washington’s army was engaged. An argument could 
certainly be made that ‘the point to be carried was not adequate to the loss of men to 
be expected from the enterprise,’162 Howe’s own words in defence of his decision not 
to attack at White Plains. 
 
Howe’s decision 
Howe must have been frustrated with the events at White Plains at the end of October; 
he had clearly intended to launch a full-scale assault on Washington’s army. There is 
no documentary evidence of Howe’s thoughts at this time, as we only have his dry 
letters to Germain to draw from, but it is possible to argue that the assault on Fort 
Washington was at least in part a reaction to this frustration. It is notable that neither 
von Heister nor Clinton took any part in the assault on Fort Washington. Clinton 
claimed to have been involved in the planning of the attack (in fact, he claimed that it 
was he who suggested the three-pronged assault). Furthermore, Clinton suggested that 
it was Howe’s original intent to attack only with the Hessians under the newly arrived 
von Knyphausen.163 
Clinton had been given command of the planned descent upon Rhode Island, 
but he was not to leave until early December and could theoretically have played a 
more active part in the attack on Fort Washington.164 He had led the flanking column 
on Long Island, the landings at Kip’s Bay and Throg’s Neck and had been selected by 
Howe to lead the assault on Chatterton’s Hill after von Heister had refused to do so. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 (TNA), PRO, CO 5/93, ff. 257-260, Howe to Germain, 3 Sep. 1776. Casualties for Long 
island are taken from Howe’s report to Germain. 
162 Howe, Narrative, p. 7. 
163 Willcox, ed., American Rebellion, p. 54. 
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Since then, as well as revealing his reluctance to attack the Americans at White 
Plains, Clinton had also made his bad-tempered comment on preferring to command 
three companies rather than serve under Howe in a bigger force (this comment was 
made during the withdrawal from White Plains). It is not certain when Cornwallis 
(who overheard the comment) informed Howe, but it is known that the British 
commander learned of the outburst, as it came up in one of the conferences between 
the two generals the following year. If the news had reached Howe’s ears before the 
attack on Fort Washington, it might have affected his opinion of Clinton.165 
Washington’s comment, that Howe might have been feeling pressure to do 
something with his army, may have merit, but the British commander was still 
operating with the support of his political master, Lord Germain. No new letters had 
arrived from home since those he had received on 23 October (detailed in the section 
on White Plains). The only substantial change in his circumstances were in his 
relationships with von Heister and Clinton.  
The casualties suffered at White Plains (214 for the British and 99 for the 
Hessians), coupled with the returns from the Battle of Long Island (318 killed and 
wounded for the British, 28 for the Hessians) raise a further point.166 It is possible that 
Howe felt the Hessians were not shouldering their fair share of the burden in the 
campaign. In addition, although the skirmishing in the Battle of Harlem Heights on 16 
September had not been an authorised action, it had still been an expensive one and 
the 168 casualties suffered were mainly borne by the British.167 In this context, von 
Heister’s refusal to attack at White Plains would certainly have been troubling, and 
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f. 26. 
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Clinton’s claim that the attack on Fort Washington had originally been intended to be 
a Hessian-only affair takes on added significance in this light. 
Although Howe’s performance on Long Island confirmed his inherently 
cautious nature, White Plains showed that he was capable of being more aggressive 
than he is generally conceived to have been. Fort Washington reinforced this 
impression and, viewed in context along with the new perspective on his decision-
making at White Plains, it is clear that Howe recognised the importance of engaging 
the rebel army, rather than merely occupying territory. It is also possible to see, in a 
man who admitted to having a temper, especially on the battlefield, a flash of 
frustration that his plans at White Plains had been undermined by subordinates and 
circumstances alike. At Fort Washington, where an isolated and vulnerable garrison 
was certain to be taken ‘at a very cheap rate, by regular approaches,’168 Howe instead 
chose to mount the most aggressive action of his entire period in command of the 
British army.  
 
 
IV: Howe’s strategy for 1776 
Whether or not Howe had a clear strategy in mind during the 1776 campaign is a 
major question when attempting to understand his period in command. Having 
considered in detail three of the most important tactical decisions made by Howe 
during this campaign, a consideration of his strategic thinking is necessary to see if he 
was consistently working towards a fully articulated plan. The concept of strategy has 
been defined in many ways, and it has been claimed that it barely existed (at least on a 
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conscious level, in the minds of commanders) before the nineteenth century.169 For 
the purposes of this assessment it will be considered to be the process by which 
campaign targets were set, never losing sight of the goals they were intended to 
achieve. Under this interpretation, the intention to capture Philadelphia in 1777 would 
not be considered strategic, but the intention to foster greater support from the loyalist 
community in Pennsylvania through the capture of Philadelphia, would. It must also 
be remembered that Howe was operating in what van Creveld considered to be the 
‘stone age’ of military command systems. In fact, van Creveld argued that the general 
absence of a concept of strategy was due in large part to the inability of commanders 
to exert sufficient strategic control of an army. He did, however, accept that certain 
strategic principles still applied (including the decision to wage an offensive or 
defensive war and the choice of battleground), whether anyone was consciously 
considering them as ‘strategy’ or not. Equally important was the move away from 
rulers of states commanding their own armies, which introduced the need for 
correspondence between the ruling entity at home and the commander in the field.170 
With 3,000 miles of the Atlantic Ocean between Howe and Britain, this was no small 
matter. 
It has generally been assumed that Howe was following the Hudson strategy 
(the linking up of two armies on the Hudson River), as outlined in his agenda-setting 
letter of June 1775, and it is common for works on the war to cite this as the 
underlying British strategy.171  Samuel B. Griffith II wrote of the ‘almost hypnotic 
influence’172 the concept had on British generals including Gage, Carleton, Clinton, 
Burgoyne and Howe, as well as Germain. Anderson wrote of the near unanimous 	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support for operations along the Hudson, alluding to a form of institutional memory 
regarding the importance of the river during the French and Indian War.173 Gruber 
noted that the strategy was apparently accepted by all the leading players in the 
British war effort and was aimed at ending the rebellion in a single campaign.174 
Mackesy also noted the near inevitability of the Hudson assuming a prominent role in 
the planning for 1776, noting that it ‘thrust like a highway into the heart of the rebel 
country’.175 
Even if it was the case that Howe followed this strategy (and, as shall be shown, 
this is highly doubtful) assuming control of the Hudson was not an end in itself, it was 
just the starting point of a plan to isolate and launch raids into the New England 
colonies. Even to reach that starting point required supporting elements. A base 
needed to be established at New York City, loyalist forces needed to be raised to act 
alongside the British and the destruction of the rebel army under George Washington 
was also a requisite, or any post along the Hudson could be targeted by an 
overwhelming force and captured.176  
 
The controversy 
Although the loss of Trenton ended the 1776 campaign on a distinctly sour note, the 
year was not considered to have been wasted and there was a general sense that Howe 
had taken a solid first step towards ending the rebellion. Driving the Americans out of 
New York had been skilfully achieved, with fewer losses than might have been 
expected, and the Hudson was now open for Howe to meet up with the northern army. 
The subsequent failures of the 1777 campaign (the absence of a decisive battle against 	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Washington and the loss of Burgoyne’s entire army at Saratoga) prompted a closer 
look at the 1776 campaign, and it started to appear as a series of missed opportunities. 
Even then, and with the benefit of hindsight, Germain initially had no major 
complaints with the progress of the campaign until Howe failed to attack the rebels at 
White Plains.177 The closer the scrutiny, however, the more apparent flaws came to 
light and, by the time the inquiry opened, Howe found himself under attack for his 
actions throughout the campaign, including halting his assaulting troops on Long 
Island, opting to take the rebel lines by siege and failing to take advantage of the 
undoubted inferiority of the rebel army at that early stage of the war.178 
Some of the most violent criticism of Howe came in the pamphlets written 
mainly by Joseph Galloway and Israel Mauduit. Galloway wrote of the ‘want of 
wisdom in the plans’179 when considering Howe’s generalship, while Mauduit 
asserted that he had been ‘baffled and defeated in all his attempts, and out-generaled 
even by a man that was none’.180 More considered appraisals still usually found Howe 
wanting and widely differing conclusions have been drawn by historians. Maldwyn 
Jones believed Howe had no clear plan of operations in mind and that consequently 
there was no coherence in his movements.181 Gruber made the important point that 
tactical considerations were of more interest to generals at the time and that none of 
the commanders in charge had experience in formulating strategy.182 In Gruber’s 
detailed analysis of the Howe brothers’ command during the war, he contested that 
although Howe had played an active role in the planning for the 1776 campaign, he 	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had deliberately changed his strategy prior to the Battle of Long Island, aiming 
instead merely to regain territory, drive the Americans out of New York and look to 
end the war the following year. Gruber was unable to pinpoint the reasons for such a 
change of heart, although he believed it stemmed from a desire to promote 
reconciliation with the colonies.183 Bicheno discounted the idea that a search for a 
decisive battle had ever been a genuine part of Howe’s plan, praising instead the ‘very 
nearly successful strategy of alternating sharp military action with political 
concessions’.184 He also asserted that a more ruthless prosecution of the war would 
have suppressed the revolution, even if the suppression had proved to be 
temporary.185 Black saw faults with the Hudson strategy, but still believed a more 
dynamic general could have implemented it successfully.186  
The question remains whether Howe had attempted to follow the Hudson 
strategy, a different one, or none at all. Adding to the impression that this was a 
rudderless campaign, Howe’s actions during 1776 sometimes appear to have been 
contradictory (storming the lines around Fort Washington while insisting on siege 
works for those on Long Island, for instance) and, as has been shown in preceding 
chapters, his own explanations of his conduct often added more layers of complexity 
and confusion. This does not necessarily mean there was no underpinning strategic 
aim. Circumstances could change from day to day and Howe’s own opinions on what 
might be achievable would have been influenced by factors including the movements 
of the rebel army, the opinions of his fellow officers and even the weather (the severe 
downpour at White Plains being a case in point). The benefit of hindsight, and also a 
fairly comprehensive knowledge of the strength of rebel positions at various times 
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during the year, colour our understanding of events and make it tempting to claim that 
Howe had never intended to fight a decisive battle. The traditional sequence of events 
shows him snubbing apparent opportunities at Long Island and White Plains, while 
refusing even to attempt an action against Washington’s lines at the Harlem Heights 
in September. A beguiling picture emerges of Howe refusing to engage the rebels 
despite their offering battle on frequent occasions.  
Howe’s correspondence with Germain (detailed in Chapter 3) included many 
assertions that a decisive victory was desirable, usually accompanied by a list of 
problems that would make it difficult to gain one. The strategy he articulated for 1776 
initially called for a quick relocation from Boston to New York (before the Americans 
could fortify it). Howe also wished to receive his reinforcements in the spring to give 
him as much time as possible to embark upon the job of destroying the rebel army and 
moving a force up the Hudson.187 This appears to have been an indication that he 
intended to follow the Hudson strategy, but by April 1776 it was clear this was not 
going to happen. Howe had been unable to extricate himself from Boston as early as 
he had planned and the raising of troops was proving problematic, causing Howe to 
express doubts that he could bring the rebels to a decisive battle.188 His concerns that 
Washington would fortify New York and act on the defensive proved prophetic and 
Howe’s orders for the Battle of Long Island, which went only so far as to outflank and 
drive back the outer line of defences along the Gowanus Heights, as well as his 
decision to take the lines by siege rather than by assault, are strong evidence that he 
had no intention of looking for a decisive action there.189 Subsequent events suggest 
that he was not looking for a decisive battle on Manhattan either. The landing point 
chosen (Kip’s Bay) allowed the 5,000-strong rebel garrison to evacuate the city, 	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rather than penning it in and forcing it to fight or surrender. Howe then refused to 
assault defensive lines at the Harlem Heights, instead forcing Washington to evacuate 
those positions by landing in his rear. From this point, however, Howe’s mode of 
proceeding changed. Once the Americans had been manoeuvred out of the defensive 
works they had been able to prepare around New York, and forced to take up 
improvised positions at White Plains, he became more aggressive. At White Plains it 
seems clear that he fully intended to launch a major assault, while at Fort Washington 
he attacked the lines that had previously daunted him around the Harlem Heights 
(partly, no doubt, because they were then guarded by a fraction of the men who had 
held them two months previously). Howe’s thinking during this stage of the campaign 
now becomes clearer. As Charles Lee had said when reconnoitring New York earlier 
in the year, the best policy for the Americans was to construct rank upon rank of 
defensive works and force the British to pay a steep price to shift them.190 Howe 
seems to have appreciated that this would be their strategy and had no intention of 
obliging them, but after forcing them to leave the safety of those lines, he was willing 
to pursue a major engagement.  
A passage in the draft of Howe’s narrative supports this. In dealing with 
preparations for shifting the rebels from Manhattan, Howe’s finalised speech referred 
to the fact that, during the pause in operations following the landing at Kip’s Bay, he 
had been gathering intelligence on the country beyond Manhattan, saying: ‘some time 
was also necessarily employed in enquiries respecting the face of the country to be 
possessed upon a supposition that the enemy should remove from Kingsbridge’.191 
The draft shows that he had originally planned to say: ‘some time was also 
necessarily employed in enquiries respecting the face of the country to be possessed 	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for the removal of the enemy from Kingsbridge and to bring them to action deprived 
of the defence of their strong works there’.192 Why Howe chose to change this is 
uncertain. The draft version hints once more at being unwilling to face the enemy on 
ground of their choosing and Howe may have felt that the speech as a whole was 
making this assertion too frequently. However, the draft version was far less passive, 
suggesting that he was acting according to a formulated plan. It also appears to have 
been an accurate portrayal of his actions at the time. Howe did force the rebels to 
leave their lines on Manhattan and he was able to bring them to battle in hastily 
prepared positions, at White Plains.  
There were no further opportunities to engage Washington’s army following the 
capture of the isolated garrison at Fort Washington. Having captured Fort Lee, on the 
opposite bank of the Hudson, on 20 November, a British corps under Cornwallis 
chased Washington’s army through New Jersey, eventually halting at the Delaware 
River.193 The pursuit of Washington’s army was not without its own controversy. 
Cornwallis, ditching baggage to enable his men to move quickly, appeared on the 
verge of capturing the fleeing rebels, reckoned to number as few as 3,000 by this 
point (a further corps of around 3,500 was with Charles Lee), only to stop, according 
to their orders, at Brunswick.194 Once more, a British force in full cry had been halted 
by the orders of Howe. Whereas Clinton had been willing to disregard such orders on 
Long Island, Cornwallis obeyed Howe’s command. This strongly supports the 
assertion that Howe was no longer looking to engage the rebel army, but had switched 
to a policy of territorial acquisition (exactly the shift in strategy that Gruber 
suggested, although it appears to have taken place later than Gruber estimated).  	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As well as restoring British authority to large swathes of the colonies, such 
territorial acquisition would encourage loyalists to enlist in provincial corps, a key 
consideration if British rule was to be restored. Howe later defended his decision to 
occupy New Jersey by referring to his belief at the time that there were large numbers 
of loyalists in the area, and that they could not fail to notice the difference between 
British and rebel authority.195  The anticipation of loyalist support in the colonies was 
to be a recurrent theme. It had already been the idea behind Clinton’s disastrous 
southern expedition and would continue to influence Howe’s planning in 1777. It had 
proved to be chimerical by the time Germain wrote to Clinton in March 1778, 
suggesting that large bands of loyalists would join the cause if operations were moved 
to the south, but in 1776 it was still a reasonable supposition to act upon.196 Both 
Clinton and Howe agreed (one of the few points on which they seem to have shared 
the same opinion) that peace could only be brought to the colonies if the loyalist 
element could be effectively employed. Clinton’s view was that the Hudson strategy 
itself could not hope to succeed without significant loyalist support in the region.197  
The decisive defeat of Washington’s army and the fostering of loyalist support 
were supposedly only complementary elements to the keystone of the strategy for 
1776, the linking up of two armies along the Hudson. Howe’s doubts over this were 
detailed in Chapter 3, but even when Germain had acted to reassure him that he would 
not lose control over his army following the junction (by appointing Burgoyne to 
command the northern army), Howe still made no move up the Hudson.198 
Conversations with Clinton had demonstrated that Howe did not consider the strategy 
to be essential, arguing that the British could continue the war effort solely from New 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Howe, Narrative, pp. 7-9. 
196 WCL, Clinton Papers, Vol. XXXI, f. 48, Germain to Clinton, 8 Mar. 1778. 
197 Ibid., Vol. XVIII, Memo of meeting with Howe, Nov. 1776. 
198 Lomas, ed., Manuscripts of Mrs Stopford-Sackville, Vol. II, pp. 60-63, Germain to 
Carleton, 26 Mar. 1777. 
	   256	  
York if the rebels successfully captured Quebec.199 The full impact of Howe’s lack of 
commitment to this strategy would not be felt until the following year, but it was clear 
by December 1776 that it was not playing a part in his plans for that campaign. 
Whether Howe had ever intended to begin a move up the Hudson is unknown. It is 
possible that, had he destroyed Washington’s army at White Plains, he might have 
then moved on the Hudson Highlands to facilitate a move up the river either at the 
end of 1776, or early in the following campaign. His ambitious plan of November 
1776 included a corps to operate on the Hudson (and a sizeable one at that, numbering 
10,000), but this was the first element of his proposed strategy for 1777 to be 
downscaled and eventually discarded in the revised plans that quickly followed and in 
the greatly curtailed plan he formulated in response to his limited reinforcements.200 It 
therefore seems more likely that Howe had little faith in the strategy and a passage in 
the draft of his narrative suggests he may even have fundamentally misunderstood its 
purpose. Musing on the fact that the northern army was attempting to reach Albany, 
he suggested that it might have been transferred to New York City and then made its 
way to Albany ‘by a more ready route’. ‘We should, I think,’ Howe continued, ‘by 
that means, have possessed ourselves of the province of New York, which was the 
view of the other plan.’201 Moving from New York City to Albany would only have 
established control over approximately half the length of the Hudson, and would not 
have cut off the middle colonies from the New England colonies, which was the 
actual aim of the Hudson strategy. Howe, perhaps wisely, omitted this section from 
his final speech, as was the case with a further illuminating passage that followed 
immediately afterwards, in which he wrote: 
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Gentlemen may perhaps ask, why I did not propose this measure to the 
minister? I answer, because I did not consider myself in any degree 
called upon to do it – a senior and more experienced officer 
commanded in Canada. He was much more competent than I to judge 
and advise… besides, ever considering the Northern Expedition as a 
measure determined by government, to have obtruded my objections 
might not only have been deemed an officious impertinence, but would 
have carried the appearance of my seeking to have the whole American 
army immediately placed under my command – a scruple of delicacy 
which I confess had weight with me at the time.202 
 
Had both of these passages been left in the speech delivered to the House of 
Commons, no one could have had any doubt that Howe felt the Hudson strategy was, 
effectively, none of his business. It was an entirely separate operation, ordered by 
government and entrusted to a completely independent corps of the British army in 
North America. He felt no obligation to it and did not even comprehend its actual 
purpose. Van Creveld noted, in a list of the prerequisites for an (unattainable) perfect 
command system, the need for a commander to be offered alternative strategies that 
were ‘real, not just subterfuges presented as a matter of form.’203 It is enlightening to 
consider the initial list of alternatives presented to Gage, by Lord Dartmouth, back in 
August 1775, in which the Hudson strategy was clearly presented as the favoured 
option. The discretion offered to Gage was illusory and Howe may have felt that he 
was bound to pay lip service at least to the following of this strategy.204 
One final element in Howe’s planning for 1776 deserves consideration. A 
general needs to make full use of any advantage he has over an opponent and, in the 
fleet commanded by his brother, Howe had a very telling advantage indeed over 
Washington. Howe made this pay by almost exclusively moving his army by means 
of Lord Howe’s transports. The Howe brothers cooperated on operations that saw 
large bodies of men landed safely at Staten Island, Long Island, Kip’s Bay, Throg’s 	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Neck and Pell’s Point. None of these movements were effectively countered by 
Washington (with the exception of Throg’s Neck, where the progress of the British 
was frustrated as much by the unexpected nature of the area chosen for the landing as 
it was by enemy action). Indeed, the American general spent most of the 1776 
campaign in an agony of indecision over where Howe’s army might move next.205 
While it could certainly be argued that Howe may have made more imaginative use of 
this facility (Clinton frequently pressed for a landing further in the Americans’ rear to 
trap their entire army)206 it offered a way to force Washington to abandon strong 
defences without taking the inevitable casualties that would follow an assault. The 
importance of close naval support was probably paramount in Howe’s thinking when 
he agreed to a proposal from his brother to seize Rhode Island (first suggested at the 
end of the preceding year), which offered a safe winter harbour for the fleet.207 The 
detachment of 6,000 men to effect this, under the command of Clinton, reduced 
Howe’s capacity to act offensively at the end of the 1776 campaign (Clinton again 
disagreed, favouring a move to take Philadelphia instead), but given the needs of the 
fleet, it was probably an unavoidable course of action.208 
 
Howe’s decision 
Howe seems to have followed a strategy in 1776 that was more coherent and realistic 
than he is generally credited with, but it is not clear that he followed the same strategy 
throughout the campaign. It is possible that he intended first to deal with 
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Washington’s army and then occupy territory to foster loyalist support. It is equally 
possible that it was only when he had failed to destroy the rebel army that he switched 
strategies to one of reoccupation. His correspondence on the subject does not allow a 
definitive conclusion to be drawn. It seems apparent that he was initially looking for a 
decisive battle, but not one to be fought on the Americans’ terms. It took time to 
manoeuvre them out of their prepared defences around New York, but once that had 
been accomplished he showed himself willing to engage Washington’s army. By the 
end of the campaign (possibly feeling that the rebel army was a spent force), 
territorial acquisition had achieved primacy in his thinking, but this was not territorial 
acquisition for its own sake. Its purpose was the fostering of loyalist support, 
something that was accepted as critical if the British war effort was to be successful. 
Knowledge of the continued failure throughout the war to harness such support is not 
a valid basis on which to criticise Howe’s strategy at this early point in the war. 
Howe does deserve criticism, however, for his failure to grasp the fundamental 
principles of the Hudson strategy. This was at best a minor consideration in his 
operations for 1776 and may not have been on his agenda at all. This is remarkable 
considering it was the established British strategy for the war, one he had officially 
supported and one in which another British army was actively engaged. Due to the 
failure of the northern army under Carleton to make much headway in 1776, this 
glaring weakness in the overall British war effort was not apparent. In the following 
campaign, with the more vigorous Burgoyne at its head, the northern army would 
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V: Howe’s strategy for 1777 
Although it is tempting to consider the 1777 campaign as one with no coherent 
strategy, that would not be entirely fair to Howe. It is true that, as it unfolded, it was 
deserving of the harsh criticism that has been levelled at it. Willcox called Howe’s 
final plan ‘a strategic cul-de-sac,’209 while Clinton claimed that no other officer 
except Cornwallis agreed with Howe’s decision to mount a seaborne offensive against 
Philadelphia rather than cooperating with Burgoyne’s northern army.210 It remains the 
case, however, that Howe first submitted a coherent, bold and potentially devastating 
plan for the 1777 campaign. At the time he committed this plan to paper, at the end of 
November, he had witnessed rebel resistance crumble. The failure to mount the all-
out attack at White Plains may have still rankled, but the overwhelming success at 
Fort Washington, the subsequent capture of Fort Lee with its huge amount of 
supplies, and the headlong retreat of the remains of Washington’s army must have 
been satisfying. Although recognising that a further campaign would be needed, 
Howe had firm ideas on the form that campaign should take. As well as cooperating 
in the Hudson strategy (perhaps a curious inclusion, given his apparent failure to 
understand its purpose) Howe wanted to expand the war into New England and 
Pennsylvania, potentially overwhelming the Americans.211 
 
The controversy 
The 1777 campaign could actually have been considered a success, if the narrow 
goals set by Howe were the only criteria by which it was judged. Philadelphia was 
taken and, in his speech to the House, Howe claimed his plans had been ‘carried into 
execution with as little deviation, as, from the nature of military operations, could 	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have been expected’.212 The draft of the narrative shows that he had originally 
planned to say: ‘That I had succeeded in my plans, as far as the nature of military 
transactions might warrant’.213 Howe, wisely, seems to have realised that this would 
have been claiming too much, because the plans he had ‘succeeded’ in were, in many 
peoples’ eyes, largely responsible for the loss of an army at Saratoga. The plans were 
also very different from those outlined in his letter to Germain of 30 November.214 
Howe, denied the extensive reinforcement he had requested, had concentrated his 
entire offensive force on Philadelphia, travelling there by sea, and had completely 
absolved himself of any responsibility for cooperating with Burgoyne’s move down 
the Hudson. The only support for Burgoyne had come in the form of the well-
executed capture of rebel forts in the Hudson Highlands, undertaken by Clinton on his 
own initiative.215 The subsequent surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga led directly to 
French involvement in the war, arguably ending any chance Britain had of regaining 
control over her former colonies. 
Such a monumental failure inevitably meant there was plenty of blame to be 
shared out. Burgoyne, Howe and Germain were held culpable in fairly equal measure. 
The total lack of coordination between the two armies was the most damning piece of 
evidence and, depending on the political viewpoint of the accuser, could be used 
against any of the three principal characters. The political opponents of the North 
administration inevitably chose to blame Germain, for failing to support the generals 
in America and also for not ensuring a coherent strategy was followed.216 Germain 
and North, concerned over the weakness of the administration and wanting the whole 
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matter to be swept aside as quietly as possible, repeatedly claimed that they were 
blaming nobody, while the Howes and Burgoyne demanded the opportunity to 
explain their conduct in front of the House.217 
Howe’s original plan for 1777 did not survive long. Less than a month after he 
had outlined his plans to Germain, they had begun to unravel. As detailed in Chapter 
3, even before the Hessian garrison was surprised and captured at Trenton (25 
December 1776) and long before the receipt of Germain’s disappointing letter 
regarding the number of reinforcements to be expected (9 March 1777) Howe had 
modified his initial plan, subordinating the move up the Hudson to an earlier strike 
against Philadelphia. His reason, the belief that there was a significant number of 
loyalists in Pennsylvania, clearly showed that the fostering of loyalist support was 
now his primary goal.218 After Trenton, when he submitted his third plan (claiming 
that even more reinforcements were now needed), the extra 5,000 men he requested 
were also to be used against Philadelphia. The offensive corps on the Hudson would 
still operate under this revised plan (assuming Germain could find 20,000 
reinforcements), but even with this massive augmentation of his force, it would 
remain of secondary importance.219 
Howe’s lack of commitment to the Hudson strategy was demonstrated in the 
consideration of his planning for 1776. His willingness to downscale and then 
completely remove it from his 1777 strategy underlines the fact, but it still leaves the 
question of what strategy Howe was pursuing. His reaction to Germain’s inability to 
provide the large number of reinforcements he had requested requires careful 
analysis. It is clear that Howe felt personally affronted by the way Germain had tried 
to fudge the numbers, but it also seems likely that he had little faith in his plan 	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working if scaled down too drastically. It is easy to overlook the fact that his revised 
plan (submitted on 20 December 1776), was only intended to be a stopgap, a means of 
proceeding until the 15,000 reinforcements arrived. It was not intended to operate as a 
standalone plan, shorn of the support from corps at Rhode Island and New York. 
Germain appears to have grasped at this plan gratefully (possibly for the simple 
reason that it required no reinforcements), offering the praise that Howe’s reasoning 
behind it was ‘solid and decisive’220 and perhaps not fully comprehending that it was 
just a different way of approaching the campaign. Howe still wanted the extensive 
reinforcements originally asked for to put his full plan into motion. 
The principal reason for choosing to move on Philadelphia at the start of the 
campaign rather than the end (as originally envisaged) was that Pennsylvania seemed 
ready to return to obedience. The possession of Philadelphia, the seat of Congress and 
the largest city in America at the time, would, in Howe’s opinion, encourage this. 
Howe also made the curious assertion that the rebels’ main army would be based near 
Philadelphia, suggesting that he needed to go there if he was to attempt to bring them 
to battle, but Washington was not tied to Pennsylvania. His movements would depend 
on Howe’s.221 Howe himself made this clear when attempting to defend his decision 
during the inquiry, claiming that ‘wherever the main body of our army had gone, 
there most assuredly would General Washington have gone also’.222 By moving on 
Philadelphia, Howe also claimed to have drawn Washington away from the Hudson 
and, therefore, to have made the best diversion possible in aid of Burgoyne’s 
progress.223 Howe actually went further than this, claiming that using his main force 
on the Hudson would have been a waste of the campaign and would have certainly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 (TNA) PRO, CO 5/94, ff. 106-109, Germain to Howe, 3 Mar. 1777. 
221 Parliamentary Register, Vol. X, pp. 371-372, Howe to Germain, 20 Dec. 1776. 
222 Howe, Narrative, p. 18. 
223 Ibid., p. 21. 
	   264	  
taken so much time that no move on Philadelphia would have been possible that year, 
an argument that depended on everyone sharing his opinion of the importance of 
taking Philadelphia.224   
The defence of his decision to invade Pennsylvania by sea, rather than by 
crossing the Delaware River, was similarly weak. In his initial reply to Germain he 
commented only on the difficulties and delay that would result from marching his 
army through New Jersey to cross the Delaware.225 In his narrative he claimed to have 
had insufficient means to cross the Delaware, but this appears a desperate excuse 
when it is considered that Washington crossed the same river to escape Howe’s 
pursuing army at the end of 1776 and successfully crossed it again to capture 
Trenton.226 The idea that crossing the river would have delayed the campaign is 
perhaps best considered in light of the fact that, having written to Germain on that 
point on 2 April, it was 23 July before his army left New York to approach 
Philadelphia by sea, and it was 27 August before it disembarked at the Head of Elk. 
The city was not taken until 26 September.227 
Consideration of the situation Howe found himself in at the end of 1776 sheds 
light on his thinking. His relationship with von Heister was now irreparably fractured. 
The Hessian general’s dissent at White Plains led Howe to believe he could no longer 
work with him and he asked for his recall on 26 December 1776.228 The situation with 
Clinton was more complex (depending on when Howe heard of his outburst on the 
withdrawal from White Plains), but it is possible that Howe was also aware of the 
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breakdown of this relationship (although even had that been the case, Clinton would 
soon be on his way to Rhode Island).229 Despite these important considerations, Howe 
apparently remained committed to the war effort, outlining his multi-faceted plan for 
1777. He even felt able to predict that this plan would end the war in the following 
year, an uncharacteristic burst of optimism. Two factors might have served to counter 
the negative influences of his relationships with von Heister and Clinton. Firstly, 
Howe’s army had improved with the benefit of a little experience. The attack on Fort 
Washington had demonstrated clearly what his men (British and Hessian alike) could 
achieve when working together. Secondly, he still enjoyed the confidence of 
Germain. Before the year ended, and before the setback at Trenton, Howe received a 
bundle of letters, dated 18 October, in which he was lavishly praised for his 
performance on Long Island and rewarded with a knighthood.230 
When (in his eyes) that confidence was withdrawn, the effect on Howe was 
devastating. He gave himself almost a full month before replying to Germain’s letter, 
yet even then the bitterness and disappointment were clear as he systematically 
dismantled the entire 1777 plan. It is not possible to know what Howe would have 
done with the 7,800 reinforcements he had originally been promised by Germain.231 
Howe had suggested that the offensive into New England, from Rhode Island, would 
have been reinstated before any move up the Hudson, but even this might have put a 
very different spin on the 1777 campaign, by giving the Americans three offensives to 
cope with instead of just two. In the event, Germain quickly revised his assessment of 
the number of reinforcements to just 2,900 and Howe received notification of this on 
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8 May, along with another letter from Germain that conveyed his opinion that the loss 
of Trenton was ‘extremely mortifying’.232  
Howe was now faced with mounting a single offensive, but evidence suggests 
he had little confidence in it achieving much in isolation. Despite his later claims that 
his actions were partly motivated by the desire to distract Washington from 
Burgoyne’s progress, in a conversation with Clinton prior to setting sail from New 
York he stated his belief that it was unlikely the rebels would defend Philadelphia.233 
Two days later, he expressed some sympathy with the concept of moving up the 
Hudson, but argued that he had received consent to go to Philadelphia by sea, 
precluding his taking any other course of action.234 Clinton was to mount a concerted 
(but ultimately futile) campaign to persuade Howe to change his mind, arguing that 
Philadelphia was a better target with which to close the campaign (as in Howe’s 
original plan) than to open it.235 He also predicted what was fairly obvious: that the 
more territory Howe occupied, the more troops would be needed for garrison duty and 
the fewer would be available for offensive operations in the future. Clinton also 
developed a foreboding about the fate of Burgoyne’s army, doubting that it would 
ever reach Albany, and his disbelief over Howe’s chosen course of action led to him 
suspecting it was actually a ruse to disguise his actual intention of acting on the 
Hudson.236 
Howe’s apparent lack of concern for the progress of Burgoyne’s army is the 
most puzzling element of the campaign. He would later claim that he had no doubts 
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over Burgoyne’s ability to progress to Albany and this seems the only reasonable 
explanation.237 There is no reason to suspect that he felt in any way antagonistic 
towards Burgoyne, yet his sense of detachment was remarkable. In July, he 
commented to Clinton that he did not understand what Burgoyne’s orders were.238 On 
17 July he wrote to Burgoyne to inform him that Washington had detached a corps of 
2,500 men to Albany (in other words, to oppose Burgoyne’s progress), proceeding 
immediately to state that he was taking his main army to Pennsylvania. He expected 
Washington to follow him but, if he instead turned his army against Burgoyne, ‘…and 
you can keep him at bay, be assured I shall soon be after him to relieve you’.239 He 
then went on to point out that General Putnam was believed to be in the Hudson 
Highlands (between Albany and New York City) with another 4,000 men. 
Howe’s orders to Clinton on leaving him in command with a small garrison at 
New York were equivocal, but strongly biased in favour of defensive action. Clinton 
was at liberty to embark upon offensive operations, but only after ensuring there was 
no threat to the security of Manhattan, Long Island, Staten Island, Paulus Hook and 
Sandy Hook.240 He was to undertake all of this with a force of less than 7,000 men 
present and fit for duty, including 3,000 provincials.241 On 30 July, Howe made 
reference to sending reinforcements to Clinton as soon as possible and asking him to 
make any diversions he might think possible ‘in favour of General Burgoyne’s 
approaching Albany’.242 Aside from this, a fake letter, intended to fall into rebel 
hands and ‘revealing’ that Howe was actually intending to take Boston and cooperate 
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with Burgoyne, with the Pennsylvania offensive being a ruse, was the only assistance 
Howe offered to the northern army.243 
Clinton never received reinforcements from Howe, but on 24 September he did 
receive 1,700 British and Hessian troops from Britain. Deciding to make at least some 
effort to assist Burgoyne, Clinton put his plan to attack the rebel-held forts in the 
Hudson Highlands into operation.244 Just four days later, he was reached by a 
messenger from Burgoyne, a Captain Campbell, who revealed the increasing plight of 
the northern army, reduced to just 5,000 men, facing 12,000 rebels in front and more 
behind, running short of provisions and with communications with Canada cut off.245 
Clinton sent his reply to Burgoyne and wrote to Howe, before pressing on with his 
assault, taking the forts and opening the route to Albany.246 Clinton agonised over 
whether he should, or could, do more, until he heard from General Pigot at Rhode 
Island that he could spare 1,000 men. Clinton grasped this chance, organising a small 
corps of  around 2,000 men under General Vaughan, together with six months’ 
provisions for 5,000 men, and despatching them up the Hudson towards Albany. By 
15 October this corps had reached Kingston (roughly half way to Albany from the 
Hudson Highlands).247  
On 8 October, Howe wrote once more to Clinton, but far from offering him 
reinforcements, Howe was requesting them. Clinton was to send the 7th, 26th and 63rd 
Regiments, the two battalions of Anspach troops and the 17th Dragoons to Howe at 
Philadelphia.248 The next day Howe wrote again. Clinton was only to hold onto the 
requested reinforcements if he was involved in ‘a very material and essential 
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stroke’249 which would only take a few days. Otherwise he was to send them 
immediately. The timing could hardly have been worse, yet in between the writing of 
these two letters Howe had received the forwarded message from Campbell, as well 
as a sketched map from Clinton outlining Burgoyne’s position.250 Clinton reluctantly 
recalled Vaughan’s corps on 22 October.251 On 25 October, Howe wrote again. After 
warmly congratulating Clinton on his successful operation in the Hudson Highlands, 
he suggested that he destroy the forts and return to New York, reminding Clinton to 
send on the reinforcements.252 The next day, yet another letter from Howe ordered 
Clinton to return the 1,000 men that had been sent from Rhode Island.253 
Howe’s thinking at this stage is difficult to comprehend. Aware, from 
Campbell’s report, of the precarious situation of Burgoyne’s army, and knowing that 
Clinton was attempting to do something to assist, he ordered Clinton to end his 
operations on the Hudson, return to New York City, send him six regiments of 
reinforcements, numbering around 2,200 men, and cancel his request for the 1,000 
troops from Rhode Island.254 Gruber let Howe off rather lightly, portraying the 
situation as a simple ignoring of Burgoyne’s situation.255 Anderson believed the 
matter went further, claiming that in correspondence with Burgoyne, ‘Sir William 
wrote a little like a man with an unwelcome servant forced upon him, whom he was 
obliged to keep busy but for whose services he felt no enthusiasm’.256 Willcox was 
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more damning, believing that Howe had ‘destroyed what he had every reason to 
believe was Burgoyne’s best hope’.257 
The fact that Clinton’s actions, audacious as they were, had come too late 
(Burgoyne surrendered his army on 17 October), does not excuse Howe’s actions. At 
the time he wrote his letters to Clinton he had reason to believe that Burgoyne’s 
situation was still salvageable. On 22 October Howe had written to Germain, 
admitting that he was aware Burgoyne had been forced to retreat, but claiming to 
doubt rumours that he had actually surrendered. It is possible, however, that Howe 
gave those rumours more credence, in which case he would surely have been 
wondering how his own conduct of the campaign might now be considered. Possibly 
foreseeing what was to come, possibly merely feeling that his position was now 




It is easy to view the 1777 campaign as an entirely wasted one. More than that, it is 
possible to see very little in the way of a guiding principle behind it, a suspicion 
underlined by Howe’s own defence of his decisions. If the commander-in-chief could 
not explain exactly what he had been trying to do and the thinking behind it, it left 
him open to criticism that here had been no clear plan. This impression, however, is 
an erroneous one, created by Howe feeling the need to defend his decisions in the 
light of Burgoyne’s surrender. Each of his decisions now had to be portrayed as 
actually having been undertaken to assist Burgoyne. This led Howe down a torturous 
path, marked by contradictory assertions: he had to go to Philadelphia because that 	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was where Washington’s army would be, yet he also went to Philadelphia to draw that 
army away from Burgoyne’s; he criticised Germain for not ordering him to follow the 
Hudson strategy if that was what he had desired, yet derided Germain’s prompting on 
that very point;259 and he viewed it as self-evident that Burgoyne must have been 
given an army adequate to his needs, while constantly bemoaning the fact that he 
himself had not. He was forced to cite the meagre leeway he had given Clinton to act 
offensively as evidence of his concern for Burgoyne and finally resorted to a claim 
that any action by himself on the lower Hudson might have been viewed as an envy-
inspired attempt to grab a share of Burgoyne’s glory.260  
It has already been demonstrated that Howe was not the clearest communicator. 
With the added burden of trying, retrospectively, to justify decisions in light of an 
unforeseen event, his defence struggled badly. Yet there was no need for this. Howe 
could justifiably have claimed that almost nobody, least of all Burgoyne himself, had 
entertained any doubts that the northern army would be safe. The date of its arrival at 
Albany was the only question mark (only Clinton appears to have had any doubts 
over it getting there at all) and Burgoyne’s own letters show clearly that he had not 
believed assistance from Howe would be necessary to effect that. In fact, Burgoyne 
was so bullish he lamented the fact that his orders to progress to Albany prevented 
him from taking the offensive into New England, where he claimed he would be able 
to subdue the rebellion by the end of the year.261 Burgoyne appeared in confident 
mood when a letter to Howe (dated 6 August) passed through Clinton’s hands at New 
York (Burgoyne would later, tellingly, omit this particular letter from the published 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 Parliamentary Register, Vol. X, pp. 416-417, Germain to Howe, 18 May 1777 (received 
16 Aug.). 
260 Howe, Narrative, pp. 16-25. Howe’s defence for choosing to concentrate on Pennsylvania. 
261 J. Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition from Canada, as Laid Before the House of 
Commons (London, J. Almon, 1780), appendix xx-xxi, Burgoyne to Germain, 11 Jul. 1777. 
	   272	  
defence of his own conduct).262 He declared he would be at Albany by 23 August at 
the latest and Clinton noted that this letter did not carry any hint of an expectation of 
assistance.263 Contrary to Burgoyne’s expectations, of course, he encountered 
difficulties and by 20 August he was suddenly expressing a desire for, and 
expectation of, support from Howe.264 Howe actually weakened his defence on this 
point, removing a passage from his narrative in which he commented on a letter from 
Burgoyne of 5 July, following his successful capture of Ticonderoga. ‘Here, sir,’ 
Howe had originally planned to say, ‘was no symptom of the distress which 
afterwards befell that unfortunate general – no apprehension of future difficulties – no 
intimation that he either expected or wished assistance from me.’265 
Discounting Howe’s clumsy defence, his actions were defensible up to the point 
he heard of Burgoyne’s plight and yet continued to demand reinforcements from 
Clinton. That is not to say that the strategy he employed (the occupation of territory in 
an attempt to encourage the colony of Pennsylvania to abandon the revolution) was 
bold, visionary or likely to bring great success, but it was a strategy. The problem was 
that it had such painfully limited aims, the inevitable consequence of his force being 
weaker (following casualties, sickness and the loss of prisoners) than it had been the 
previous campaign. Had all gone according to plan, as Howe allowed himself to muse 
during his narrative, Britain would have been in command of three colonies at the end 
of 1777: New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania (Howe reckoned that a successful 
approach to Albany by Burgoyne would not only have completed the conquest of 
New York, but would also have caused New Jersey to fall into line when considered 	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alongside the occupation of Pennsylvania).266 A third campaign might then have 
carried the war into New England, or possibly subdued the southern colonies to 
isolate the hotbed of the rebellion (Howe apparently believed that New England, 
being the strongest area militarily, should be the last to be attacked, but he removed 
this assertion from his narrative).267 
Also, lost in the wreckage of the 1777 campaign, is the fact that Howe had 
proposed a rather striking course of action. It has been overlooked by historians, 
perhaps for the simple reason that it was never enacted and was just part of the last of 
a long list of proposed courses of action provided by Howe. This was Howe’s third 
proposition, the one requiring an additional 5,000 reinforcements in addition to the 
15,000 already asked for.268 Perhaps this unrealistic demand for reinforcements has 
also contributed to the plan being overlooked, but it was remarkable for one simple 
reason. It envisaged trapping Washington between two separate corps of Howe’s 
army acting in conjunction, the one moving on Philadelphia by land and the other by 
sea. Howe only touched on the full scope of this plan when replying angrily to 
Germain’s failure to provide the reinforcements requested, but such a large-scale 
pincer move was highlighted by van Creveld as rare before 1800, citing examples of 
where armies had marched divided for logistical reasons, but not ‘as part of a 
successful strategic manoeuvre directed against the enemy in the field’.269 We have no 
way of knowing how this plan might have unfolded, but it is evidence of rather more 
adventurous thinking than Howe is generally credited with. 
After 8-9 October (the time when Clinton’s message regarding Burgoyne 
reached Howe) Howe’s actions were less comprehensible. Even accepting that it was, 	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by then, too late for him to have made a difference (and his request for reinforcements 
did not reach Clinton in time to stop his move on the Hudson Highlands), his apparent 
lack of concern over the northern army simply cannot be rationally explained. As he 
requested permission to hand over his post to Clinton less than two weeks later, it is 
reasonable to suggest that Howe had already given up any hopes of winning the war. 
It is also possible that he did not appreciate the full scale of Burgoyne’s predicament, 
or believed he would, at worst, be able to retreat to safety.  
For Howe, this must have been a dizzying turn of events. From the end of 1776, 
when his armies seemed invincible while he basked in the approbation of his King 
and government and planned a devastating campaign to end the rebellion, his situation 
had been transformed by the embarrassment of Trenton, the apparent loss of support 
from Germain, the final breakdown of his relationship with Clinton and the 
unforeseen disaster at Saratoga. He may simply have been stunned by the succession 
of hammer blows and unwilling, or unable, to carry on. 
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Conclusion 
Your military exploits have been without plan, object or decision… 
What advantages does England derive from any achievements of yours? 
To her it is perfectly indifferent what place you are in, so long as the 
business of conquest is unperformed, and the charge of maintaining you 
remains the same.1 
 
Although written purely for propaganda purposes, Thomas Paine’s assessment of 
Howe’s generalship, as his army occupied Philadelphia at the end of the 1777 
campaign, was pithy and perceptive, and it was an opinion shared by many. The 
purpose of this thesis was to attempt to find the ‘plan, object or decision’ in Howe’s 
period in command of the British army, through the conception and implementation 
of two campaigns. The influencing factors of relationships with subordinates and 
politicians, the quality and composition of his army and the personal qualities Howe 
brought to the task have all been considered. The intention was not to resurrect a 
reputation or simply to contradict each element of the accepted version of Howe’s 
command. It was merely to come to a better understanding of Howe as a general. 
Arguments have been built upon a reinterpretation of well-known and 
previously used material, alongside new perspectives offered by the draft of Howe’s 
narrative. For a subject starved of primary source material, the discovery of more than 
80 pages of fresh evidence is obviously of vital importance and although it does not 
answer all of the questions swirling around Howe’s generalship, it offers new insight 
into many of them. Howe’s repugnance for punitive warfare, for instance, comes 
through more strongly in the draft than it does in the final version of his speech. 
Perhaps of equal importance, given the confusion over the strategy he chose for the 
1777 campaign, is the revelation that he not only felt no obligation to cooperate with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 T. Paine, The American Crisis, in Mauduit, Strictures, p. 17. 
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Burgoyne’s push into New York from Canada, he did not even understand what the 
Hudson strategy was intended to achieve. The draft also underlines Howe’s lack of 
facility with words, clearly displaying (sometimes through repeated revisions of a 
single sentence) that he had agonised over how to frame his argument. The fact that 
he sometimes chose to omit arguments that actually made sense (most obviously 
when he deleted a sentence explaining how Burgoyne’s early correspondence had 
made no mention of expecting assistance) strengthens the impression that Howe was 
not a gifted communicator. 2 
Although new conclusions can be proposed for some of Howe’s tactical 
decisions (most notably at White Plains) and even for some of his strategic thinking, 
other elements remain impenetrable. It is simply not possible to understand Howe’s 
thinking during key moments of the 1777 campaign, it is only possible to suggest 
plausible explanations. In some areas, the accepted view of Howe can be challenged 
and new theories can be proposed for some of his most contentious decisions. In other 
areas, little new light can be shed and in some cases it appears that history has 
actually been kind to the general. It appears, for instance, that he was even more 
cautious at heart than he is generally reckoned to have been.  
The lack of private letters makes it difficult to assess Howe’s personal 
relationships, but inferences can be drawn from his professional correspondence. 
Consideration of this, alongside the invaluable notes Henry Clinton took of meetings 
with Howe, reveal a mass of contradictions. In the three major relationships 
considered, Howe displayed markedly different characteristics. With Clinton, he was 
able to maintain patience and civility in the face of mounting evidence of his second-
in-command’s increasing contempt for him, yet with Germain he was unable to cope 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 WCL, Strachey Papers, Draft of Howe’s Narrative, f. 67. 
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with the first sign of a lack of confidence. In his dealings with von Heister, Howe 
appears to have taken an instant dislike to the Hessian general and does not seem to 
have made any effort to foster a more productive relationship. The von Heister and 
Clinton relationships suggest that Howe was a man to make quick judgements. There 
is evidence of an initial period of harmony between he and Clinton, suggesting that 
the two men instinctively liked each other when they first met, an assertion underlined 
by Clinton’s recounting of their amicable passage to America aboard the Cerberus. 
This appears to have sustained the relationship even as Clinton drifted away into 
actual hostility. For whatever reason (von Muenchhausen cited von Heister’s 
stiffness, which would not have sat well with Howe’s preference for informality), 
there was no good first impression on which to draw when it came to the Hessian 
commander.3 Repeated instances of niggling disagreements punctuated the few 
months they worked together and any hope of a rapprochement was dealt a fatal blow 
by events at White Plains. (Howe also showed himself able to bear a grudge in his 
dealings with Colonel Vaughan of the 46th Regiment. Loftus Cliffe noted how a 
personal quarrel between the two from years previously still soured the commander-
in-chief’s relationship with Vaughan).4 
With Germain, there again appears to have been an initial period of harmony, 
although there is no evidence of warmth between the two men. Howe’s inability to 
draw on that harmony when the relationship hit difficulties around the planning for 
the 1777 campaign was perhaps a symptom of the greater importance of Germain as 
far as Howe’s situation was concerned. While a sniping second-in-command could be 
patiently dealt with, or even conveniently sent away to command at a separate post, a 
political master (the man responsible for supplying the men and materials with which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Muenchhausen, At General Howe’s Side, p. 62. 
4 WCL, Loftus Cliffe Papers, 12 Nov. 1777, Loftus Cliffe to Bartholomew Cliffe. 
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to wage the war and the man with the final say over whether or not a general was to 
retain his command) could not be marginalised. Germain’s opinion may have been 
more important than Clinton’s, but Howe’s response to his perceived withdrawal of 
that confidence was still extreme, adding to the impression of a man prone to 
emotional reactions. Couple this with Clinton’s revelation that Howe admitted he 
could not control his temper in battle and a rather different picture emerges than of the 
lethargic, indolent man frequently portrayed by historians.5 
Alongside Howe’s temper, there appears to have been an unwillingness to adapt 
to situations as they unfolded. Four important moments in the 1776 campaign 
illustrate this. He was not willing to allow his orders to be exceeded at the Battle of 
Long Island, repeatedly ordering his men to desist in their unauthorised assault on the 
rebel lines. Clinton, having been willing to ignore orders from Howe on that occasion, 
had perhaps learned his lesson by the time the British landed at Kip’s Bay. Under 
orders only to secure the Inclenberg Heights after landing, he did that and nothing 
more, passing up an opportunity to advance across the island and trap a large portion 
of Washington’s army. During the withdrawal from White Plains, Clinton’s attempt to 
change the order of march earned a sharp response from Howe (prompting Clinton’s 
outburst, which Cornwallis overheard) and during the pursuit of Washington through 
New Jersey, Cornwallis felt unable to exceed his orders to halt at Brunswick, despite 
the fact that he appeared close to catching the American army. Howe’s inflexibility 
may have been his most damaging trait. Although entering the realm of speculation, it 
is possible to argue that it limited the scale of his successes on Long Island, at Kip’s 
Bay and in New Jersey. The fact that he displayed the same inflexibility, and even a 
flash of temper, over something as simple as a proposed order of march, suggests that 	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he was unable to discern when a firm hand was vital and when his subordinates might 
be allowed a little leeway. 
The idea that it was his uncertainty over the discipline of his army that led to 
this inflexibility is a persuasive one. His men appear to have been headstrong and this 
cost them on Breed’s Hill and at the Harlem Heights. It is possible that it also resulted 
in increased casualties at White Plains (from the sequence of events described by 
Clinton, it appears that the assault on Chatterton’s Hill was launched while Howe was 
fetching his second-in-command from the other wing of the army to lead the attack, 
which strongly suggests that the order to advance had not been given). This attack 
also proved costly and only Howe’s persistence in recalling his men at the Brooklyn 
lines prevents us from knowing whether that moment of rashness would also have 
resulted in an inflated casualty list. If Howe did believe that letting his men act on 
their own initiative was inviting disaster, he proved that where there was time to make 
a considered decision, and where the enemy was not advantageously posted, he was 
willing to attack. He was frustrated at White Plains by a combination of factors, but 
nothing prevented him from launching a devastating and well-coordinated attack on 
Fort Washington. Howe, it appears, was not philosophically opposed to major 
assaults, he was merely philosophically opposed to fighting on his enemy’s terms. 
Tactically, Howe was capable, if not inspired. Clinton’s persistent pressing for 
landing his army in the Americans’ rear was bolder and promised far more significant 
results, but Howe’s battles were not, as he put it, ‘repugnant to sound principles’.6 He 
looked to turn his enemy’s flank and render his position untenable on Breed’s Hill, 
along the Gowanus Heights and at White Plains. This was perfectly acceptable 
military practice. Only at Fort Washington, where there was no flank to turn and 	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manoeuvring the enemy out of their position was not a viable option, did he stray 
from this principle, opting instead to force an outnumbered foe to fight on multiple 
fronts against overwhelming force. It was this action that prompted Fortescue to 
declare: ‘Howe at his best was no contemptible commander’.7 
Strategically, Howe was also not so bereft of ideas as he appeared. Once it is 
accepted that he genuinely intended a full-scale assault at White Plains, his 
movements throughout the 1776 campaign become more coherent and consistent. His 
first goal was to manoeuvre Washington out of his prepared defences and only then 
would he consider the risk of an assault to be justified. Even prepared defences were 
no deterrent to an attack if, as at Fort Washington, the men holding those positions 
were too few in number. It seems clear that the initial focus of Howe’s overall 
strategy was to gain control of New York. Conventional theory would contend that 
this was to secure the base for the implementation of the Hudson strategy, yet Howe’s 
attitude to this could hardly have been clearer. He did not see it as the essential 
strategy for the campaign, did not appear to understand fully how it was supposed to 
be implemented (or what the benefits of its successful implementation would be) and 
even had doubts over his own position should the two armies form their junction 
along the river. Howe was willing to devote a portion of his forces to this strategy, but 
only as part of a multi-faceted campaign. It was never the main goal towards which he 
was working. In 1776 there was a clear opportunity to advance up the Hudson after 
Howe had forced Washington to retreat across New Jersey. He instead switched to a 
policy of territorial gain, hoping to encourage loyalist support. In 1777, the only way 
any move might have been made up the Hudson was if Germain had been able to 
secure the massive reinforcement necessary to implement Howe’s original plan for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Fortescue, War of Independence, p. 46. 
	   281	  
the campaign. Howe’s revised plans proved that the invasion of Pennsylvania had 
become his primary objective and even an offensive from Rhode Island against 
Boston had apparently superseded the Hudson strategy in terms of importance in 
Howe’s thinking. With the benefit of hindsight it now seems obvious that the situation 
was inviting disaster. One general was operating on a single strategic goal, while 
another had relegated that goal to tertiary status.  
The fact that Burgoyne had not expected or asked for support from Howe is 
often overlooked and a more circumspect approach from the commander of the 
northern army might well have saved that army to fight another day. Even considering 
this, the progress of Howe’s 1777 campaign is at times extremely difficult to 
comprehend. There is an inescapable feeling that he had no faith in the campaign 
achieving much of merit. The conquest of Pennsylvania and, hopefully, the fostering 
of substantial loyalist support, was initially envisaged only as a complementary 
element in a complex and aggressive campaign. Without the support of operations 
from Rhode Island and New York it could not hope to deliver the dramatic results that 
Germain was repeatedly hinting at: the complete overthrow of the revolution. Howe’s 
emotional nature again comes into play in considering his decision-making prior to 
the opening of the 1777 campaign. From a lofty position as the 1776 campaign wound 
down, Howe suffered two severe blows: the defeat at Trenton and the apparent loss of 
confidence of Germain. Already coping with a dysfunctional relationship with von 
Heister and possibly aware that Clinton was also by then actively hostile, this may 
have been more than Howe could cope with. It was certainly a shattering turn of 
events, but it is possible to see the characteristics of a tantrum in Howe’s reaction. It 
was emotional and deliberately destructive. Even after a period to reassess his 
position and perhaps regain his equilibrium, Howe persisted with the campaign 
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outlined in his first, angry response to Germain. He refused to change it despite 
Clinton’s best efforts and despite the fact that he appears to have belatedly seen the 
sense of picking up the pieces of the Hudson strategy. Finally, and remarkably, the 
best defence he could offer for persisting in his invasion of Pennsylvania was that it 
had been approved by Germain.  
All of Howe’s major operations in 1776 had been employed with the help of his 
brother’s fleet. His only move in 1777 was undertaken in the same way, even though 
this entailed a month-long sea voyage to bring his army as close to Philadelphia as it 
had been at the end of 1776. There were sound reasons for relying on the fleet to 
move the army in 1776, as it allowed Howe to leapfrog rebel positions and drive them 
out of Manhattan without the need for a battle. In 1777 there was no clear tactical or 
strategic need for his men to go to Pennsylvania by sea. Originally mooted by Howe 
as a complementary operation, to trap Washington between two corps, the move made 
little sense on its own. Clinton commented on the ability of the Howe brothers to 
work together, citing it as their greatest strength, and this was certainly the case in 
1776, but the seaborne invasion of Pennsylvania was not an effective partnership of 
army and navy. The only thing it unequivocally did was to remove the responsibility 
for the progress of the campaign from Howe and place it on his brother. While being 
ferried to Pennsylvania, Howe was free from the responsibilities of command and 
even the controversial decision to proceed via the Chesapeake rather than the 
Delaware was considered a purely naval matter, as shown by the line of questioning 
during the inquiry.8 This suggests that Howe had decided he wanted no more of the 
war even before the 1777 campaign began. This would certainly explain his lack of 
interest in other elements of the campaign (Clinton’s post at New York and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Parliamentary Register, Vol. XII, pp. 33-51. Evidence of Captain Andrew Snape 
Hammond. 
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Burgoyne’s push from the north). Howe did not officially ask to be allowed to resign 
until October, but it seems possible he had already realised that it was inevitable. 
Furthermore, such an interpretation would also explain why he could offer no 
acceptable reasons for his operations in 1777. There were no such reasons because he 
was not following a considered, reasoned and purposeful campaign. 
The timing of Howe’s resignation is intriguing. It is possible that he was aware 
of Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga; rumours were undoubtedly swirling.9 If he had 
received reliable intelligence, then this would have been yet another hammer blow. 
There is no reason to suspect that Howe felt any antipathy towards Burgoyne and it is 
far more reasonable to suggest that he had simply never considered that his army 
would be in any danger. Howe’s own experience of the rebels was of a disorganised 
rabble that repeatedly ran from battle and even the setback at Trenton had been a 
small-scale attack on a minor outpost. Following his conversations with Clinton, 
Howe would have been aware that at least some people believed he should have been 
cooperating with Burgoyne during the campaign and it would not have been difficult 
to imagine where a portion of the blame for Burgoyne’s surrender was going to fall.  
Two of the most damaging blows to Howe’s position were delivered against 
other commanding officers: Rall at Trenton and Burgoyne at Saratoga. In each case, 
Howe could reasonably have expected each officer to have been able to cope with the 
situation they found themselves in, yet in each case his part in the misfortune could 
clearly be traced by anyone who wanted to cast doubt on his fitness for overall 
command. This raises the issue of one more intangible element surrounding Howe’s 
command. Had Napoleon, as he reputedly liked to do with his generals, asked about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Parliamentary Register, Vol. X, pp. 436-438, Howe to Germain, 22 Oct. 1777. 
	   284	  
Howe’s luck, the reply would not have been favourable.10 Howe was perhaps not 
aggressive enough a commander to seize opportunity when it fleetingly presented 
itself, but it cannot be denied that fortune did not smile on him. If events had taken a 
different turn at key moments (a sudden urge to retreat for Burgoyne, a premonition 
of disaster for Rall, perhaps even good weather at White Plains) he may have emerged 
from the war with credit intact. 
Yet, even though Howe was not the bumbling incompetent his harshest critics 
described, he deserves at least some of the blame for the reputation that has formed 
around him. A highly detailed explanation of his conduct, delivered to the House of 
Commons and published later as a pamphlet, ought to at least make it clear what he 
had intended to do while in America. Howe managed to speak for what must have 
been more than an hour and say very little, but he was not staging a filibuster, he was 
genuinely trying to absolve himself of blame for the failure to end the rebellion. Even 
considering his lack of eloquence his performance was poor, and the discovery of a 
draft of his narrative is perhaps most remarkable because it shows that the final 
version he delivered had actually been polished and refined. Howe was either 
politically naive to believe his narrative could defend his reputation, or he was 
extremely astute and realised that nobody was going to mount a serious assault on 
him. The opposition would focus on undermining Germain and North, while Germain 
and North would be interested only in ending the affair as quickly as possible to 
prevent too much scrutiny of their own record. Had the razor-sharp minds that poured 
scorn on Germain had motivation instead to turn their rhetoric on Howe it is hard to 
see how he could have escaped complete disgrace, and had he been cross-examined at 
his own inquiry it is difficult to imagine him giving a creditable performance. Perhaps 	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then, in the opponents ranged against him on what was effectively his last battlefield, 
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